

Prevent Strategy



Prevent Strategy

Presented to Parliament by the
Secretary of State for the Home Department
by Command of Her Majesty

June 2011

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1. Foreword

Intelligence indicates that a terrorist attack in our country is 'highly likely'. Experience tells us that the threat comes not just from foreign nationals but also from terrorists born and bred in Britain. It is therefore vital that our counter-terrorism strategy contains a plan to prevent radicalisation and stop would-be terrorists from committing mass murder. Osama bin Laden may be dead, but the threat from Al Qa'ida inspired terrorism is not.

The *Prevent* programme we inherited from the last Government was flawed. It confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with Government policy to prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist ideology at the heart of the threat we face; and in trying to reach those at risk of radicalisation, funding sometimes even reached the very extremist organisations that *Prevent* should have been confronting.

That is why we have reviewed the *Prevent* programme, and these are the results.

First, we will respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat from those who promote it. In doing so, we must be clear: the ideology of extremism and terrorism is the problem; legitimate religious belief emphatically is not. But we will not work with extremist organisations that oppose our values of universal human rights, equality before the law, democracy and full participation in our society. If organisations do not accept these fundamental values, we will not work with them and we will not fund them.


Second, we will prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support. We will build on the successful multi-agency 'Channel' programme, which identifies and provides support for people at risk of radicalisation.

Third, we will work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation. Here, progress has been made in recent years, but it is patchy and must be better. So we will work with education and healthcare providers, faith groups, charities and the wider criminal justice system. We will also work to tackle the challenge of radicalisation on the internet.

There will be other changes too. For example, the monitoring and evaluation of *Prevent* projects has not been robust enough to justify the sums of public money spent on them. We will make sure that they are improved, and unless there is evidence that they are effective and of value for money, projects will lose their funding.

Finally, we will do more than any other Government before us to promote integration, but we will do so separately and differently from *Prevent*. As the Prime Minister declared in his Munich speech, the combined effect of this work and of the new *Prevent* strategy will be an unyielding fight against extremism. And as the Deputy Prime Minister said in his Luton speech, we will use smart engagement to take on extremist ideas alongside a ruthless determination to find and punish those who promote or take to violence.

I would like to pay tribute to Lord Carlile of Berriew, who has provided independent oversight for the review. He agrees that this is a sound strategy for preventing the threat of home-grown terrorism. I believe it is a strategy that will serve us well for many years to come.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Theresa May', with a large, sweeping flourish at the beginning.

Theresa May MP
Home Secretary and Minister for Women and Equalities

2. Preface

As the person appointed to provide independent oversight of this review, I welcome the opportunity to write a short preface. In addition to this preface, I have provided the Home Secretary with my more detailed comments.

I have been fully informed of the progress of the review and have participated in it extensively. My activities have included involvement in early scoping, meetings with Ministers and officials and visits to parts of the country where *Prevent* activities could be seen in operation and scrutinised. I have been consulted closely in connection with the text of this strategy document. I have no doubt about the enormous hard work, and intellectual integrity, which have gone into the preparation of this substantial policy.

Although *Prevent* has included some quite broad and occasionally unfocused community cohesion activities in the past, generally it has been productive. It is realistic to accept that some problems have arisen, notably from the feeling of some parts of the community that they have been victims of state 'snooping'. Also, there has been some controversy about the extent to which the public sector should engage with possible extremists, albeit with the purpose of achieving the greater public good. The new policy should enable Ministers and officials to avoid these pitfalls: they will have clarity as to what is properly part of *Prevent*, and of connected activities in Departments other than the Home Office.

This new strategy defines far more strongly than before the proper scope of *Prevent* as an integral part of counter-terrorism strategy. It reflects the clear impetus and policy imperatives arising from the Prime Minister's speech in Munich on 05 February 2011. His powerful and unambiguous message includes that *Prevent* is to be seen as focused on extremism; for it is clear that for many who have committed terrorist acts extremism is the foundation, the driver for terrorism.

The messages from *Prevent* in the future will be clearer, whether delivered at home or abroad. The potential for perceived discrimination will be reduced. Governance will be strengthened at every level, from the application of conventional Government measurement tools to the creation of a national non-executive scrutiny board.

This new strategy is designed to endure. Already it has to deal with a range of terrorism threats, including Al Qa'ida and right-wing extremism. None is singled out for special treatment outside the operational demands of current threat levels. New groups may emerge as others fade.

However, as the recent death of Usama bin Laden has shown, *Prevent* has to cope with a changing and sometimes dramatic agenda. At least in the short term, his death will make us more vigilant about a possible extremist backlash. It should also provide interested organisations, from the student arena to the worlds of business and politics, with an opportunity they should welcome to declare unequivocally that they oppose extremism and all its consequences. Nothing less will do if they wish to enjoy any confidence and cooperation from the British Government and public.

Within that difficult and challenging context, I am satisfied that this document will provide a sound basis for whatever circumstances we reasonably can predict.

It has my considered and strong support.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Alex Carlile', written in a cursive style.

Lord Carlile of Berriew QC
June 2011

3. Executive summary

- 3.1 The Government is committed to a *Prevent* strategy. But the strategy over the past few years has not been fully effective and it needs to change. This review evaluates work to date and sets out a strategy for the future.

Context

- 3.2 The UK faces a range of terrorist threats. The most serious is from Al Qa'ida, its affiliates and like-minded organisations.
- 3.3 All the terrorist groups who pose a threat to us seek to radicalise and recruit people to their cause. But the percentage of people who are prepared to support violent extremism in this country is very small. It is significantly greater amongst young people.
- 3.4 We now have more information about the factors which encourage people to support terrorism and then to engage in terrorism-related activity. It is important to understand these factors if we are to prevent radicalisation and minimise the risks it poses to our national security.
- 3.5 We judge that radicalisation is driven by an ideology which sanctions the use of violence; by propagandists for that ideology here and overseas; and by personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors which, for a range of reasons, make that ideology seem both attractive and compelling.
- 3.6 There is evidence to indicate that support for terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrated, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy. Work to deal with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values.
- 3.7 Terrorist groups can take up and exploit ideas which have been developed and sometimes popularised by extremist organisations which operate legally in this country. This has significant implications for the scope of our *Prevent* strategy. Evidence also suggests that some (but by no means all) of those who have been radicalised in the UK had previously participated in extremist organisations.

Guiding principles: a framework for *Prevent*

- 3.8 *Prevent* is part of our counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Its aim is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.
- 3.9 *Prevent* will address all forms of terrorism but continue to prioritise according to the threat they pose to our national security. At present, the majority of our resources and efforts will continue to be devoted to preventing people from joining or supporting Al Qa'ida, its affiliates or related groups.
- 3.10 We remain absolutely committed to protecting freedom of speech in this country. But preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist (and non-violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology. *Prevent* will also mean intervening to stop people moving from extremist groups or from extremism into terrorist-related activity.
- 3.11 Policy and programmes to deal with extremism and with extremist organisations more widely are not part of *Prevent* and will be coordinated from the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG).
- 3.12 *Prevent* must deal with all forms of terrorism and not just with Al Qa'ida. But the allocation of resources will be proportionate to the threats we face. At present the greatest threat to the UK as a whole is from Al Qa'ida and groups and individuals who share the violent Islamist ideology associated with it.
- 3.13 We envisage no changes to the legal framework for *Prevent*-related work.
- 3.14 *Prevent* depends on a successful integration strategy. But integration alone will not meet *Prevent* objectives. And *Prevent* must not assume control of or allocate funding to integration projects which have a value far wider than security and counter-terrorism; the Government will not securitise its integration strategy. This has been a mistake in the past.
- 3.15 There have been allegations that previous *Prevent* programmes have been used to spy on communities. We can find no evidence to support these claims. *Prevent* must not be used as a means for covert spying on people or communities. Trust in *Prevent* must be improved.
- 3.16 The Government's commitment to localism will support the *Prevent* strategy. Communities and local authorities have a key part in this strategy. But as a national security issue, *Prevent* needs to be developed in very close conjunction with central Departments.
- 3.17 *Prevent* will be funded from the Home Office and other Departments. Grants will be made available for local authority *Prevent* work. Evaluation of *Prevent* activity to date has been poor. Money has been wasted. We will tighten up arrangements for evaluation at all levels in future. Funding and other support will not be provided to extremist organisations. Neither Government Departments nor the police will rely on extremists to address the risk of radicalisation.
- 3.18 The review found no evidence to indicate widespread, systematic or deliberate funding of extremist groups, either by the Home Office or by local authorities or police forces. But there have been cases where groups whom we would now consider to support an extremist ideology have received funding. Stricter monitoring is required to ensure this does not happen in future.

- 3.19 The process of radicalisation in the UK often has overseas connections. To be effective, *Prevent* work must take place overseas as well as in the UK. But that work has not always been effective to date and funds have been wasted. In future, the work needs to be much better aligned with domestic priorities and more rigorously appraised.
- 3.20 We will assess in the coming year whether the balance between the three main areas of *Prevent* expenditure – local projects, policing and *Prevent* work overseas – is appropriate.

Objectives

- 3.21 Within this overall framework the new *Prevent* strategy will specifically:
- respond to the **ideological challenge** of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it;
 - **prevent people from being drawn into terrorism** and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and
 - work with **sectors and institutions** where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.
- 3.22 These areas of work are outlined in detail in the remainder of the document.

Objective One: the ideological challenge

- 3.23 All terrorist groups have an ideology. Promoting that ideology, frequently on the internet, facilitates radicalisation and recruitment.
- 3.24 Challenging ideology and disrupting the ability of terrorists to promote it is a fundamental part of *Prevent*.
- 3.25 Previous work in this area has made some progress but has not consistently reached the few people who are most susceptible to terrorist propaganda. It has failed to recognise the way in which terrorist ideology makes use of ideas espoused by extremist organisations and has not fully understood the implications this should have for the scope for our work. It has not effectively engaged with and used the influence and reach of communities and community groups. Previous *Prevent* work has sometimes given the impression that Muslim communities as a whole are more 'vulnerable' to radicalisation than other faith or ethnic groups.
- 3.26 Much more needs to be done in this critical area. But it must be proportionate and focused. It must not imply a need to change the attitudes of most people in this country towards terrorism. It must not seem to pass judgment on faith or to suggest only a particular kind of faith is appropriate or acceptable. It must be done in conjunction with communities here and overseas who are often better able than Government itself to disprove the claims made by terrorist groups and to challenge terrorist and associated extremist ideologies.
- 3.27 A future strategy in this area will include better communication of Government security and foreign policies to rebut claims made about them; more projects in education, communities and the criminal justice system to enable understanding of and challenge to terrorist ideology; and support for experts where ideology draws on and misrepresents theology and requires a detailed response.

3.28 It will be vital to challenge apologists for terrorism. Challenge may mean simply debate about extremist ideas which also form part of a terrorist narrative. But, where propagandists break the law in encouraging or approving terrorism, it must also mean arrest and law enforcement action. And where people seek to enter this country from overseas to engage in activity in support of extremist and terrorist groups, we will also use the Home Secretary's power to exclude them.

Objective Two: supporting vulnerable people

3.29 Radicalisation is usually a process not an event. During that process it is possible to intervene to prevent vulnerable people being drawn into terrorist-related activity. There are some analogies between this work and other forms of crime prevention.

3.30 Programmes of this kind, although central to an effective *Prevent* programme, are comparatively new and evidence of impact is correspondingly limited. Allegations have been made that the programmes have been disproportionate and intrusive and have restricted free speech. We recognise the risk that the criteria for entry to these programmes can be too broad. We have considered further allegations that the programmes have been used for spying.

3.31 We conclude that, properly handled, programmes of this kind are essential. They should pre-empt and not facilitate law enforcement activity. They will not be a means for covert activity. Safeguards will ensure their integrity and, in particular, appropriate protection of data.

3.32 This area of *Prevent* will build upon Channel, the existing multi-agency programme to identify and provide support to people at risk of radicalisation. Channel has had some success. The programmes will address the risks from all forms of terrorism. They must draw on the expertise of policing, local authorities and community organisations.

3.33 Organisations commissioned to provide support to vulnerable people are in a position of great influence. They must be credible and able to reach and talk to people at risk. But we will not fund, or work with, extremist groups for this (or any other) purpose.

3.34 As in other areas of *Prevent*, evaluation of these programmes has not been fully effective. It will be significantly enhanced and new procedures will be put in place to ensure value for money.

3.35 We will conduct research and collaborate with other countries to continuously improve our understanding of radicalisation. This is vital to ensure the effectiveness of these programmes.

Objective Three: working with key sectors

3.36 A wide range of sectors in this country are helping to prevent people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The way Government works with particular sectors will vary.

3.37 Priority areas include education, faith, health, criminal justice and charities. The internet is also included here as a sector in its own right although delivery of *Prevent* programmes through the internet is a theme running through this review and strategy.

3.38 Some progress has been made in and with all these sectors. Some sectors (like faith) have been at the forefront of work to tackle radicalisation in this country. But more can and must be done. Like other areas of *Prevent*, programmes must be proportionate to the risks we face; we look to engage with these sectors because they are capable of addressing and resolving some of the challenges we face.

3.39 There should be no 'ungoverned spaces' in which extremism is allowed to flourish without firm challenge and, where appropriate, by legal intervention.

Prevent delivery

3.40 This section explains how *Prevent* will be implemented in the future.

3.41 It describes the structures that are in place to ensure effective coordination, oversight and accountability and outlines how we will strengthen them. *Prevent* will be coordinated from and by the Office for Security and Counter-terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office and the Home Secretary will be the lead Minister.

3.42 We explain here the new arrangements and structures that we will put in place for the local delivery of *Prevent* and the partnerships which will be the basis for success. In future *Prevent* will be prioritised according to the risks we face and not (as has been the case) on the basis of demographics. This is a significant development. The 25 priority areas are listed here. We expect these areas to change over time.

3.43 The role of policing has been important in the development of *Prevent* to date. *Prevent* is not, however, a police programme and it must not become one: it depends on a wide range of organisations in and out of Government. Some changes to the police role in *Prevent* are essential to enhance confidence in the programme. But we judge that one of the effects of *Prevent* to date has been the improvement in understanding and cooperation between police and communities in this country on a range of issues, including security.

3.44 We anticipate that there will continue to be three main areas of *Prevent* funding: local authority work in association with communities; policing; and work overseas. The funding for the first two areas will be provided by the Home Office. The funding for the third will come through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The balance between funding in these areas will be constantly reviewed.

3.45 It has been a theme in this review that evaluation and performance monitoring have been weak and they must now be improved. Data collection has been inadequate. It has not always been possible to understand what funding has been used for, or what impact projects have had.

4. Introduction

- 4.1 On 09 November 2010, the Home Secretary announced a review of *Prevent*, the counter-terrorist programme which aims to stop people being drawn into terrorist-related activity. *Prevent* is one of the key elements of CONTEST, the Government's counter- terrorism strategy.
- 4.2 The Government regards *Prevent* as an important area of work but believes the previous *Prevent* strategy has not been fully effective. The Home Secretary directed the review to:
- ensure *Prevent* is proportionate and focused;
 - look at the purpose and scope of the *Prevent* strategy, its overlap and links with other areas of Government policy and its delivery at local level;
 - examine the role of institutions – such as prisons, higher and further education institutions, schools and mosques – in the delivery of *Prevent*;
 - consider the role of other *Prevent* delivery partners, including the police and other statutory bodies;
 - consider how activity in the UK can be better coordinated with work overseas; and
 - examine monitoring and evaluation structures to ensure effectiveness and value for money.
- 4.3 Lord Carlile of Berriew QC was appointed to provide expert, independent oversight of the review. It has been written in the OSCT in the Home Office.
- 4.4 A consultation process in connection with this review began on 10 November 2010 and ran for three months. A web-based questionnaire sought views on specific aspects of *Prevent*: over 400 responses were received. 11 consultation events were held around the country which attracted approximately 600 people. A series of focus groups were also held. Details can be found on the Home Office website. Whitehall Departments also consulted their principal partners.
- 4.5 This document is both a retrospective analysis and evaluation of *Prevent* work to date and a forward-looking strategy for *Prevent* in the future. The review:

- outlines our current understanding of terrorist threats to the UK and its interests, the scale of radicalisation and the factors driving it (chapter 5);
- provides the framework and objectives for a new strategy (chapters 6 and 7);
- sets out the programmes required to make the strategy a success (throughout); and
- considers issues regarding implementation (chapter 11).

Terminology

4.6 Many terms and expressions are used in discussion and debate about *Prevent*. The review and the consultation indicated that there are almost as many definitions of some of these terms as there are people using them. At Annex A we provide a glossary; we draw particular attention to the way in which this document uses the terms extremism, radicalisation and terrorism.

The devolved administrations

4.7 Counter-terrorism, and therefore *Prevent*, is a reserved matter and the responsibility of the UK Government and UK Ministers.

4.8 However, many of the sectors in which *Prevent* is most active have been devolved: the way *Prevent* has been delivered in Scotland and Wales has sometimes been different from the way in which it has been delivered in England. We look at these different approaches in more detail below (pages 142-145)

4.9 Unless otherwise stated, the majority of this document – and the judgements and conclusions contained within it – applies primarily to England. The main exception is the role of the police in *Prevent* in Wales, which is not devolved.

5. *Prevent*: The context

Summary

The UK faces a range of terrorist threats. The most serious is from Al Qa'ida, its affiliates and like-minded organisations.

All the terrorist groups who pose a threat to us seek to radicalise and recruit people to their cause. But the percentage of people who are prepared to support violent extremism in this country is very small. It is significantly greater amongst young people.

We now have more information about the factors which encourage people to support terrorism and then to engage in terrorist-related activity. It is important to understand these factors if we are to prevent radicalisation and minimise the risks it poses to our national security.

We judge that radicalisation is driven by an ideology which sanctions the use of violence; by propagandists for that ideology here and overseas; and by personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors which, for a range of reasons, make that ideology seem both attractive and compelling.

There is evidence to indicate that support for terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrated, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy. Work to deal with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values.

Terrorist groups can take up and exploit ideas which have been developed and sometimes popularised by extremist organisations which operate legally in this country. This has significant implications for the scope of our Prevent strategy. Evidence also suggests that some (but by no means all) of those who have been radicalised in the UK had previously participated in extremist organisations.

The threat

- 5.1 The current threat level to the UK from terrorism is SEVERE. This means that an attack is highly likely and could occur without warning at any time.

International terrorism

- 5.2 The most significant terrorist threat we face comes from Al Qa'ida, its affiliates and like-minded terrorist organisations inspired by violent Islamism. Of the 115 terrorist offenders currently in custody in England and Wales, 79 are associated with these groups. A number of other offenders

who have been convicted under non-terrorism legislation are also known to have engaged in Al Qa'ida-related terrorist activity before their arrest.

- 5.3 Since the first CONTEST strategy was published in 2006, the threat from violent Islamist terrorism has continued to diversify; more regional terrorist groups have a global agenda and aspire to attack targets here and in other countries. They include Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) – responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks – and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), who claimed responsibility for the Times Square car bomb attack in May 2010.
- 5.4 In recent years we have also seen attempted attacks by unaffiliated (lone) terrorists, often influenced by Al Qa'ida's rhetoric of global jihad, but who have been operating largely on their own. Groups related to Al Qa'ida have specifically encouraged actions of this kind which have significant implications for our *Prevent* strategy.

Northern Ireland-related terrorism

- 5.5 Historically, the principal threat from terrorist organisations in the UK came from Northern Ireland-related terrorist groups. Between 1969 and the signing of the Belfast Agreement in April 1998, over 3,500 people died in the UK in attacks by the Irish Republican and Loyalist terrorist groups. While the political process and the ongoing implementation of the 1998 Belfast ('Good Friday') Agreement saw an end to the Troubles and a dramatic decline in terrorist activity, there remains a serious and persistent threat from terrorist groups in Northern Ireland.
- 5.6 This threat has increased significantly over the past two years. The murder of PC Ronan Kerr in April was the sixth attack against national security targets in Northern Ireland this year and followed 40 attacks in 2010 (there were 22 attacks in 2009 and 15 in 2008).
- 5.7 The current threat comes principally from republican terrorist groups opposed to the political process, including the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), who were responsible for the murder of two soldiers in Antrim in 2009, the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), who were responsible for the murder of PC Stephen Carroll in 2009 and Óglaigh na hÉirann (ONH) which has claimed responsibility for a number of attacks since 2009. A smaller number of unaffiliated individuals have been engaged in or have supported attacks.¹
- 5.8 Republican terrorist groups have long recognised the political and propaganda value of mounting an attack in Great Britain and in September 2010, the Northern Ireland-related terrorist threat to Great Britain was raised from MODERATE to SUBSTANTIAL meaning that an attack is a strong possibility. The last attack by Northern Ireland-related groups in Great Britain was in 2001. The threat in Northern Ireland itself is SEVERE, which means an attack is highly likely.
- 5.9 Dealing with the threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism in Northern Ireland is the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. While *Prevent* does not deal directly with the threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism, the issues dealt with under this *Prevent* strategy and the principles it sets out are relevant to the attempts to counter the threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism. Most relevant policy areas are the responsibility of the devolved administration in Northern Ireland with whom we continue to cooperate very closely.

¹ Independent Monitoring Commission (2010), *Twenty-fifth report of the Independent Monitoring Commission*. London: The Stationery Office. Available from: www.nio.gov.uk/twenty_fifth_report_of_the_independent_monitoring_commission.pdf

Extreme right-wing terrorism

- 5.10 Extreme right-wing terrorism in the UK has been much less widespread, systematic or organised than terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida. There are 17 people serving prison sentences in this country for terrorism-related offences who are known to be associated with extreme right-wing groups, though none of these groups are themselves terrorist organisations. In 2010, an extreme right-wing ideologue was jailed for 11 years for assembling one of the largest arms caches found in recent years in England.² But extreme right-wing terrorist plots have predominantly been undertaken by people acting on their own or with one or two associates.³
- 5.11 People involved in extreme right-wing terrorism have not received the same training, guidance or support as many of those who have engaged with Al Qa'ida or Al Qa'ida-influenced organisations. Nor have they ever aspired or planned to conduct operations on the scale of those planned by their Al Qa'ida counterparts.

Other forms of terrorism

- 5.12 In the past thirty years many other types of terrorist groups have been active in this country, sometimes planning attacks and at other times raising funds and recruiting people to their cause.⁴ Some of the groups have been predominantly secular; others have had both political and religious motivations.
- 5.13 Between the early 1970s and late 1980s, groups conducted attacks here motivated in particular by the conflict in Israel-Palestine. Sikh separatist groups emerged in the Punjab in the late 1970s and early 1980s and have also been active here. They include Babbar Khalsa, the International Sikh Youth Federation, Dal Khalsa and Bhinderanwala Tiger Force. From its foundation in 1976, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) recruited people in this country and raised funds here for its operations in Sri Lanka.

Radicalisation, recruitment and Prevent

- 5.14 All terrorist groups need to radicalise and recruit people to their cause. How, where and to what extent they try to do so will vary. Some groups are avowedly elitist and do not seek to expand their membership beyond a small number of people. Others aspire to be mass movements and to transition from being terrorists to insurgents, with the aim of using armed conflict to overthrow recognised governments. The Abu Nidhal Organisation was an example of the first type of group. Al Qa'ida is an example of the second.
- 5.15 Al Qa'ida and many of the groups associated with it are ambitious. They aspire to radicalise and recruit people in large numbers, in this country and elsewhere, to be part of an international network with an international agenda. This agenda draws selectively on earlier militant Islamist ideologies which sought to remove existing governments in the Muslim majority world, using violence where necessary, and establish what their proponents considered to be genuine Islamic states and ultimately a single Islamic caliphate. Al Qa'ida and its allies believe that terrorism around the world against military and civilian targets is a legitimate means to this end.

² The person responsible was jailed in January 2010 under the Terrorism Act 2000. More than 50 explosive devices, 40 knives and over 30 firearms were discovered. More detail can be found at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8462205.stm>

³ Gable, G. and Jackson, P. (2011) Lone wolves: myth or reality? (Searchlight): DCLG

⁴ The 2009 CONTEST strategy provides a more detailed summary of the historical background to international terrorism. HM Government (2009), *The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism*. London: The Stationery Office. (Cm 7547) pp. 20-24.

5.16 Because Al Qa'ida and related groups pose the greatest current threat to people in this country and our interests overseas and because they seek recruitment and radicalisation on a significant scale, most of our *Prevent* work has been directed to controlling their activities. We judge that this will continue to be the case but we consider the balance of our *Prevent* work in more detail below (pages 61-70).

Scale

- 5.17 Polling in this country, notably the last Citizenship Survey in 2010, indicates that very small percentages among all faith groups support violence as a way of dealing with injustice or in the name of religion.⁵ This survey is largely in line with other polls in this country since 9/11 intended to assess the level of support for terrorism here and overseas. It is important to emphasise, therefore, that the aspirations of Al Qa'ida and like-minded groups in this country have not been realised. They attract very low levels of support. There is no evidence that this support base is growing.
- 5.18 In the Citizenship Survey, approval of violent extremism is higher amongst young people and for people from lower income and socio-economic groups.⁶ We return to the implications of these findings below.
- 5.19 Overseas, there has been extensive polling to understand the levels of support for Al Qa'ida in particular, for other terrorist groups associated with them, for the types of attack which they have conducted and for the political views which they espouse. There is some evidence that support for Al Qa'ida is decreasing. But the table below shows the picture is not uniform.⁷ In some countries, levels of support remain very high, for example, 49% in Nigeria, 34% in Jordan and 20% in Egypt.

⁵ Department for Communities and Local Government (2011), *Citizenship Survey: April–December 2010, England*. London: Communities and Local Government Publications. p.26. For violent extremism in general, respondents were asked 'How right or wrong do you think it is for people to use violent extremism in Britain to protest against things they think are very unfair or unjust?'. For violent extremism in the name of religion, they were asked 'Please tell me how right or wrong you think each of the following is: people in Britain using violent extremism in the name of religion, to protest or achieve a goal'. 1% of all respondents said violent extremism in general was 'always' or 'often right'. A further 5% thought it was 'sometimes right, sometimes wrong'. Less than 0.5% said the use of violent extremism in the name of religion was 'always' or 'often right'. A further 1% thought it was 'sometimes right, sometimes wrong'.

According to the survey (from April 2009-March 2010), 3% of Muslims thought it was 'always' or 'often right' to use violent extremism in Britain to protest against things they judged to be very unfair or unjust compared to 1% of Christians, 1% of Hindus and 1% of those with no religion. While 6% of Christians said violent extremism was 'always/often right' or 'sometimes right, sometimes wrong', a higher proportion of Hindus (14%) Muslims (12%) and those with no religion (9%) chose one of these responses.

⁶ The survey also divided respondents according to age, income and socio-economic group, among other factors. Between April 2009 and March 2010 (unpublished), 18% of all 16-19 year old respondents judged violent extremism was either 'always right', 'often right' or 'sometimes right, sometimes wrong' compared to 7% of 25-34 year-olds and 4% of 35-49 year-olds. While 3% of those in managerial/professional employment said violent extremism was 'always right', 'often right' or 'sometimes right, sometimes wrong', this rose to 6% in intermediate occupations, 7% among those in semi-routine/routine occupations and those who had never worked/ were long-term unemployed and 16% among full-time students. Furthermore, 11% of those earning under £5,000 per annum felt violent extremism was 'always right', 'often right' or 'sometimes right, sometimes wrong' compared to between 5 and 7% of those in higher income bands.

⁷ Pew Global Attitudes Project (December 2010), *Muslim Publics Divided on Hamas and Hezbollah*. Washington DC: Pew Research Centre. Available from: <http://pewglobal.org/files/2010/12/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Muslim-Report-FINAL-December-2-2010.pdf>. Based on Muslims only. Figures are % favourable. Pakistani views of Al Qa'ida not shown because one question was asked later in survey, which may affect comparability of results. See also Pew Global Attitudes Project (2008), *Unfavourable views of Jews and Muslims on the increase in Europe*. Washington DC: Pew Research Center, p.4. Available from: <http://pewglobal.org/files/2011/03/Pew-2008-Pew-Global-Attitudes-Report-3-September.pdf>. We have not seen polling about attitudes following recent events in the Middle East and North Africa.

Support for some of the political positions associated with Al Qa'ida, such as attitudes towards the West, is much higher.⁸

% favourable	Hezbollah	Hamas	Al Qa'ida
Jordan	55	60	34
Lebanon	52	49	3
Nigeria	45	49	49
Indonesia	43	39	23
Egypt	30	49	20
Pakistan	19	18	–
Turkey	5	9	4

Drivers

- 5.20 Since the last *Prevent* strategy, academic, intelligence and other Government work has illuminated the drivers of radicalisation, the characteristics of people who have been radicalised and who have joined terrorist groups, and the specific pathways to support for, and participation in, terrorist acts.
- 5.21 Much of the research is focused on terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida, but has also drawn on knowledge of other types of violence, including non-Al Qa'ida-related terrorist activity, gang violence and cults.⁹ We return below to consider drivers for other types of terrorism which pose a current threat to the UK.
- 5.22 Some recent academic work suggests that radicalisation occurs as people search for identity, meaning and community. It has been argued in particular that some second or third generation Muslims in Europe, facing apparent or real discrimination and socio-economic disadvantage, can find in terrorism a 'value system', a community and an apparently just cause.¹⁰ We note that organisations working on *Prevent* have also found evidence to support the theory that identity and community are essential factors in radicalisation.
- 5.23 Social movement and social network theory emphasise that radicalisation is a social process particularly prevalent in small groups. Radicalisation is about 'who you know'. Group bonding, peer pressure and indoctrination are necessary to encourage the view that violence is a legitimate response to perceived injustice. We have also seen evidence to support this theory from classified Government reporting.
- 5.24 The first CONTEST strategy judged that there was evidence to support these and other perspectives and argued that there were five broad issues driving radicalisation by Al Qa'ida and like-minded groups in this country: an ideology that purported to justify and oblige acts of terrorism; people who promoted that ideology, often taking advantage of places and institutions in this country; a vulnerability in some people created by a very wide range of experiences and

⁸ WorldPublicOpinion.org Program on International Policy Attitudes (2007), *Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda*. University of Maryland, p.7 and pp.21-22. Available from: www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf

⁹ See external research commissioned by OSCT including: Munton, T. et al (forthcoming), *Vulnerability and resilience to Al Qa'ida influenced violent extremism – Learning from the gang, cult, political activism and violent extremism literature*. London: Home Office, Disley, E. et al (forthcoming), *Individual disengagement from violent extremist groups - A Rapid Evidence Assessment*. London: Home Office Publications.

¹⁰ Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2010), *Violent Radicalisation in Europe: What We Know and What we Do Not Know*. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. 33 (9) pp. 797-814

social factors; a lack of resilience in some places and communities; and grievances, some real and some imagined, which were frequently exploited by apologists for violence and made a reason for engaging in it.

- 5.25 So far as Al Qa'ida-related terrorism is concerned, this review has found that our earlier analysis of the key drivers of radicalisation remains largely valid. So we believe that radicalisation – in this country – is being driven by: an ideology that sets Muslim against non-Muslim, highlights the alleged oppression of the global Muslim community and which both obliges and legitimises violence in its defence; a network of influential propagandists for terrorism, in this country and elsewhere, making extensive use of the internet in particular; and by specific personal vulnerabilities and local factors which make the ideology seem both attractive and compelling. The strategy which we develop in the second part of this document is based on this assessment.
- 5.26 The 2010 Citizenship Survey sheds further light on what we describe above as personal vulnerabilities and local factors. It has shown that support for all kinds of violent extremism is more prevalent not only among the young but among lower socio-economic and income groups. It has also shown that people who distrust Parliament, who believe that ethnic and faith groups should not mix, and who see a conflict between being British and their own cultural identity are all likely to be more supportive of violent extremism. Support for extremism is significantly associated with a perception of discrimination and the experience of racial or religious harassment. It is also associated with a negative view of policing.¹¹
- 5.27 In June 2009, qualitative research on issues relevant to *Prevent* was conducted in a small number of local areas.¹² This research broadly corroborates the Survey. Support for violence is associated with a lack of trust in democratic government and with an aspiration to defend Muslims when they appear to be under attack or unjustly treated. Issues which can contribute to a sense that Muslim communities are being unfairly treated include so-called 'stop and search' powers used by the police under counter-terrorism legislation; the UK's counter-terrorism strategy; a perception of biased and Islamophobic media coverage; and UK foreign policy, notably with regard to Muslim countries, the Israel-Palestine conflict and the war in Iraq.¹³
- 5.28 We regard the findings of the Citizenship Survey and this separate research as important and return to them later in this study. They are largely supported by other classified work which we cannot publish here. At this stage we note that they indicate the dependence of successful *Prevent* work on developing a sense of belonging to this country and on a perception of the importance and legitimacy of integration. They also underline the relevance to this strategy of measures the Government has already taken to address disproportionate and in some cases unnecessary counter-terrorism powers.¹⁴ We return to this point below.
- 5.29 Neither the survey nor the DCLG research referenced here provide a full picture of personal issues that can lead to radicalisation, specifically towards terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida. They have less to say about the influence of ideology, although respondents to the qualitative

¹¹ Citizenship Survey (April 2009-March 2010) (unpublished). Logistical regression analysis was conducted by DCLG to understand the key variables associated with the response that violent extremism was 'always wrong'. To ensure presentational consistency in this document, the results here are transposed to reflect factors associated with more support for violent extremism.

¹² Department for Communities and Local Government (unpublished).

¹³ See also, Research, Information and Communications Unit (2010), *Understanding perceptions of the terms 'Britishness' and 'Terrorism'*. London: Home Office pp. 44-45.

¹⁴ *Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers: Review Findings and Recommendations*, HM Government, January 2011. www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/review-of-ct-security-powers/

survey referred to confusion among young Muslims regarding issues of faith in a 'plural doctrinal environment'. The Citizenship Survey and the research also have little to say about the influence of peer groups – sometimes family members – and particular charismatic radicalisers in the radicalisation process. On the evidence we have seen, we regard this as important. We return to these issues below.

- 5.30 Recent open source research provides insight into the background of people convicted of Islamist terrorism-related offences over the past ten years.¹⁵ The data indicates that most offences have been committed by men under the age of 30. Most were British. Almost 25% had links to Pakistan – either as British nationals with Pakistani heritage or Pakistani nationals - and almost 15% to East Africa (notably Somalia). Almost 50% of the sample were resident in London at the time of their offence, notably in the north or north east of the city; 13% were resident in the West Midlands (12% in Birmingham), 9% in Yorkshire/Humber (9%) and 7% in the South East. Just over one third of the British citizens and just under one third of the total for whom information on education was available had attended university or a higher education institute. Fewer than half, however, were either in employment or full-time education. 35% were unemployed.
- 5.31 These statistics track very closely with classified analysis of people engaged in terrorism-related activity who have not yet been convicted. A significant additional point is that many people convicted for terrorism-related crimes have previously engaged in (although not necessarily been convicted for) non-terrorism-related criminal activity.¹⁶
- 5.32 There are important overseas aspects to the radicalisation process in this country. A large number of people who have engaged in terrorism in this country have come here from overseas, notably from countries in the Muslim-majority world which have been affected by conflict and instability: most of those convicted here between 1999 and 2009 were British nationals but fewer than half were born in this country.¹⁷ Similar percentages have been found among people who have engaged in terrorist-related activity and who have not been convicted.
- 5.33 Many people who have been radicalised here have been significantly influenced by propagandists for terrorism who are based overseas and in many cases they have spent time in a current or historic theatre of conflict in the Muslim-majority world. Some have been influenced by the time they have spent in religious institutions in their countries. Many have been recruited while they have been travelling or resident overseas. These connections all highlight the key fact that *Prevent* work in this country is often dependent on essential *Prevent* work overseas, conducted by the UK, other governments or by multilateral organisations. We return to this below (pages 52-54).

Terrorism and extremism

- 5.34 In assessing drivers of and pathways to radicalisation, the line between extremism and terrorism is often blurred. Terrorist groups of all kinds very often draw upon ideologies which have been developed, disseminated and popularised by extremist organisations that appear to be non-violent (such as groups which neither use violence nor specifically and openly endorse its use by others).

¹⁵ Simcox, R., Stuart H. and Ahmed, H. (2010), *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*. London: The Centre for Social Cohesion. pp.227-232 and 237-245.

¹⁶ See Bakker, E. (2006), *Jihadi terrorists in Europe: their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad: an exploratory study*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, p.48.

¹⁷ Simcox, R., Stuart H. and Ahmed, H. (2010), *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*. London: The Centre for Social Cohesion. p.232-235

- 5.35 Some politically extreme organisations routinely claim that: the West is perpetually at war with Islam; there can be no legitimate interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims in this country or elsewhere; and that Muslims living here cannot legitimately and or effectively participate in our democratic society. Islamist extremists can specifically attack the principles of participation and cohesion, rejection of which we judge to be associated with an increased willingness to use violence (see pages 24-25). Islamist extremists can purport to identify problems to which terrorist organisations then claim to have a solution.
- 5.36 Likewise, extreme right-wing groups, whose white supremacist ideology advocates the use of violence to address perceived social injustice, have provided both the inspiration and justification for people who have committed extreme right-wing terrorist acts.
- 5.37 Evidence also shows that some people who have engaged in terrorist-related activity here have previously participated in extremist organisations. According to the open source survey to which we refer above, about 15% of people convicted for terrorist-related offences here between 1999 and 2009 had been connected with the extremist group Al-Muhajiroun (which, with its various successor organisations, is now proscribed under terrorism legislation). We know that a handful of others have been connected to Hizb-ut-Tahrir.¹⁸
- 5.38 In some cases, people who have been radicalised to the point of approving of terrorism have passed through a prior extremist phase. But this is not always so. Some people are recruited into a terrorist organisation and radicalised at the same time.

Northern Ireland-related terrorism

- 5.39 A range of factors drive recruitment to and support for Northern Ireland-related terrorist groups. Ideologically, the key factor for republican groups throughout the history of the conflict in Northern Ireland has been the constitutional position and in particular the ongoing British presence in Ireland.
- 5.40 While the 'Good Friday' Agreement provided a political resolution to this issue by enshrining the principle of consent (that Northern Ireland will remain part of the UK until a majority vote otherwise), a small number of people have become disillusioned with the pace of progress and with the political parties engaged in the new political systems set up by the Agreement.
- 5.41 But in Ireland, as elsewhere, ideology is rarely the only factor in the process of radicalisation and recruitment. Recruitment is often personality-driven or dependent on family or local allegiances. The promise of status, excitement and in some cases financial reward are all relevant. Socio-economic factors also play a significant role: communities with significant terrorist activity generally score highest on a range of social deprivation indicators.

Extreme right-wing terrorism

- 5.42 Given the small number of relevant cases (and the absence here of extreme right-wing terrorist organisations and formal groups) our understanding of how people become involved in extreme right-wing terrorism is inevitably less developed than it is for terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida. But there are similarities.

¹⁸ It is important to note however that it will not always be clear to what extent a person who engages in terrorist-related activity here has been involved with extremist groups, so these statistics need to be treated with some caution.

- 5.43 Extreme right-wing terrorism, like Al Qa'ida-influenced terrorism, is driven by a supremacist ideology, which sanctions the use of extreme violence as a response to perceived social injustice and dysfunction. That ideology is a response to and reflects a perception that identity itself is under threat from social change. People can be drawn to right-wing terrorist ideology through the rhetoric and language of apparently non-violent right-wing extremist groups.
- 5.44 Peer pressure and the prospect of personal benefit are also important: one of the most common routes into extreme right-wing terrorism can be through contact with like-minded people. But extreme right-wing terrorism is not driven or justified by religion: this has a substantial impact on how we may intervene to prevent terrorism of this kind.
- 5.45 People drawn to extreme right-wing terrorism are usually male, poorly educated (although there are some cases of high-achieving individuals) and often unemployed. In some cases, previous involvement in criminal activity has been an issue. The internet plays a key role in reinforcing ideology and facilitating activity.
- 5.46 In recent years, Islamophobia has increasingly become part of extreme right-wing terrorist ideology. People have justified their actions as a response to Al Qa'ida-influenced terrorism, extremist organisations and to alleged threats from Muslim communities. But extreme right-wing groups and radical Islamist groups such as Al-Muhajiroun increasingly define themselves by their opposition to each other: that opposition facilitates radicalisation and recruitment.

6. Guiding principles: A framework for *Prevent*

Summary

Prevent is part of our counter-terrorist strategy, CONTEST. Its aim is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

Prevent will address all forms of terrorism but continue to prioritise according to the threat they pose to our national security. At present, the majority of our resources and efforts will be devoted to preventing people from joining or supporting Al Qa'ida, its affiliates and related groups.

We remain absolutely committed to protecting freedom of speech in this country. But preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist (and non-violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology. Prevent will also mean intervening to try to stop people moving from extremist groups or extremism into terrorist-related activity.

Policy and programmes to deal with extremism and with extremist organisations more widely are not part of Prevent and will be coordinated from DCLG.

Prevent must deal with all forms of terrorism and not just with Al Qa'ida. But the allocation of resources will be proportionate to the threats we face. At present the greatest threat to the UK as a whole is from Al Qa'ida and groups and individuals who share the violent Islamist ideology associated with it.

We envisage no change to the legal framework for Prevent-related work.

Prevent depends on a successful integration strategy. But integration alone will not meet Prevent objectives. And Prevent must not assume control of or allocate funding to integration projects which have a value far wider than security and counter-terrorism: the Government will not securitise its integration strategy. This has been a mistake in the past.

There have been allegations that previous Prevent programmes have been used to spy on communities. We can find no evidence to support these claims. Prevent must not be used as a means for covert spying on people or communities. Trust in Prevent must be improved.

The Government's commitment to localism will support the Prevent strategy. Communities and local authorities have a key part in this strategy. But as a national security issue, Prevent needs to be developed in very close conjunction with central Departments.

Prevent will be funded from the Home Office and other Departments. Grants will be made available for local authority Prevent work. Evaluation of Prevent activity to date has been poor. Money has been wasted. We will tighten up arrangements for evaluation at all levels in future. Funding and other forms of support will not be provided to extremist organisations. Neither Government Departments nor the police will rely on extremists to address the risk of radicalisation.

We will assess in the coming year whether the balance between the three main areas of Prevent expenditure – local projects, policing and Prevent work overseas – is appropriate.

The review found no evidence to indicate widespread, systematic or deliberate funding of extremist groups, either by the Home Office or by local authorities or police forces. But there have been some cases where groups whom we would now consider to support an extremist ideology have received funding. Stricter monitoring is required to ensure this does not happen in future.

The process of radicalisation here often has overseas connections. To be effective, Prevent work must take place overseas as well as in the UK. But that work has not always been effective to date and funds have been wasted. In future, the work needs to be much better aligned with domestic priorities and more rigorously appraised.

The aim and scope of Prevent

- 6.1 The aim of the *Prevent* strategy is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. *Prevent* is part of the Government's counter-terrorism strategy. It draws on counter-terrorism funding, in some cases legislation and on counter-terrorism resources.
- 6.2 Whereas *Prevent* is part of CONTEST, a counter-terrorism strategy, and deals with terrorism, the Government will address the challenge of extremism – and extremist organisations in particular – primarily through other means. They include: the Government's new approach to promoting integration, which DCLG is leading; other parts of the criminal justice system, notably legislation regarding religious and racial hatred; and debate and civic challenge.
- 6.3 Government policy regarding groups who may be associated with extremism (notably policy regarding Ministerial or official engagement) will also be coordinated by DCLG.
- 6.4 But the line between extremism and terrorism is not always precise. As we have said in the first part of this document, terrorist groups very often draw on extremist ideas developed by extremist organisations. Some people who become members of terrorist groups have previously been members of extremist organisations and have been radicalised by them. Others (though not all) pass through an extremist phase.
- 6.5 Preventing people becoming terrorists will require a challenge to extremist ideas where they are used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups. It will also require intervention to stop people beginning to move away from extremist but legal groups into proscribed illegal terrorist organisations.

- 6.6 The relationship between terrorism and extremism is therefore complicated and directly relevant to the aim and objectives of *Prevent*. It will not always be possible or desirable to draw clear lines between policies in each of these areas. But the lines can be clearer than they have been hitherto. That will also bring greater clarity to the *Prevent* strategy.
- 6.7 We note that previous *Prevent* documents used the phrase ‘violent extremism’. The review found that the term is ambiguous and has caused some confusion in the past, most notably by giving the impression that the scope of *Prevent* is very wide indeed and includes a range of activity far beyond counter-terrorism. We avoid using the phrase here, although we recognise that programmes comparable to *Prevent* are being run in other countries under the banner of preventing or countering violent extremism.

The review concludes that the main aim of Prevent must be to prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. That will also require challenge to extremist ideologies which can be made to justify terrorism and intervention with some extremists who are moving into terrorism. Prevent is part of the Government’s much larger toolkit designed to challenge extremism, extremist groups and terrorism.

- 6.8 In line with CONTEST, the previous *Prevent* strategy focused on the most significant risks to national security, namely the threat from terrorism associated with and influenced by Al Qa’ida. This threat continues to be the most significant facing the UK and its interests.
- 6.9 The original strategy allowed for the possibility that *Prevent* could be used to tackle other forms of terrorism. The review found evidence that local *Prevent* practitioners (notably the police) have done this, and in particular that some projects have addressed the threat posed by extreme right-wing groups. But the common perception is that *Prevent* has dealt solely with terrorism associated with Al Qa’ida.
- 6.10 A majority (over 80%) of respondents to the consultation which accompanied this review believed that *Prevent* should address a wider range of threats, including not only Al Qa’ida but also violence from extreme right-wing or other ethnic or religious organisations.
- 6.11 We believe that *Prevent* should be flexible enough to address the challenge posed by terrorism of any kind. *Prevent* programmes should be able to support people being drawn into all forms of terrorism. To take a single example, work in schools to discuss and consider what terrorism is should look at terrorism in the round and not just at Al Qa’ida. It is vital to understand how, historically, terrorism has drawn recruits from all parts of societies and from many faith groups.
- 6.12 However, it is also the case that the greatest terrorist threat we currently face comes from Al Qa’ida and groups associated with it. For as long as that remains the case resources must be prioritised accordingly and focused on this area.

The review concludes that Prevent should address all forms of terrorism, but continue to ensure resources and effort are allocated on the basis of threats to our national security. As it is the greatest threat to the UK as a whole, the priority will be to focus on terrorism associated with Al Qa’ida.

Legal issues

- 6.13 The Terrorism Act of 2006 established offences which in effect relate to *Prevent*. They include in particular the offence of encouraging terrorism or disseminating publications that seek to encourage terrorism.¹⁹ These offences of incitement to terrorism have become known as ‘glorification’ offences.²⁰ These provisions were intended to curtail radicalising activity in this country by prominent apologists for terrorism. But prosecuting people under some of this legislation has not been simple. Since the Act was passed, only 3 people have been convicted for these offences under sections 1 and 2 of the Act.²¹
- 6.14 The conviction rates do not necessarily reflect the wider deterrent impact of such legislation, though we have no authoritative evidence to indicate what that might be. More people who have been engaged in propaganda and radicalisation have been prosecuted under generic terrorist offences than under offences specific to what has become known as ‘glorification’.
- 6.15 We have heard during the consultation process that preceded this publication that legislation about glorification and other powers has had the inadvertent effect of making some people reluctant to engage in legitimate debate and discussion about terrorism. This is often important to *Prevent* – a subject to which we return. We believe this indicates a need to be much clearer about the purpose of the legislation.
- 6.16 Under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary has the power to proscribe groups currently ‘concerned in terrorism’.²² This power aims, *inter alia*, to curtail radicalising activity by terrorist organisations. Proscription makes it a criminal offence for a person to belong to, or invite support for, that organisation. It is also a criminal offence to arrange a meeting in support of a proscribed organisation or wear clothing or carry articles in public which arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation. Proscription sends a strong message that terrorist organisations are not tolerated in the UK and deters them from operating here.
- 6.17 In its January 2011 review of some aspects of the UK’s counter-terrorism and security powers the Government considered whether existing proscription legislation and powers should be extended and powers created to proscribe organisations promoting hatred. The review concluded that the powers should remain unchanged.²³

¹⁹ Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 makes it an offence to publish statements (in any form) that are ‘likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism’. Section 2 of the Act makes it an offence to disseminate terrorist publications that similarly seek to directly or indirectly encourage terrorism. In effect, these sections build on Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 which made it an offence to collect or make a record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism. It also makes it an offence to possess a document or record containing information of this kind.

²⁰ The term ‘glorification’ was the general descriptor used by the then Government before the bill was passed. In the Counter-Terrorism Act 2006, the term is only used in the context of one of the offences relating to the indirect encouragement of terrorism.

²¹ Home Office (2009/10) *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: arrests, outcomes and stops and searches*. Crown Copyright 2010. Home Office statistical bulletin, 28 October 2010. London: Home Office.

²² An organisation ‘is concerned in terrorism’ if it commits or participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism or is otherwise concerned in terrorism. The Terrorism Act 2006 extended the meaning of promoting or encouraging terrorism to include the unlawful glorification of acts of terrorism.

²³ HM Government (2011), *Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers: Review Findings and Recommendations*. London: The Stationery Office. (Cm 8004) Available from: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/review-of-ct-security-powers/

- 6.18 The holding of extremist views is protected by Article 10 of European Convention on Human Rights and cannot be addressed through criminal law. However, in addition to counter-terrorism legislation, a range of other laws and executive powers have been used to deal with aspects of extremism and radicalisation. Powers derived from public order-related legislation, for example, can address activity which contributes to stirring up racial or religious hatred or hatred on grounds of sexual orientation.²⁴
- 6.19 Legislation also impacts on *Prevent* in a different way. Research suggests that counter-terrorism legislation and wider policing powers can contribute to the radicalisation process. In the survey we quoted above, specific reference was made to 'stop-and-search'. In its review of counter-terrorism powers, the Government has already taken steps to address disproportionate and in some cases unnecessary counter-terrorism powers, including 'stop-and-search' in particular.²⁵

Preventing terrorism and promoting cohesion

- 6.20 The first part of this paper indicated that there is an association between support for terrorist violence and a rejection of a society where ethnic and faith groups mix easily and trust one another – a society which is cohesive and integrated. We judge that communities who do not (or, alternatively, cannot) participate in all civic society are more likely to be vulnerable to radicalisation by all kinds of terrorist groups.
- 6.21 A stronger sense of 'belonging' and citizenship makes communities more resilient to terrorist ideology and propagandists. We believe that *Prevent* depends on integration, democratic participation and a strong interfaith dialogue.
- 6.22 But it is important not to overstate the relationship between radicalisation and community or individual isolation. We have also seen classified evidence that indicates very clearly that apparently well-integrated people have committed terrorist attacks.
- 6.23 The last *Prevent* strategy recognised connections between *Prevent* and work on cohesion (as it was then generally known), although at the time the strategy was introduced data from the Citizenship Survey was not available. One of the 2007 *Prevent* strategy objectives was to increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism; another was to address grievances, whether real or perceived, which might be exploited in the radicalisation process. But the term resilience was never fully or comprehensively defined; the 2009 CONTEST strategy noted that grievances included perceptions of British foreign policy, racism, discrimination, inequalities, lack of social mobility, under-employment and the experience of criminality.²⁶ Both these objectives therefore implicitly and sometimes explicitly encouraged the use of *Prevent* funding and *Prevent* delivery structures for a very wide range of projects, some of them more to do with cohesion than with counter-terrorism.

²⁴ Part III of the Public Order Act 1986 makes it an offence, amongst other things, to say or do something or to possess or display written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting and which is intended to stir up racial hatred or make it likely that racial hatred will be stirred up. Part IIIA of the Public Order Act 1986 (as amended by the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008) makes it an offence to use threatening words or behaviour; or to display any written material which is threatening, if it is intended to encourage religious hatred or hatred on grounds of sexual orientation. Prosecutions for these offences require the consent of the Attorney General. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (as amended by the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001) creates racially or religiously aggravated offences in relation to specified assaults, criminal damage and specified public order offences.

²⁵ HM Government (2011), *Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers: Review Findings and Recommendations*. London: The Stationery Office. (Cm 8004) Available from: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/review-of-ct-security-powers/

²⁶ HM Government (2009), *The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism*. London: The Stationery Office. (Cm 7547), p.91.

- 6.24 Other factors appear to have contributed to the use of significant amounts of *Prevent* funding for wider community cohesion programmes. In England, funding provided for *Prevent* to local authorities under the Area Based Grant (ABG) (totalling £45.7 million over the spending review period from 2008 to 2011) was not ring-fenced, which gave authorities flexibility to decide how it should be spent. At the same time, some local authorities encountered opposition to *Prevent* work and therefore chose to use the funding for less contentious cohesion or community safety projects more likely to receive community support.²⁷ Finally, responsibility for *Prevent* was in many cases given to local authority staff already responsible for wider community-based interventions. This encouraged the convergence of *Prevent* and cohesion programmes.
- 6.25 In 2008, the Government published a review into early *Prevent* funding.²⁸ The review estimated that the 261 projects delivered in England in 2007/08 had reached an estimated 44,000 people.²⁹ The results provided a breakdown of the types of activity local authorities were supporting. The table below illustrates this in more detail.

Percentage	Activity type	Examples
54%	Debates, discussions and forums	'Safe space' debates to discuss current affairs or grievances
33%	General educational activities	Presentations to schools about Islamic beliefs and culture. Addressing under-achievement of Pakistani boys
27%	Leadership and management activities	Establishment of mosque management committees. Provision of professional media training to key contacts to help them manage media interest around terrorism issues.
26%	Non-accredited training	Active citizenship training for local Muslim women's forum. Training of imams in English language, ICT and British society by qualified tutors.
19%	Arts and cultural activities	Local theatre production which raised issues of extremism in communities
13%	Sports and recreation	Boxing clubs, football clubs

²⁷ For example, Waltham Forest's *Prevent* action plan was entitled 'Working Together; Living Together; Being Together' and positioned the work on *Prevent* within their wider community cohesion strategy. The authority, like many others, felt that this approach provided the best way to engage communities and secure their support.

²⁸ Department for Communities and Local Government (2008), *Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund Mapping of project activities 2007/2008*. London: Communities and Local Government Publications. Available from: www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/1092863.pdf

²⁹ See also The Taxpayers' Alliance (2009), *Council Spending Uncovered II No.5: The Prevent Strategy*. London: The Taxpayer's Alliance. Available from: www.taxpayersalliance.com/Prevent.pdf. This report provides a record of projects commissioned by local authorities in the Pathfinder year (2007-8) and the first year of ABG (2008-9) based on FOI requests submitted to local authorities.

6.26 Consolidated records of projects commissioned by local authorities indicate that just over 1000 further projects were delivered across England over the three years of funding under DCLG's ABG.³⁰ The findings of an internal review exercise based on a limited sample of around 220 projects delivered during 2009/10 and 2010/11 show that the emphasis on resilience and cohesion continued through the end of the ABG period. The projects were assessed in terms of how far they dealt directly with counter-terrorism. The following table shows approximate breakdowns of the different types of activity:

	Approximate percentage of projects	Description and examples
 <p>MOST CT</p> <p>LEAST CT</p>	20%	<p>Activity focused on terrorism and targeted at the most vulnerable people and sectors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • activity which challenges the terrorist ideology for example, speakers challenging terrorist narratives; • support for vulnerable people through identification, referral and intervention; and • projects addressing grievances for example, 'safe-space' debates on issues related to terrorism.
	25%	<p>Cohesion and integration activity with reference to extremism and/or terrorism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • projects aimed more specifically at extremism and/or terrorism, but with no attempt to focus on vulnerable people or institutions.
	40%	<p>General cohesion and integration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • broad interfaith, anti-racism and Islamic education projects, without reference to extremism or terrorism; • activity aimed at Muslim communities viewed as diversionary (for example, sports activity) but without any focus on the most vulnerable or with any reference to extremism or terrorism; and • general Muslim forums, Muslim women's groups, leadership and mentoring for young people.
	10%	<p>Governance, research, training</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • internal local authority training, additional posts, research and evaluation.
	5%	<p>Capacity building</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • general training of imams, faith capacity building.

6.27 We believe that some *Prevent* police funding has also been spent on initiatives primarily intended to build resilience and promote cohesion. For more information on the police's galvanising role in *Prevent* pages 136-138.

³⁰ Information on local authority projects derived from local *Prevent* progress monitoring collated via the Government Offices. Information was provided on the basis of local authority action plans which were not all updated regularly. Additional information was provided at the discretion of local authorities and some differences do exist between authorities. Some data in some areas was unavailable.

- 6.28 During the consultation for this review there was substantial support for the principle that *Prevent* funding should not be used for the much wider objectives of promoting integration and community cohesion. Respondents noted that this created the impression that the Government was supporting cohesion projects only for security reasons and in effect ‘securitising integration’. Respondents gave examples of where funding for cohesion and also faith-based projects could only be obtained by using counter-terrorism funds and, sometimes, by dealing with counter-terrorism officials and police officers.
- 6.29 In March 2010, the House of Commons Select Committee for Communities and Local Government report on *Prevent* stated that ‘much *Prevent* money has been wasted on unfocused or irrelevant projects, as a result either of misunderstanding of *Prevent* or of a lack of willingness and capacity of local organisations to deliver.’³¹ The report recommended more work on cohesion but also concluded that it should be decoupled from *Prevent*.
- 6.30 The relationship between *Prevent* and cohesion and integration needs to be very carefully managed. *Prevent* depends on a successful cohesion and integration strategy. But, as a general rule, the two strategies and programmes must not be merged together. Combining the strategies risks using counter-terrorism funds and delivery structures for activities which have a much wider purpose and whose success will be jeopardised by being given a security label. Moreover, channelling *Prevent* funding into cohesion projects has the further effect of making it less likely that *Prevent* will meet its own objectives. *Prevent* depends on a successful integration strategy but that strategy by itself will not deliver the *Prevent* objectives.
- 6.31 We recognise that in some circumstances there will be exceptions to these general rules. Some projects whose purpose goes much wider than counter-terrorism will also have such a direct benefit to *Prevent*-related work that they justify *Prevent* funding. But these projects will be the exception not the norm. We also accept that many staff working on *Prevent*, notably in policing and local authorities, will continue to have cohesion-related functions, something that is more rather than less likely as local authorities look for opportunities to make efficiency savings.

The review concludes that Prevent will depend on a successful integration programme. But, as a general rule, Prevent and cohesion programmes must remain distinct, though coordinated with one another. Counter-terrorism Prevent funding must not be used extensively for community interventions which have much wider social objectives.

The Government has already decided that responsibility for Prevent will lie with the Home Office (in the OSCT) and responsibility for integration with DCLG.

The review also concludes that significant funding was provided to local authorities without sufficient guidance, accountability or oversight. In future, Prevent programmes should be more tightly focused.

³¹ House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee (2010), *Preventing Violent Extremism, Sixth Report of Session 2009–10*. London: The Stationery Office. p.61. Available from: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/65.pdf

Prevent and Pursue

- 6.32 *Prevent* and *Pursue* are two of the four main programmes in CONTEST, the Government's counter-terrorism strategy. The aim of *Prevent* is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The aim of *Pursue* is to stop terrorist attacks in the UK and against our interests overseas. *Pursue* depends upon intelligence gathering by the police and the security agencies in this country and overseas.
- 6.33 There are touch points between these two programmes: *Prevent* depends on *Pursue* to facilitate the disruption and conviction of people engaged in radicalisation activities which are clearly illegal; *Pursue* depends on *Prevent* to restrict the number of people engaging in terrorism-related activity.
- 6.34 But one of the most damaging allegations made about *Prevent* in the last two years has been that it has strayed into the area of *Pursue* and become a means for spying on Muslim communities. This allegation was raised in the media and in a research paper in late 2009.³²
- 6.35 The allegation was based on claims that: some *Prevent* projects received funding on the proviso that they collected information which was then passed to the police; statutory authorities were being encouraged to identify to the police for *Prevent*-related support, people who were being radicalised but who were holding views which were not illegal; the information the police were seeking was highly intrusive and included data on mental health, sexuality, and associates; and that *Prevent* was encouraging the police and local authorities to seek information about Muslim communities to an extent that would not apply to other faith communities. There was general concern that for a programme intended to deal with people who were not yet engaging in illegal activities, the police played a disproportionate role.
- 6.36 The Home Office conducted a review into the more detailed allegations and concluded that there was little or no evidence to support them (a copy of the public response can be found on the Home Office website). *Prevent* project funding was not conditional on the disclosure of sensitive personal information. Arrangements for sharing data about vulnerable people (Information Sharing Agreements) were in accordance with the Data Protection Act and standard arrangements between public sector agencies. There was no evidence that data was being collected as a matter of course on a wide range of personal issues.
- 6.37 The allegations were also considered by the Communities and Local Government Select Committee report on *Prevent* in 2010. The report stated that different use of terms such as intelligence gathering, spying and surveillance were posing challenges to *Prevent*. Information collection for the purposes of project monitoring and community mapping was sometimes being confused with covert operational activity.³³ The report accepted that the allegations about data sharing were based on a misunderstanding about the process for supporting vulnerable people.
- 6.38 But the consultation process to this review indicates that there remain wider concerns about the relationship between *Prevent* and *Pursue*. We aim to address some of these concerns (which go wider than policing) in the course of this report. We look at the role of *Prevent* Engagement Officers and Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officers below (pages 136-139).

³² Kundnani, A. (2009), *Spooked! How not to prevent violent extremism*. London: Institute of Race Relations. Available from: www.irr.org.uk/pdf2/spooked.pdf and Dodd, V. (2009), Government anti-terrorism strategy 'spies' on innocent. *The Guardian*, 16 October. Available from: www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/oct/16/anti-terrorism-strategy-spies-innocents

³³ House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee (2010), *Preventing Violent Extremism, Sixth Report of Session 2009-10*. London: The Stationery Office., p5. Available from: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/65.pdf>

- 6.39 But here we emphasise that it must be a guiding principle of *Prevent* that the programme is not used as a means for covert spying on people or communities. We do not believe that has been the case. It must not be.
- 6.40 Data collected about people for the purposes of *Prevent* must be necessary and proportionate. There should be transparency about the way it is collected and the purpose for which it is intended. The data must be protected in accordance with standard procedures among public bodies (as set out in Information Sharing Agreements between local partners) and those procedures must be transparent.
- 6.41 There may be occasions where, in the course of *Prevent*-related work (as in the course of any other work), local authorities, statutory partners or the police identify someone who may already be engaged in illegal terrorism-related activity. People suspected of being involved in such activity should be referred to the police for an investigation to be considered. That investigation cannot take place or be conducted under the auspices of *Prevent*.
- 6.42 We understand concerns among some police officers that nothing should be said in the context of *Prevent* which inadvertently undermines community engagement and the work they do to encourage people to report suspicious activity and criminal behaviour. But we can see no contradiction between this objective – which we clearly endorse – and the principles we have set out here. Rather the opposite: covert use of *Prevent* damages community trust and will inhibit the reporting of suspicious activity.
- 6.43 While *Prevent* must not be used as a means of systematically gathering intelligence on people or communities, it is essential that accurate and relevant information about the terrorist threat is shared by the police with local *Prevent* partners. Over the past two years Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles (CTLPs) have been developed for this purpose.³⁴ Although the quality of early reports was variable, we believe that they are consistently improving and that they are they are vital to a successful *Prevent* strategy.

The changing context for *Prevent* delivery

- 6.44 Over the past few years, *Prevent* has been delivered through a combination of central Departments, local government, policing and local, regional and national community organisations. In general terms, the Government has set *Prevent* objectives as part of its overall counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Organisations have developed programmes to try to meet these objectives. As we have argued above, the implementation of the strategy has been variable.
- 6.45 We continue to believe that, as a key national security issue, *Prevent* has to be developed centrally, in this case by the Home Office, on the basis of extensive consultation, research and understanding. The Home Office should also continue to monitor the delivery of *Prevent*, recognising the requirement for much closer evaluation. We consider this in more detail below (pages 141-142).
- 6.46 Home Office Ministers have already made the decision to fund *Prevent* coordinators in up to 25 local authorities. Their role will be to ensure delivery of *Prevent* objectives by bringing together organisations engaged in *Prevent* work, ensuring that appropriate programmes are in place and,

³⁴ CTLPs are police-owned and produced classified reports that outline the threat from terrorist activity within a specific area, police force, or local authority area. CTLPs are distributed to a small group of people and have facilitated a dialogue between police and partners, enabling them to understand how the terrorist threat relates to their local communities.

where necessary, facilitating effective interaction with a wide range of communities and community organisations with an interest in *Prevent*. They will continue to work closely with local *Prevent* policing leads.

- 6.47 The Government has already taken and implemented a decision to abolish Government Offices in the regions. Government Office regional *Prevent* coordinator posts have also ended. Local authority leads will work in partnership with the *Prevent* teams in central Departments, notably the Home Office.
- 6.48 As part of wider public service and local government reforms designed to create the Big Society, the Government is committed to a fundamental shift of power away from central Government to communities, families and individuals across the nation. Localised decision making will become a normal part of everyday life, giving people more say, more choice and greater opportunities for ownership of their local facilities and services.³⁵
- 6.49 During the consultation process, respondents clearly saw the benefits that localism could bring to *Prevent*. It was seen first and foremost as an opportunity to use the knowledge, access and influence of people and communities to challenge extremist and terrorist ideology. Respondents also noted that communities very often had the best understanding of how and with whom *Prevent* could best be delivered.³⁶
- 6.50 A number of specific reforms have been enacted or are due to be enacted in the near future which will alter the way *Prevent* operates locally, especially in England. The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill, currently before Parliament, provides for the introduction of directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in every police force in England and Wales from May 2012.³⁷
- 6.51 PCCs will represent their communities, understand their crime and anti-social behaviour priorities and hold the Chief Constable to account for achieving them. They will have a broad remit to ensure community safety, with their own budgets to prevent crime and tackle drugs. They will work with local authorities, community safety partnerships and local criminal justice boards, helping to bring a strategic coherence to the actions of these organisations at force level.
- 6.52 Under these reforms, a Chief Constable will remain operationally independent and retain the direction and control of their police force, including for counter-terrorist policing. The Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) will set a Police and Crime Plan for their force area which will set out publicly the strategic objectives and budget with which the Chief Constable shall be responsible and held account for delivering. The Bill provides for both the PCC and the Chief Constable to be bound by a strong duty to have regard to the Strategic Policing Requirement which will set out the requirement for policing capabilities to tackle threats that go beyond police force boundaries. This will include CONTEST, of which *Prevent* is a key strand. We expect PCCs to be engaged in *Prevent* and to agree to an appropriate local strategy for *Prevent* policing in their area.

³⁵ For more background on the Government's localism agenda, see HM Government (2010), *Decentralisation and the Localism Bill: an Essential Guide*. London: Department for Communities and Local Government. Available from: www.communities.gov.uk/documents/localgovernment/pdf/1793908.pdf. This makes the case for a radical shift of power from the centralised state to local communities, and describes the six essential actions required to deliver decentralisation down through every level of government to citizens. The guide focuses on the Localism Bill, which provides the legislative foundation for change and exemplifies all of the six actions described.

³⁶ Many respondents also agreed that all *Prevent* partners, local and national, needed to more systematically and freely share examples of good practice and communicate more effectively the lessons learned from the previous four years of *Prevent* activity.

³⁷ The Mayor of London will take on the role of Police and Crime Commissioner for the City of London.

Funding

- 6.53 There are three important issues regarding the funding of *Prevent*: the degree to which it is subject to central control and ring-fencing; the type of organisations who may receive it; and the relative balance between the three areas which currently receive the bulk of the funding (local authorities, policing and the FCO for *Prevent* work overseas).
- 6.54 Since 2007, *Prevent* in England has been funded mainly by the Home Office, DCLG and FCO. These Departments have in turn allocated resources to a wide range of organisations, agencies, other Government Departments and local government. Some Departments (such as the Departments for Education (DfE), Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and Health) have supplemented this with funding from their own budgets.
- 6.55 In the past, funding for local authority *Prevent* projects was allocated on the basis of Muslim population size, with those areas with the largest Muslim populations receiving the most funding. The limitations of this approach are clear, but at the time, it was considered the best available. With the benefit of greater information and understanding, funding to local authorities in the future will be prioritised on our assessment of the risk of radicalisation in specific areas. We set out a model for this later in this document.
- 6.56 As we have seen, the Government's localism agenda aims to shift power from central Government to the local level. In terms of funding to local authorities, this generally involves abolishing ring-fenced grants to allow local authorities to set their own agendas and priorities.
- 6.57 Unlike most other areas of local authority business, *Prevent* is intended to address risks to our national security. It is one part of our national counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. We have already seen, however, that implementation of it to date has been very variable in quality and (to the extent we can determine) in effect. For these reasons, we intend to provide precisely targeted and dedicated funding for *Prevent* for the foreseeable future with the aim of ensuring consistency in delivery against the objectives we have set. But we also expect proposals for funding to be developed locally – by local authority leads in conjunction with other *Prevent* partners – and we have no intention of micro-managing local projects.
- 6.58 Funding decisions also need a careful assessment of the organisations to which the funding is being given. The review examined claims that *Prevent* funding had been deliberately given to groups and organisations advocating extremist ideologies on the grounds that they were better able to deal with challenges posed by radicalisation.³⁸
- 6.59 The review noted that under the previous strategy a small number of Muslim organisations had been funded from the Home Office to deliver programmes to support people at risk of radicalisation (outlined below, chapter 9) on the basis that, unlike other organisations, they were able to relate to and therefore work with the people concerned.
- 6.60 We are concerned that insufficient attention has been paid to whether these organisations comprehensively subscribe to what we would consider to be mainstream British values: democracy, rule of law, equality of opportunity, freedom of speech and the rights of all men and women to live free from persecution of any kind. We are also concerned that some funding provided to them for the purposes of *Prevent*-related work has been used to help people with

³⁸ By extremism here we mean the active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. See Glossary, pages 107-108 below.

vulnerabilities which are not connected to radicalisation. Funding for these organisations has already been amended and is still under review. Any future funding will also be contingent upon much tighter monitoring and evaluation.

- 6.61 The review found evidence that some *Prevent* funding from central Government and local authorities had reached a small number of organisations who had expressed (or employed people who had expressed) extremist views.
- 6.62 Within the context of Home Office *Prevent* funds, all recipients have been subject to regular scrutiny, including by the police. Grant conditions for intervention providers have required security vetting. However, it is clear that monitoring of these organisations, especially those dealing with vulnerable people, has been insufficient. We return to this below.
- 6.63 Records and audit trails for *Prevent* funding have not always been comprehensive. It is therefore possible that *Prevent* funding has reached extremist groups of which we are not yet aware. We will continue to investigate this issue.
- 6.64 In future, neither *Prevent* funding nor support will be given to organisations that hold extremist views or support terrorist-related activity of any kind, in this country or overseas. This applies irrespective of the source of the funding: central Government, local government or policing.
- 6.65 The review concludes that new obligations on local authorities and other public bodies to publish details of expenditure will introduce greater levels of transparency, enabling people to challenge funding that they believe is not in the wider interest of their community. We believe that the work that DCLG is doing to oversee Government engagement with organisations that may be extremist will also be an important additional safeguard (see above, pages 27-28).
- 6.66 We note that in some areas security vetting will be unable to identify people or groups who espouse views that conflict with the basic principles of *Prevent* and care needs to be taken for this reason.
- 6.67 We would emphasise that criteria for funding are different from criteria for engagement (such as contact and dialogue). There may be cases where the Government judge that there is a need to engage with groups or individuals whom it would never choose to fund. That may particularly be the case overseas, where we may need to engage with groups or individuals that are seen as moderate in their own country but not in the UK.
- 6.68 In recent years there have been three large areas of *Prevent* funding: local authority work; policing; and *Prevent* work overseas. During this year – as in the last two years – funding for *Prevent* police work will be the single largest area of expenditure.
- 6.69 During the consultation exercise for this review, we have repeatedly been advised of police concerns that they are holding too great a part of the *Prevent* agenda. There are a number of reasons for this but one is simply the fact that they have received more funding than anyone else and have used that funding to dedicate more resources to this agenda. The number of people employed by the police to deal with *Prevent* exceeds the numbers who have been employed by local authorities.

6.70 We are not convinced that this is the right use of the resources we have available. The effect has been to create the impression that *Prevent* is a police programme, which it is not. As we have seen in this section, that impression can in turn create suspicion of *Prevent* and a reluctance to engage with it. As we begin delivery of the new strategy, we will therefore examine the division of funding more closely and specifically consider if the funding for local authorities and community groups needs to increase at the expense of funding for *Prevent* policing. We are sympathetic to this case but also alive to the central role that policing will always need to play in *Prevent* delivery. We consider the issue of funding for *Prevent* work overseas further below.

Evaluation

6.71 Evaluating preventative programmes is inherently challenging. Success is often reflected in changing attitudes as much as behaviours, attitudes which are complex to measure and assess. The review concludes that, while many efforts have been made to evaluate *Prevent*, their success has been patchy. Progress has been made in measuring outputs but not always in measuring outcomes. Adequate monitoring and evaluation processes have not always been in place and some are still in development. The requirement to deliver *Prevent* quickly, combined with generous funding allocations, led to limited quality control. These problems were apparent at all levels of the programme.

6.72 In England, local authorities were expected to evaluate their *Prevent* work routinely. Some areas also commissioned independent evaluation of their *Prevent* programmes. Monitoring of local activity also took place through the local government performance framework and through quarterly trackers completed by Government Offices. But, as we have seen, *Prevent* work was often joined with work on wider cohesion issues and *Prevent* funding did not address specific *Prevent* objectives. Where programmes did address *Prevent* objectives, success criteria were not in place. The absence of any national-level evaluation of local authority projects delivered over the last three years of DCLG funding remains a significant gap.

6.73 Police activity has been monitored at a local, regional and national level through self-assessment against the activities contained within the Association of Chief Police Officer's (ACPO) *Prevent* Development Plan.³⁹ While this has provided some measure of progress, it has not always assessed impact or outcomes. ACPO's review of *Prevent* policing in 2010 agreed that a clearer set of performance measures and outcomes were necessary and that improved performance data would enable resources to be focused more clearly on priority areas.

6.74 Nationally, Departments worked hard to understand what impact *Prevent* programmes might have (such as in prisons or education) but struggled to get a baseline idea of the risks that the programmes were intended to mitigate and thus to measure progress in addressing risk over time.

6.75 Programmes to support vulnerable people should in theory have been easier to assess and evaluate and more progress has been made in this area. But data collection has not always been satisfactory and there have not always been common methods used across a wide range of community organisations, making like-for-like comparison of impact and value-for-money difficult.

6.76 Overseas, efforts have been made to understand what factors in a specific state might lead to progress in addressing radicalisation. But these factors are themselves the subject of intense academic and analytical debate and the degree to which they can be influenced by UK policies and investment is rarely obvious.

³⁹ The ACPO *Prevent* Development Plan 2010/2011 is a publicly available document, available on the ACPO website at: www.acpo.police.uk/ACPOBusinessAreas/PREVENT/WhatPreventmeanstoyou.aspx

6.77 Going forward, we will look for much greater rigour in addressing *Prevent* projects. Funding decisions must be made on the ability to deliver against *Prevent* objectives. The focus must be on impact and outcomes (attitudinal or behavioural change in a target audience) not on outputs (for example, a simple assessment of numbers reached by a particular project). Wherever possible, common methods need to be followed across the many state and non-state providers on *Prevent*. Overseas we need to be much clearer in demonstrating impact, not only in the country concerned but also in the UK. We return to the issue of evaluation below (page 141).

Prevent overseas

6.78 Terrorist attacks planned against targets in this country have very often had connections overseas. Some have been planned in or directly involved people from third countries; some have been funded from overseas; many have involved people who have been trained abroad. Terrorist attacks overseas have also been conducted by people from this country. Domestic and international terrorism are interconnected.

6.79 The radicalisation process also has significant overseas connections. Many people radicalised here have been influenced by ideology developed overseas and by messages broadcast into this country from abroad. The great majority of terrorist-related websites that most concern us are hosted outside this country. Many people from this country who have been radicalised have travelled overseas and during that time have met and been influenced by extremist or terrorist organisations: their travel is part of the radicalisation process. A significant number of radicalised people now resident here have travelled to this country from overseas and were radicalised before they arrived.

6.80 Radicalisation has had a major impact on states whose security is vital to our own. We noted above the high levels of support for aspects of the ideology associated with Al Qa'ida (page 23).

6.81 All our counter-terrorism work has to have an international component to it and *Prevent* is no exception. To stop people supporting or becoming terrorists, we need to work overseas as well as at home. But the challenges overseas are much greater than the challenges we face here. Levels of support for terrorism are often higher; the influence we have is much less and the evidence base for what is effective is generally incomplete.

6.82 It is therefore vital that *Prevent* work overseas is carefully prioritised. But in the past, the FCO funded activity overseas that aimed to build community resilience and support wider cohesion goals (for example English language training for imams or empowering Muslim women). We do not believe this work is effective in *Prevent* terms and the focus has since moved.

6.83 We judge that *Prevent* overseas must wherever possible have a demonstrable impact on UK domestic security in general and the domestic *Prevent* agenda in particular. It otherwise needs to have an impact on risks which have a wider bearing on our national security.

6.84 The FCO has more recently prioritised work in Pakistan and in other countries with significant diaspora communities here. In these countries, work to address radicalisation can have a significant domestic UK impact. The FCO has also prioritised a different group of countries, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, whose Muslim institutions and organisations have considerable global influence which can positively or negatively shape the *Prevent* agenda. We believe this work can have a very significant impact here.

- 6.85 The Department for International Development (DfID) also has a role to play. Although its main purpose is to reduce poverty, overseas development work in some areas can help to build resilience to terrorism through programmes that strengthen governance and security, create jobs, and provide basic services including education.
- 6.86 A great deal of work has also been done by many Departments and agencies here to share and learn best practice on *Prevent* with and from other countries. Some of this work has been done bilaterally. Other work has been done through multilateral organisations, notably the EU and the UN. Again, we believe that this work is important.
- 6.87 In common with domestic *Prevent* programmes, the focus and evaluation of *Prevent* work overseas has been mixed. The overseas programme worked against the same set of objectives as the domestic programme and therefore suffered from similar problems. Some of it was more relevant to cohesion than to *Prevent*. Other programmes had no discernible impact on the UK. In many cases, evaluation was focused on outputs (such as the number of people who attended an event or read a message) and not on whether the people concerned were amongst those who we would regard as vulnerable to extremism or terrorism. Much has already been done to address these issues. Moving forward, *Prevent* work overseas will be increasingly aligned with domestic *Prevent* work.
- 6.88 There will remain a key question about the appropriate balance of investment between *Prevent* work at home and *Prevent* work overseas. During financial year 2010/11, approximately one quarter of *Prevent* spend related to activity overseas. We question whether this accurately reflects the balance of priorities or returns that funding can bring. We note that in 2010/11 the Government spent approximately the same on *Prevent* overseas as it did on *Prevent* work funded by DCLG through local authorities. We intend to keep this under review, alongside the funding issues regarding police and local authorities (see pages 47-50 above).

7. A new *Prevent* strategy

- 7.1 The new *Prevent* strategy will be based around the guiding principles outlined in chapter 6. They represent a significant departure from the previous strategy:
- The aim of *Prevent* should be to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.
 - *Prevent* should address all forms of terrorism, but continue to prioritise according to the risks to our national security. Its principal focus will therefore remain terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida and related groups.
 - *Prevent* needs to deal with extremism where terrorism draws on extremist ideas; and where people who are extremists are being drawn towards terrorism-related activity.
 - *Prevent* will depend on wider Government programmes to strengthen integration and should be carefully coordinated with them. Other than in exceptional circumstances, *Prevent* should not fund these programmes and should be distinct from them.
 - *Prevent* will remain one part of our counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. The relationship between *Prevent* and what we call *Pursue* (such as work to investigate and disrupt terrorist activity) must be very carefully managed. *Prevent* is not a means for spying or for other covert activity.
 - We intend that agencies and Departments work to a common set of objectives in this area. But we look to local authorities and communities to consider how those objectives can best be implemented: they will have the expertise and the understanding of local context which in this as in many other policy areas is vital.
 - Funding for local authority projects will be precisely targeted and dedicated to ensure it is used for the purposes for which it is intended. But central Government should not seek to micro-manage decisions about local delivery which are properly the responsibility of local partners.
 - Funding will not be provided to extremist organisations.
 - It will not be part of this strategy to use extremists to deal with the risk from radicalisation.

- Public funding for *Prevent* must be rigorously prioritised at home and overseas. The balance of investment within domestic *Prevent* work and between that work and *Prevent* overseas needs to be regularly assessed. All our *Prevent* programmes need to be relevant to *Prevent* objectives.
- The evaluation of *Prevent* work is critical and must significantly improve. Data collection must be more rigorous.

7.2 Within this overall framework the new *Prevent* strategy will have three objectives. It will:

- respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it;
- prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and,
- work with a wide range of sectors and institutions (including education, faith, health and criminal justice) where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.

7.3 We believe that these objectives reflect our understanding of the radicalisation process and the factors which are important to it.

7.4 We also regard the internet as vital to *Prevent* work, not just because we need to more effectively disrupt terrorist use of the internet, but because of the range of opportunities it provides to challenge terrorist ideology. How we use the internet and how it is being used in the radicalisation process are issues which appear throughout this document. A section below also considers the internet as a sector in its own right and looks at the work that we are doing with the internet industry itself to address radicalisation and terrorism online.

7.5 In the terms of reference for this review, the Home Secretary directed that *Prevent* should be proportionate and focused. We regard this as particularly important because of the view that the last *Prevent* strategy was disproportionate – in particular, that it stigmatised communities, suggested that they were collectively at risk of radicalisation and implied terrorism was a problem specific to Muslim communities.

7.6 We judge that the strategy we outline here is proportionate to the threat we face. It recognises that the vast majority of people of all faiths in this country reject terrorism without any qualification. The purpose of *Prevent* is not to convince the majority of people that terrorism is wrong – they need no convincing. Rather, the purpose is to enlist the support of people in our country to reach the much smaller minority who may be drawn into terrorism, often through extremist views.

7.7 The strategy will not allocate resources according to a crude calculation of Muslim population density. It will allocate resources on the basis of risk, an assessment in turn informed not by numbers of people of any faith but by the activity we have seen by terrorist organisations and terrorist sympathisers. This is a fundamental reorientation of our *Prevent* work. The strategy implies no judgment on particular communities: it reflects a judgment on the groups which intend to cause us harm.

7.8 At present, the greatest threat we face remains that from Al Qa'ida and like-minded groups. That has to be the focus on our *Prevent* work. But the new strategy will apply to all terrorist threats we

face, including in particular the threat from extreme right-wing terrorism. Although this strategy does not directly apply in Northern Ireland, many of the principles can be applied to Northern Ireland-related terrorism.

- 7.9 In contrast to the previous *Prevent* strategy, the revised strategy will therefore be more focused, more rigorous and consequently more effective.
- 7.10 The following three sections consider in more detail the three key objectives of the new *Prevent* strategy. They describe the challenges we face, assess work to date and explain our future priorities.

8. Objective One: Challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it

Summary

All terrorist groups have an ideology. Promoting that ideology, often through the internet, facilitates radicalisation and recruitment.

Challenging ideology and disrupting the ability of terrorists to promote it is a fundamental part of Prevent.

Previous work in this area has made some progress but has not consistently reached the few people who are most susceptible to terrorist propaganda. It has failed to recognise the way in which terrorist ideology makes use of ideas espoused by extremist organisations and has not fully understood the implications this should have for the scope for our work. Nor has it effectively engaged with and used the influence and reach of communities and community groups. Previous Prevent work has sometimes given the misleading impression that Muslim communities as a whole are more 'vulnerable' to radicalisation than other faith or ethnic groups.

Much more needs to be done in this critical area. But it must be proportionate and focused. It must not imply a need to change the attitudes of most people in this country. It must not appear to pass judgment on faith in general or to suggest only a particular kind of faith is appropriate or acceptable. It must be done in conjunction with communities here and overseas who are often better able than Government to disprove the claims made by terrorist groups and to challenge terrorist and associated extremist ideologies.

A future strategy in this area will include better communication of the Government's security and foreign policies to rebut claims made about them; more projects in education, communities and the criminal justice system to enable understanding of and challenge to terrorist ideologies; and support for experts where ideology draws on and misrepresents theology and requires a detailed response.

It is vital to challenge apologists for terrorism. Challenge may mean simply debate about extremist ideas which form a part of terrorist narrative. But where propagandists break the law in encouraging or approving terrorism it must also mean arrest and law enforcement action. And where people seek to enter this country from overseas to engage in activity in support of extremist and terrorist groups we will also use the Home Secretary's power to exclude them.

Introduction

- 8.1 Central to the development of any movement or group is the construction of an ideological framework. Ideology offers its believers a coherent set of ideas that provide the basis for organised political action, whether it is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power.⁴⁰ Ideology may also coordinate activity in the absence of leadership or a command structure.⁴¹
- 8.2 Some organisations, including those engaged in terrorism, have very detailed ideologies, based on historic texts and extensive contemporary literature, including what purports to be rigorous thinking about key texts from the recent and even distant past. Other groups pay much less attention to developing a specific ideological position and rely instead on a few slogans and one or two key written texts.
- 8.3 Ideology is a central factor in the radicalisation process. People who accept and are motivated by an ideology which states that violence is an acceptable course of action are more likely to engage in terrorism-related activity. People who come to believe in such an ideology may be not only willing to kill but also to sacrifice their own lives.⁴² Challenging that ideology is therefore an essential part of a preventative counter-terrorism programme.
- 8.4 Some terrorist groups, such as Al Qa'ida, use religion as both a basis for their ideology and as a means of justifying their actions. Understanding the connection between ideology and theology and how the first can masquerade as the second is important.
- 8.5 Ideology depends on ideologues, people who promote that ideology and encourage others to subscribe to it. Some apologists for terrorism have a particular appeal for young people across the world. Who they are (their background and life history) and how they behave is as central to their appeal as what they say. Challenging ideology also means identifying these ideologues, ensuring they cannot take advantage of the freedoms in this country to peddle their messages without debate or rebuttal, prosecuting them where they have broken the law and restricting their access to this country where we judge it is appropriate to do so.
- 8.6 Communications technology has transformed the capability of terrorist groups. The internet in particular has not only facilitated attack planning but also the distribution of terrorist propaganda and the process of radicalisation and recruitment. Ideological challenge has to use all the communications tools which have been adopted by terrorists and where necessary also intervene in the virtual space to curtail illegal activities.
- 8.7 Challenging ideology is also about being confident in our own values – the values of democracy, rule of law, equality of opportunity, freedom of speech and the rights of all men and women to live free from persecution of any kind. Challenge must be accompanied by advocacy of the very systems and values which terrorists in this country and elsewhere set out to destroy. To that extent, challenging ideologies is a collective responsibility.

⁴⁰ Heywood, A. (2007), *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*. 4th Ed.: Palgrave Macmillan.

⁴¹ The Change Institute (2008), *Studies into violent radicalisation: The beliefs, ideologies and narratives. A study carried out by the Change Institute for the European Commission – Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security*. London: The Change Institute. Available from: www.changeinstitute.co.uk/images/publications/changeinstitute_beliefsideologiesnarratives.pdf

⁴² Schmid, A. (2010), The Importance of Countering Al Qa'ida's Single Narrative. *Countering Violent Extremist Narratives*. The Hague: National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (NCTb). Available from: http://english.nctb.nl/Images/Countering%20Violent%20Extremist%20Narratives%20-%20202_tcm92-259489.pdf?cp=92&ndcs=25496

- 8.8 Our consultation on *Prevent* showed mixed views on whether a future *Prevent* strategy should include a counter-ideological element. Some expressed concern that the Government was involving itself in matters of faith in a way that they believed was inappropriate. Many others thought activity in this area was essential and we had to do more. Respondents wanted Government to provide factual information to facilitate ideological challenge at a local level.
- 8.9 We agree with those who said activity in this area is essential. Although challenging ideology is of central importance to *Prevent*, it can also be complicated. It raises key issues of principle as well as practice. We need to be clear what we are trying to achieve, who is best placed to achieve it and what we think success might look like. But we believe it is the responsibility of Government to facilitate and support the creation of a wide range of efforts to challenge terrorist ideology, including where appropriate supporting websites, blogs and social networking activities. We endorse the proposal that Government facilitates wider community challenge by providing appropriate information.
- 8.10 In this section, we focus on issues relating to the type of terrorism that is associated with Al Qa'ida because this represents the greatest risk to this country and to our interests overseas. We also reference other types of terrorism where appropriate.

Al Qa'ida and its associates

- 8.11 The ideology associated with Al Qa'ida and like-minded groups proposes that most governments in Muslim majority countries are 'un-Islamic' or 'apostate'. It calls for their overthrow by *jihad* and for the imposition of new governments, (and ultimately a pan-Islamic Caliphate) based on a very specific interpretation of Islamic law. The ideology claims that these 'apostate' regimes have been supported and in some cases occupied by western states that are waging a war on Islam. It proposes that violent *jihad* and terrorism against these states are not only legitimate but a religious duty. It makes no distinction between civilian and military targets.
- 8.12 Many of the key principles advanced by Al Qa'ida were new. There was no precedent for the claim that killing 'Americans and their allies' was a duty for every Muslim.⁴³ But in some respects the ideology associated with Al Qa'ida and its associated groups draws on and often manipulates a considerable body of literature, some of it written many years ago.
- 8.13 Senior figures in Al Qa'ida have acknowledged their debt to Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian Islamist and the ideological inspiration behind parts of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Qutb significantly developed the notion of violent *jihad* as a means of establishing what he regarded as a true Islamic state in a world which he believed was characterised by unbelief and amorality. Qutb did not, however, suggest that violence should be perpetrated in western countries.
- 8.14 Al Qa'ida sympathisers also draw on and extensively develop detailed concepts in the Salafist theological tradition. They have broadened the possible application of the doctrine of *takfir*, the practice of declaring judgement on people, groups or institutions considered to be theologically inferior or misguided. They have then reinterpreted Salafist doctrine to incite hatred, enmity and violence (*jihad*) to people considered to be unbelievers. They regard violence and martyrdom as a form of worship and submission to God.⁴⁴

⁴³ A claim made in 1998 in the manifesto of the then newly established World Islamic Front.

⁴⁴ For further background on Al Qa'ida ideology, see in particular *Al Qaeda in its own words*, ed. Kepel and Milelli, Harvard: 2008. pp. 147-170. Al Qa'ida and the Muslim Brotherhood now hold very significantly different views and Al Qa'ida would regard the Brotherhood as having betrayed their cause. Many Salafist organisations would also have very significant differences with the exploitation of Salafist theology by Al Qa'ida and other terrorist groups.

- 8.15 The traditions on which they draw are reflected in the range of names which have been used to describe the ideology of Al Qa'ida and other like-minded groups. They include 'global jihadists', 'jihadist terrorism', 'militant Salafists', 'Salafi jihadists' and *takfiris*. Many (though not all) Salafist groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and a wide variety of other organisations are also sometimes described as 'Islamist', a word used in a variety of ways to refer to a political philosophy which, in the broadest sense, promotes the application of Islamic principles to governance. Groups like Al Qa'ida are sometimes described as militant or violent Islamists and we have used these terms in this document.
- 8.16 It is clear that the narrative associated with Al Qa'ida includes a number of important propositions about non-Islamic, western countries. It claims that because the West is at war with Islam, Muslims living in western countries cannot associate or socialise with non-Muslims or legitimately participate in the democratic process. It uses derogatory labels and encourages adherents to draw a sharp distinction between true Muslims and the kafir (un-believers). It rejects notions of integration or cohesion and regards democracy itself as illegitimate.
- 8.17 These propositions are not unique to Al Qa'ida or like-minded terrorist groups. They are also part of an ideology shared by extremist organisations operating in this country and elsewhere: as we noted in the first part of this review (pages 33-34) there is no precise line between what we have described here as terrorist ideology and what we elsewhere describe as extremist ideology. Some of these extremist organisations are also Salafist in orientation; others are associated with different radical Islamist movements.
- 8.18 A considerable amount of research has now been completed into the ways in which the ideology associated with Al Qa'ida now circulates in this country. We know that comparatively few texts circulate on the internet and in hard copy and will be known to people who have been radicalised here.⁴⁵ Many of these texts are carefully studied and debated. We have also seen radicalisation manuals which take highlights from source material to construct a case for terrorism and which are intended for use in private study groups.
- 8.19 We know that visual material (circulating on the internet or by DVD) is an important additional tool in the radicalisation process. This material frequently includes footage of terrorist attacks and often graphic and brutal images of people being killed. In some cases it shows the death of innocent Muslims. The material tries to enhance the reputation and credibility of terrorist groups and to justify what they do.
- 8.20 But the transmission of ideology for the purposes of radicalisation also depends on people who both develop thinking about the case for terrorism and then set out to disseminate their views to their target audience. Twenty years ago some of these ideologues operated in public in this country with apparent impunity. Their activities are persistent but now very often more discreet. It is rare that apologists for terrorism who are living here have a public profile.
- 8.21 Terrorist cells in this country see it as part of their job to covertly persuade other people of the legitimacy of their cause and to recruit people to their organisations. A great deal of the time of some cell members has historically been devoted to this area of work. Our research indicates

⁴⁵ The list includes, in particular, works by Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, Abu Mohammed al-Maqdissi, Abu Musab as-Suri, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Usama bin Laden and Anwar Al Awlaki. For further background see: The Change Institute (2008), *Studies into violent radicalisation: The beliefs, ideologies and narratives. A study carried out by the Change Institute for the European Commission – Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security*. London: The Change Institute. Available from: www.changeinstitute.co.uk/images/publications/changeinstitute_beliefsideologiesnarratives.pdf

that although the internet has a critical role to play, the activity of influential and often charismatic propagandists who have covert face-to-face contact with vulnerable people is a key part of the radicalisation process.

- 8.22 The scope of the ideology associated with Al Qa'ida, the numbers of people engaged in disseminating all or part of it, and the various formats in which it is presented indicate the extent of the challenge posed by this aspect of preventative work. We return to this when we evaluate work in this area to date.
- 8.23 It should be the role of Government to address some of the claims made by terrorist and extremist groups, for example the assertion that the West is at war with Islam and that it is deliberately mistreating Muslims around the world. Challenging other parts of terrorist and extremist narratives is at least partly a role for Government; but can equally be a task better addressed by people and organisations in communities in this country whose own experiences often best disprove the claims made for and about them.
- 8.24 But dealing with the theology of Al Qa'ida is only a role for Government in certain well-defined and exceptional situations. Although the Government may provide support and assistance, it must avoid seeming either to want or to endorse a particular kind of 'state Islam'. That is certainly not our purpose. The vast majority of this work can and should only be done by communities and scholars in this country or overseas.

Activity to date

- 8.25 By 2007, two years after the terrorist attacks on London, very little work had been done to address the ideological challenge posed by terrorism and extremism. But the 2007 *Prevent* strategy led to more effort and, in particular, projects intended to:
- enable Government to effectively communicate its policies in areas of controversy (including both foreign policy and counter-terrorism);
 - enable people and organisations to better challenge terrorist ideology;
 - address some of the theological claims made by contemporary terrorist groups; and
 - disrupt the activities of apologists for terrorism in this country.
- 8.26 We have looked in detail at projects in each of these four areas and the progress they have made. We summarise our findings below. We conclude with comments on lessons which have been learned. We return to some of these themes under Objective 3 (pages 63-94) below.
- 8.27 The vast majority of our work which we cover here was focused on the ideology of Al Qa'ida and related groups. At the end of this section we look at the work that needs to be done to challenge other terrorist ideologies.

Communications

- 8.28 The Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) was established in the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office in 2007. At that time, it comprised representatives from the Home Office, DCLG and the FCO and reported to Ministers in all three

Departments. Its function was to coordinate Government communications about the terrorist threat and our response to it and to facilitate and generate challenge to terrorist ideology and the claims made by terrorist groups. RICU also undertook research to support these two objectives.

- 8.29 In its first few years, RICU developed proposals about ways to describe the terrorist threat which were accurate, likely to be understood and accepted but which would not inadvertently lend credence to the claims about counter-terrorism made by extremist and terrorist groups. Some of these proposals were adopted by Government and reflected in the language which Government used (the term 'war on terrorism', for example, was judged to be prone to misinterpretation and has generally been avoided in this country).
- 8.30 RICU has also conducted research to show the impact of the language it recommended. We comment further on this work below. We note here that in some respects it erred in seeking to make language acceptable to some in Muslim communities, at the expense of candour; and in giving more weight to forms of expression which can reach people in British Muslim communities rather than all communities in this country.
- 8.31 After 2007, the FCO and DfID devoted much more effort to communicating their work to audiences in this country, making the point that, far from being at war with Islam, the then Government was making great efforts to address deprivation, human rights issues and governance in Muslim-majority countries. This communications work broke new ground and was a significant departure from previous practice. The FCO has also helped foreign governments challenge terrorist ideology in their own countries.
- 8.32 We know that some apologists for terrorism in this country have claimed that domestic counter-terrorism work is simply another aspect of what they claim is a war on Islam. Conscious of these claims, the police have also sought and developed a much closer dialogue regarding their counter-terrorism work with communities in the UK, and in particular with Muslim communities often most directly affected by counter-terrorism operations. Police outreach has many purposes, but it has addressed some concerns about police work in particular and counter-terrorism work in general. The police must be careful in their contacts and accountability for police actions in this area should be strong.
- 8.33 In section 11 (page 95), below, we reference recent research that indicates how police relations with Muslim communities have improved over the past few years. We believe that police understanding of Muslim communities has improved significantly as a result of *Prevent*. We highlight in particular the importance of work with communities to discuss how and why counter-terrorism operations are conducted. This work, notably the police programme Operation Nicole,⁴⁶ has increased understanding among all participants.

Community challenge

- 8.34 The last *Prevent* strategy made available professional communications skills to community groups who appeared to be well-placed to challenge the ideology we associate with Al Qa'ida. This work was coordinated by RICU, often in conjunction with local authorities and civil society groups, and more recently has focused on a few geographical areas where evidence indicates high levels of extremist and terrorist propaganda have been circulating. Further work has been conducted with

⁴⁶ Operation Nicole is a table top exercise that has been developed by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Prevent Delivery Unit in conjunction with independent facilitators. It is specifically designed to break down barriers between police and communities by promoting an understanding of how counter-terrorism operations work.

some national, international and multilateral organisations with the objective of creating networks capable of developing and promoting a wider counter-narrative. The best of this work has engaged with new media (including community television) and with groups run by victims of terrorism to create a genuinely powerful message.

- 8.35 The last strategy made a start in providing schools with advice on how to equip young people with the knowledge and skills to challenge extremist narratives. It supported the development of citizenship education in madrassahs through the Islam Citizenship Education Project, backed by the Schools Development Support Agency and community-based organisations. In higher education, BIS worked with student unions to ensure better awareness of extremist speakers on campus and to ensure that their views were balanced by speakers with different perspectives. In prisons the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) supported Muslim chaplains in work to challenge extremist views. Some authorities also ran projects with faith organisations and institutions. We return to this below (pages 85-127).

Theology

- 8.36 The last strategy recognised the difficulty of the Government taking a position on matters of theology. But the Government designated Islamic studies as a 'strategically important and vulnerable subject', allowing the Department to facilitate networking and collaboration between academics.⁴⁷ It supported work by a group of leading scholars, community leaders and academics to consider how Islam is contextualised in this country.⁴⁸
- 8.37 The FCO and DCLG also sponsored a series of 'road shows' by Muslim community groups around the country involving lectures, debates and cultural events aimed at promoting a mainstream message of Islam on a number of key issues, including terrorism. The FCO supported further initiatives overseas, networking imams from this country with counterparts elsewhere to understand extremist issues and how they might best be addressed.

Disrupting propagandists

- 8.38 The last *Prevent* strategy led to some action to sensitise Government Departments, agencies and public places for which Departments have responsibility, to the actions of known radicalising people and organisations, particularly those holding speaking events in public. BIS published guidance to raise awareness of the risk of radicalisation in higher and further education institutions. NOMS provided practical support and training for staff to help them manage terrorist offenders effectively. UK Border Agency (UKBA) staff in Immigration Removal Centres and prisons received training to help them identify the signs of radicalisation.
- 8.39 The Home Secretary has the power to exclude or deport non-British citizens on grounds of national security and, in some circumstances, to deprive people of British citizenship. In 2005, the then Home Secretary announced that those who engage in what were termed 'unacceptable behaviours' would normally be excluded from the UK. Unacceptable behaviour includes public speaking or publishing material that foments, justifies or glorifies terrorist violence or fosters hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK or otherwise can be demonstrated as providing support for extremists.

⁴⁷ The 'strategic importance' of these subjects refers to the need for some kind of assistive intervention to facilitate provision. Where such intervention is necessary in order to address a mismatch between supply and demand, the subject is designated as both strategically important and vulnerable.

⁴⁸ Suleiman, Y. et al (2009), *Contextualising Islam in Britain: Exploratory Perspectives*. Cambridge: Centre for Islamic Studies. Available from: www.cis.cam.ac.uk/CIBPReportWeb.pdf

8.40 Since the introduction of this policy, over 130 people have been excluded from the UK, including extreme animal-rights activists and anti-abortionists, anti-Semites, Islamophobes and neo-Nazis, as well as people broadly associated with terrorist and other extremist groups.

Evaluation

- 8.41 Work to counter ideology has therefore been wide-ranging. Some of it has been done by Government (in particular where Government policies which feature most frequently in terrorist propaganda need to be clearly explained) and some of it by people and organisations in communities, facilitated by Government where necessary. But the work has faced a number of problems.
- 8.42 In the first place, this work has not sufficiently disaggregated the concept of ideology and explained what it means, what it includes, what needs to be done about it and by whom. A clearer explanation is more likely to reduce misunderstandings and correct any misconceptions – in particular, that Government is taking upon itself the role of theological arbiter or that this part of *Prevent* means that Government is passing judgement on Islam itself.
- 8.43 Second, some of the early work proceeded without a clear idea of the audience for whom it was intended. At best, this wasted money and diverted valuable resources. At worst, it gave the impression that the Government had to convince Muslim communities in this country of something which the vast majority know very well already – that terrorism is unacceptable and wrong.
- 8.44 Third, it is not yet clear whether this work has had a direct impact on the small percentage of people in this country who may be vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist organisations. In some cases we judge this is unlikely. Too often, projects have been evaluated on the basis of the number of individuals who have received a message, undertaken training or attended a workshop, rather than the impact that that message, training or workshop has had on their thinking or behaviour. In some cases (for example, on some of the work on theology) little or no attempt has been made to translate very high quality thinking and research into something that makes a difference to people outside a specialised academic environment.
- 8.45 Finally, work to date has not recognised clearly enough the way in which some terrorist ideologies draw on and make use of extremist ideas which are espoused by apparently non-violent organisations very often operating within the law. We have noted this issue in considering the context for and the proper scope of *Prevent*. In the context of this section, this means that *Prevent* must also challenge extremist ideas where they form part of a terrorist narrative.
- 8.46 We also believe that there needs to be much more coordination between work to challenge ideology overseas and work in the UK. We judge that a better understanding of diaspora communities, centres of authority and examples of best practice is central to this aim and more research is needed in this area.
- 8.47 RICU has had a central role in developing counter-ideological or counter-narrative work. We believe that their track record has been mixed. Research has enhanced understanding of audiences here and the impact of specific messages. Coordination of outward-facing Government communication about counter-terrorism has improved. But the language that RICU has proposed to describe terrorism and the terrorist threat (for example, ‘terrorists are criminals’) has risked removing the ideological component which it should be the purpose of RICU to address.

- 8.48 The impact of RICU's counter-narrative work has been variable. Some projects designed before the evidence base had matured suffered from lack of precision around target audiences and messages. They struggled to have an impact and were difficult to evaluate. Although RICU was right to focus on working with local and national organisations to develop and disseminate counter-narratives, some of those organisations have struggled to make themselves heard and failed to draw a clear line between messages about counter-narrative and cohesion. More care now needs to be taken to identify credible partners and to develop powerful and specific narratives across a range of communications channels, especially on the internet (which we cover at greater length below).
- 8.49 We also believe that insufficient work has been done to understand how to rebut the more complex texts circulating in this country which justify terrorism. Government has a key role to play here in providing information about what those texts are. Communities and theologians have a role to play in explaining why they are wrong.
- 8.50 The previous strategy was not systematic enough in coordinating the range of tools available to the Government in challenging those who promote extreme or terrorist ideologies. There has been some recent and relatively limited engagement with regulatory bodies such as the Charity Commission (see below, pages 127-130) Ofcom and Ofsted but more needs to be done in this area.

Next steps

- 8.51 Work to challenge ideology must be part of *Prevent*. But not enough has been done, or done effectively, to date. This section sets out how we will address that problem.
- 8.52 First, we need to recognise that terrorist ideology has a number of components - theological, political and social. Government can take the lead in some of these areas; in others, Government is better placed to facilitate work by communities in this country and overseas.
- 8.53 In addressing ideological issues, we also need to be very clear about our purpose and method. The great majority of people in this country find terrorism repugnant and will never support it. Work to challenge ideology should not try to change majority opinion because it does not need changing. Our purpose is to reach the much smaller number of people who are vulnerable. The Government must help mobilise and empower communities to challenge terrorism, not give the impression that they need to be convinced terrorism is wrong.
- 8.54 We will continue to communicate clearly our policies overseas, in particular in Muslim-majority countries. Departments and agencies will have a key part to play in explaining why we need to address the terrorist threat here and how we intend to do so. The Government has also already moved to change the legal foundation of our counter-terrorism work to ensure it is proportionate and necessary to the challenges we face. Departments and agencies working overseas will also need to make it clear to other countries the fact that the UK will be more active in challenging extremism of any kind.
- 8.55 The new *Prevent* strategy will identify more projects in education, communities and the criminal justice system which enable people to challenge terrorist ideology effectively. The earlier strategy only made a start in these areas. In each case we will want to demonstrate that, directly or indirectly, the projects have tangible impact.

- 8.56 We will not want to engage in matters of theology but we recognise the imperative for theologians, academics and communities to do so. We will support their efforts by providing information on the texts which are being used to radicalise people in this country; we want to ensure that counter-narrative work is widely circulated and in a form that reaches as many people as possible.
- 8.57 Although we will not engage directly in theology, we will engage robustly in politics, working with others to reduce the appeal of the political element of extremist ideology to people who might be attracted to terrorism.
- 8.58 We will also encourage and seek to work with the many mosques in the UK who have already taken a leading role in challenging terrorism. We recognise and want to support the key role of imams in reaching young Muslims and being able to engage with them on these issues.
- 8.59 We will continue to work with other countries to mobilise informal non-government networks who can best challenge terrorist propaganda. We must do better at understanding and evaluating the projects to ensure that they are having an impact.
- 8.60 We will retain RICU, largely in its current form, but will expect much sharper and more professional counter-narrative products. We welcome the fact that new, more cost-effective programmes have already been designed which will engage a wider range of credible civil society partners, deliver tightly-focused projects able to tackle specific local threats in the UK, and link overseas and UK diaspora audiences to greater effect.
- 8.61 We will carefully and independently assess the help RICU provides to non-government organisations. We will continue to invest in communication research and evaluation. We will retain capacity to innovate and experiment with counter-narrative campaigns, making best use of emerging information and communications technology. There will be much greater scrutiny of RICU projects, costs and value-for-money.
- 8.62 Our primary focus for counter-ideological work online is on increasing the confidence of civil society activists to challenge online extremist content effectively and to provide credible alternatives. We will continue to work with social media enterprises, such as Facebook, to help civil society organisations understand the effect of social media and web 2.0 on marketing communications, online influence and public relations. We hope this will help civil society groups plan and manage their digital communications more effectively and gain experience of putting these tools and techniques to effective practical use.
- 8.63 Taking action against propagandists and radicalisers requires careful coordination between work in the Pursue and *Prevent* areas of CONTEST. Some of the actions of people engaged in propaganda work are illegal under UK counter-terrorism or race and religious hatred legislation and require intervention by the police. We look at this above (pages 34-37).
- 8.64 As we said in part 6 of this review, we can see no case for amending any of the legislation which relates to this issue. The recent review of counter-terrorism powers and legislation did not consider offences regarding glorification but it did look at issue of proscription and specifically whether proscription should be extended to cover groups who may be engaged in inciting racial hatred. It concluded that there was no compelling case to change existing proscription legislation.

- 8.65 Going forward, we will want to emphasise the connection between extremist and terrorist ideologies. We believe that there is scope for more work to identify and take action against propagandists for terrorism in this country and overseas. This research, which should be led by the OSCT and partner agencies, needs to be shared with a wider range of statutory partners in a standard format, likely to be prepared by RICU.
- 8.66 Propagandists for terrorism and for ideologies taken up by terrorists should not be permitted to make use of publicly owned venues. Local authorities and others must be ready to take appropriate action. Where conferences and speaker meetings involving propagandists are taking place in universities and colleges, communities and privately-owned locations, authorities – including the police – should always be ready to brief the owners and ensure they understand what is taking place.
- 8.67 The Government has already moved to ensure robust application of the unacceptable behaviours exclusion criteria, taking steps to improve the processes that support identification and assessment of potential exclusion cases and the implementation of decisions to exclude. We will now also look for a closer dialogue with a number of states overseas, from where propagandists may be speaking and travelling to communities here.
- 8.68 FCO and UKBA are considering how to deliver unambiguous messages about extremism and terrorism, and the penalties involved, through the visa application and issuing process. Such an approach would also include advice about our core values, including our belief in human rights, democracy and the rule of law. UKBA will consider which communications messages and channels would be most effective as a priority and will offer solutions to Ministers.
- 8.69 We will also seek to work more closely with regulatory bodies by developing stronger and closer partnerships with Ofcom, Ofsted and the Charity Commission.
- 8.70 Our work to address the ideologies underpinning others forms of terrorism, such as extreme right-wing terrorism, is less developed than work on terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida. We will address this as a priority.

9. Objective Two: Protecting vulnerable people

Summary

Radicalisation is usually a process not an event. During that process it is possible to intervene to prevent vulnerable people being drawn into terrorist-related activity. There are some analogies between this work and other forms of crime prevention.

Programmes of this kind, although central to an effective Prevent programme, are comparatively new and evidence of impact is correspondingly limited. Allegations have been made that the programmes have been disproportionate and intrusive and have restricted free speech. We recognise the risk that the criteria for entry to these programmes can be too broad. We have considered further allegations that the programmes have been used for spying.

We conclude that, properly handled, programmes of this kind are essential. They should pre-empt and not facilitate law enforcement activity. They will not be a means for covert activity. Safeguards will ensure their integrity and, in particular, appropriate protection of data.

This area of Prevent will build on Channel, the existing multi-agency programme to identify and provide support to people at risk of radicalisation. Channel has had some success. The programmes will address the risks from all form of terrorism. They must draw on the expertise of policing, local authorities and community organisations.

Organisations commissioned to provide support to vulnerable people are in a position of great influence. They must be credible and able to reach and talk to people at risk. But we will not fund or work with extremist groups for this (or any other) purpose.

As in other areas of Prevent, evaluation of these programmes has not been fully effective. It will be significantly enhanced and new procedures will be put in place to ensure value for money.

We will conduct research and collaborate with other countries to continuously improve our understanding of radicalisation. This is vital to ensure the effectiveness of these programmes.

Introduction

- 9.1 Radicalisation is usually a process not an event. During that process, behaviours as well as opinions are likely to change. These changes may be apparent to the friends, families and work colleagues of the person concerned.
- 9.2 In January 2009, Nicky Reilly was convicted after he attempted to attack a restaurant in Exeter. Previously, he had regular contact with mental health services and had spoken about terrorism to them. In December 2010, Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly killed himself in a bomb attack in Stockholm, Sweden. Al-Abdaly's extreme beliefs and behaviours had raised concerns at the mosque he attended in Luton. He had been challenged by mosque leaders and eventually expelled but mosque leaders did not consider it appropriate to refer him to the authorities. Andrew Ibrahim was jailed in July 2009 for plotting to blow up a shopping centre in Bristol. Ibrahim was arrested after members of the Muslim community, who had attended an awareness workshop on *Prevent*, raised concerns about him to the police.⁴⁹
- 9.3 These cases and others indicate the scope for positive intervention in the radicalisation process before a law enforcement response is required, and demonstrate the consequences if interventions do not take place or do not succeed.
- 9.4 This area of *Prevent* is based on the premise that people being drawn into radicalisation and recruitment can be identified and then provided with support. The purpose of that support is to dissuade them from engaging in and supporting terrorist-related activity. This support is sometimes described as 'de-radicalisation', a term which is sometimes used to refer to cognitive or behavioural change: in the context of our own programmes we use it to refer to both. We seek to remove people from the influence of and from contact with terrorist groups and sympathisers, and to challenge any support they have for them.⁵⁰
- 9.5 Like other aspects of *Prevent*, programmes to support vulnerable people in this country and elsewhere are comparatively new. The evidence for success is correspondingly limited. Methodologies have not yet been fully proven and they continue to develop. Programmes of this kind raise significant civil liberties issues. The identification and referral process can, if poorly handled, include people who are not at risk of radicalisation. At worst, it can appear that these programmes are an attack on freedom of expression and are both unnecessary and disproportionate. It has been alleged that data collected about innocent people has been shared by statutory authorities with policing and that the data has been placed on police records. This area of *Prevent*, it has been claimed, is a form of spying.
- 9.6 We return to these allegations below. They highlight that these *Prevent* programmes are not strictly comparable to programmes to prevent drugs use (about which few if any of these allegations could or would be made) and need to be handled with great care. Proportionality is again important. But we also believe that, if properly handled, these programmes are essential and that safeguards can be put in place to ensure their integrity. Taking early action to protect people from radicalisation is not the same as surveillance or intelligence gathering. It is intended to pre-empt not to facilitate law enforcement action.

⁴⁹ A short film produced by Avon and Somerset Police shows how his case illustrates the signs of vulnerability and the role that those in contact with individuals at risk can have in raising potential concerns. This is currently available to frontline staff and community organisations.

⁵⁰ For a recent overview of some of these issues see Rabasa, A., Pettyjohn, S., Ghez, J. and Boucek, C. (2010) *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Activity to date

- 9.7 Programmes to support people at risk of radicalisation were noted in the 2007 *Prevent* strategy but did not develop substantively until the following year. In many areas, these programmes are now delivered through Channel, a police-coordinated, multi-agency partnership that evaluates referrals of individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism, working alongside safeguarding partnerships and crime reduction panels.
- 9.8 From a two-site pilot in 2007, 28 coordinators and a handful of support posts, Channel now covers about 75 local authorities and 12 police forces. Channel is modelled on other successful multi-agency risk management processes such as child protection, domestic violence and the management of high risk offenders. It uses processes which also safeguard people at risk from crime, drugs or gangs. Funding for Channel is provided by OSCT.
- 9.9 The latest guidance on Channel was published by the OSCT in partnership with ACPO and DCLG in 2010.⁵¹ It explains that the Channel process comprises three discreet steps: identification; risk assessment and referral; and support.
- 9.10 The guidance states that identification of vulnerable people should be made by a wide range of statutory organisations. They include local authorities; police; youth offending services; social workers; housing and voluntary groups. Identifications must be made carefully and against a range of possible indicators.
- 9.11 The indicators (if observed) set the bar for referral quite high and would not (as is sometimes claimed) enable the referral of people simply for the holding of political opinions or having commitment to a faith. They include: expressed support for violence and terrorism; possession of violent extremist literature; attempts to access or contribute to violent extremist websites; possession of material regarding weapons and/or explosives; and possession of literature regarding military training, skills and techniques. Under a section entitled 'personal history' the guidance proposes that attention be paid to: claims of involvement in organisations; espousing violent extremist ideology; claims of attendance at training camps; and claims of involvement in combat or violent activity on behalf of violent extremist groups.
- 9.12 Under the previous *Prevent* strategy, many Departments and statutory partners have undertaken activity to raise awareness and help frontline staff to identify signs of vulnerability. At the heart of this work has been the Workshop to Raise Awareness of *Prevent* (WRAP), an interactive and facilitated workshop developed by OSCT. Based around a DVD, WRAP covers issues such as the history of terrorism, radicalisation as a social process, connections to other forms of extremism, the Al Qa'ida 'narrative' and factors which may contribute to vulnerability. The workshop, available since 2009, is intended to provide frontline staff with:
- an awareness and understanding of *Prevent* and their role within it;
 - the knowledge and confidence to discuss related issues; and
 - the ability to use existing expertise and professional judgement to recognise and refer potentially vulnerable individuals who may be susceptible to radicalisation.

⁵¹ <http://tna.europarchive.org/20100419081706/> <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/prevent/channel-guidance>

- 9.13 About 15,000 frontline staff have received WRAP training. Delegate feedback collected between September 2010 and March 2011 indicates that 92% of WRAP delegates felt they finished the course with a good or very good understanding of *Prevent* and related issues. 80% of delegates felt they had an enhanced or excellent understanding of the radicalisation process, vulnerability factors, and how to identify and refer and 84% believed as a result they were better able to contribute to *Prevent*. The Scottish Police have identified and adopted WRAP as their premier tool in raising awareness of terrorism. Working with OSCT, the Scottish Police have also delivered this training to colleagues and delivery partners (such as the Scottish Prison Service as well as education and health staff) across Scotland.
- 9.14 The police have also supported awareness-raising of identification and referral processes within local authorities through delivery of the Operation Hindsight exercise. This session is based on a real example of radicalisation and provides key local authorities; statutory and voluntary agencies with the tools to identify vulnerability and offer appropriate intervention measures and support mechanisms.
- 9.15 As of September 2010, analysis from the Government Office tracker showed that 74% of the 94 local authority funded areas (and 49% of the remaining areas) had processes in place to identify, assess and refer vulnerable people.
- 9.16 Following identification of vulnerable people, the Channel guidance proposed that referrals be made to a Channel coordinator; typically a police officer or a local authority employee. Referrals are assessed by the coordinator and senior statutory partners to establish if the person concerned is vulnerable to terrorism or instead should exit the programme or be referred elsewhere.
- 9.17 A multi-agency panel then considers what support maybe provided. That might include: counselling; faith guidance; civic engagement; working with support networks; and mainstream services. It follows that providers of support might be statutory or community organisations. Arrangements were put in place to ensure providers were checked against the Criminal Records Bureau.
- 9.18 Clearly, any Channel-type programme will only be as good and effective as the intervention providers on whom it can call. Under the previous *Prevent* strategy, support has taken a variety of forms, in some cases involving mainstream service provision such as help with social or personal problems like finding employment or counselling about relationships. But some cases have also called for more specific interventions to debate and refute radical ideologies.
- 9.19 Interventions have been delivered by either mainstream services or community-based projects funded by local authorities. But they have also been provided by a number of community-based interventions projects developed and directly funded by OSCT in conjunction with some other central Departments and the police. OSCT has gradually developed a network of community-based providers, based across the country.
- 9.20 The OSCT-funded intervention providers receive cases from Channel. They work directly with some other referral partners, in effect by-passing the multi-agency assessment panel in Channel itself. They also generate a number of cases through their own outreach or gateway activities. They are sometimes well placed to challenge radicalising groups in their community.
- 9.21 We have noted above (pages 47-48) that some of the organisations funded to provide interventions to people of particular backgrounds and in some specific geographical areas have held views that are not consistent with mainstream British values. We return to this below.

9.22 The Channel guidance provided a clear statement about the information sharing principles and legislative framework for Channel and covered the following areas:

- **Necessity and proportionality:** personal information should only be shared between Channel partners where it is strictly necessary to the intended outcome and proportionate to it. Key to determining the necessity and proportionality of sharing information will be the professional judgement of the risks to an individual or the public.
- **Consent:** wherever possible the consent of the person concerned should be obtained before sharing any information about them. In the absence of consent personal information cannot be shared without satisfying one of the gateway or exemption conditions.⁵²
- **Power to share:** the sharing of data by public sector bodies requires the existence of a power to do so, in addition to satisfying the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998.
- **Data Protection Act and the Common Law Duty of Confidentiality:** in engaging with non-public bodies, the Channel coordinator should ensure that they are aware of their own responsibilities under the Data Protection Act.

9.23 Evaluation of Channel has been primarily process based. We judge that mapping of outputs has again been hampered by a lack of quality-assured data. Channel coordinators currently record management information in line with ACPO guidance. Recording standards have varied over time and across forces, so aggregated data may not be internally consistent and there is some evidence of the entry of imperfect data which it has not been possible to clean or correct. The available data (which covers the period April 2007 to the end of December 2010) shows that:

- 1120 people have been referred to the Channel programme;
- the majority of referrals were made by education partners, the police and youth offending services;
- the majority of referrals were aged between 13 and 25;
- there were 290 referrals aged under 16; and 55 referrals aged under 12.
- of the total number of referrals, over 90% were male;
- of those referred as potentially vulnerable to violent extremism:
 - 88% were referred owing to concerns around international terrorism;
 - 8% were referred owing to concerns around right-wing violent extremism; and
 - 4% were referred owing to concerns around other types of violent extremism.⁵³
- 286 referrals were assessed by a multi-agency panel to be in need of an intervention.

⁵² <http://tna.europarchive.org/20100419081706/http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/prevent/channel-guidance>

⁵³ The terminology used here reflects the historic nature of this data. 'International terrorism' in this context refers to terrorism influenced by Al Qa'ida.

- 9.24 For the same period (April 2007 to December 2010), information has also been gathered from police forces showing that the faith of 67% of referrals was recorded as being Muslim; 26% was 'not known'; and 7% was of 'other religion'.
- 9.25 The total funding for Channel for the period April 2007 to March 2011 was approximately £4.7 million.
- 9.26 In October 2008, OSCT, in partnership with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), undertook a process evaluation of Channel. The lessons learned fed in to the development of the national Channel guidance. For confidentiality reasons this evaluation has not been published.
- 9.27 In December 2008, the Lokahi Foundation was awarded a tender to evaluate OSCT-funded interventions providers. The exercise assessed a range of criteria: methodological rigour; case management; governance; management, administration and practice and financial management on a four point scale. Its focus on implementation provided an insight into how the projects were performing and where improvements needed to be made, as a foundation for later assessment of outcome. It was not tasked with evaluating on the basis of outcome.

Next steps

- 9.28 We believe that Channel is an important component of *Prevent*. But, like other *Prevent* programmes, it is important to absorb the lessons that have been learned over the past few years. It is also essential that going forward Channel reflects the framework principles for this new strategy (section 6, above).
- 9.29 Channel is about stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. It must not be confused with a strategy to deal with extremist organisations. Where people holding extremist views appear to be attracted to or moving towards terrorism they clearly become relevant to Channel multi-agency boards. Otherwise they do not.
- 9.30 Channel needs to deal with all types of terrorism. We note that in practice this is already happening at the initiative of the police and local authorities. We welcome this and it should continue.
- 9.31 Channel programmes should be prioritised around areas and places of higher risk, defined as those where terrorist groups and their sympathisers have been most active.
- 9.32 During the consultation to this review, we found that the attraction of community cohesion work appears to have sometimes steered people towards Channel who may have been perceived as potentially vulnerable in some broader sense, rather than specifically at risk of being drawn into terrorism. We have also noted the extent to which the nature of intervention capability available locally has determined the kinds of cases that are being dealt with through the programme. These trends need to be corrected.
- 9.33 We have found that Channel has facilitated local multi-agency partnership working between police and local statutory partners. Some sites have recognised the synergies between Channel and other local safeguarding mechanisms and frameworks and have worked locally to include *Prevent* indicators in the Common Assessment Framework (CAF) and safeguarding policies.⁵⁴ We welcome this though we note differing views about the utility of CAF as a tool for *Prevent*: it may not have the flexibility to assess people who are vulnerable to radicalisation.

⁵⁴ The CAF is a shared assessment and planning framework for use across all children's services and all local areas in England. It aims to help the early identification of children and young people's additional needs and promote coordinated service provision to meet them. Further details can be found at www.education.gov.uk/childrenandyoungpeople/strategy/integratedworking/caf/a0068957/the-caf-process

- 9.34 It is essential in this area, more even than in other areas of *Prevent*, that data collection is improved against a standard set of criteria. A key next step will be the development and implementation of a new Case Management Information System (CMIS) and more robust consistent risk assessment framework for Channel coordinators. This will also enable better performance monitoring of all intervention providers, whether they are funded locally or centrally by OSCT.
- 9.35 We note that at present OSCT-funded intervention providers do not have a 'standardised' risk assessment tool; each project has developed and deployed its own risk assessment. Other statutory referrals to Channel are assessed using a framework owned by that particular statutory partner.
- 9.36 Intervention providers are in a position of great influence over vulnerable people. They must be credible and able to reach and relate to people who will very often be alienated and separated from mainstream society and Government. Some of these people may have been in prison. It is clearly vital that we select intervention providers carefully, understand how they work, their values and outlook, and are completely clear about the results they obtain. We will significantly enhance the monitoring of the intervention process. *Prevent* will not fund intervention providers who promote extremist ideas or beliefs.
- 9.37 Recognising the sensitivities related to recording and managing personal information associated with Channel, access to CMIS must be strictly controlled. But once it is finalised the risk screening and assessment tool which will be part of CMIS will be available on the Home Office OSCT website.
- 9.38 We are considering possible changes to the governance of Channel. But we believe it is vital that the risk assessment stage and development of support intervention continue to be led by local multi-agency panels in conjunction with the police. We recognise that the police have a key role to play – not least in ensuring that people engaged in criminal activity are not put on the Channel programme – but their involvement must be balanced by input from local authorities and other statutory partners. There is considerable work still to be done to build confidence in Channel amongst voluntary workers, the general public and religious institutions and leaders.
- 9.39 OSCT commissioned three Rapid Evidence Assessments to help develop our understanding of research on radicalisation and de-radicalisation.⁵⁵ There is little empirical evidence underpinning intervention work in this area here in the UK and internationally. Further research may be needed in future but we are also clear that valuable learning and best practice is more likely to come from intervention providers and the Channel process. Subject to data protection it is essential that this learning is identified and shared.
- 9.40 We have focused in this section on the principal programmes which have been set up to support people vulnerable to radicalisation. We note however that there is a wider range of work with which this needs to be coordinated. This includes work in education, healthcare and in particular in prisons. We consider this further in the next section.

⁵⁵ Munton, T. et al (forthcoming), *Vulnerability and resilience to Al Qa'ida influenced violent extremism – Learning from the gang, cult, political activism and violent extremism literature*. London: Home Office; Disley, E. et al (forthcoming), *Individual disengagement from violent extremist groups – A Rapid Evidence Assessment*. London: Home Office Publications; Bouhana, N. and Wikström, P. (forthcoming), *Al Qa'ida-influenced radicalisation: A Rapid Evidence Assessment guided by Situational Action Theory*, London: Home Office.

9.41 It is harder to focus limited overseas resources on supporting vulnerable people – the FCO's *Prevent* work overseas has generally targeted projects and programmes at groups. The FCO and DfID will now consider how they can contribute further to this objective. We note that DfID's wealth creation programmes, aimed at reducing poverty and facilitating growth, will help to create jobs and economic opportunities, including access to financial services and skills development. These programmes will also help to address the lack of employment opportunities which may increase the chances of vulnerable people being attracted to terrorism.

10. Objective Three: supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation

Summary

A wide range of sectors in this country are helping to prevent people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The way Government works with particular sectors will vary.

Priority areas include education, faith, health, criminal justice and charities. The internet is also included here as a sector in its own right, although delivery of Prevent programmes through the internet is a theme running through this review and strategy.

Some progress has been made in and with all these sectors. Some sectors (like faith) have been at the forefront of work to tackle radicalisation in this country. But more can and must be done. Like other areas of Prevent, programmes must be proportionate to the risks we face. We engage with these sectors because they are capable of addressing and resolving some of the challenges we face.

This section considers each of these sectors in turn, explains why they are relevant to Prevent, how they are affected by radicalisation, what work has been done to date and what we plan to do in future.

Introduction

- 10.1** In the UK, evidence suggests that radicalisation tends to occur in places where terrorist ideologies, and those that promote them, go uncontested and are not exposed to free, open and balanced debate and challenge. Some of these places are the responsibility of Government, some are Government-funded but have considerable autonomy and others are both privately owned and run (but may still be subject to Government regulation).
- 10.2** As part of this strategy, we will work with these sectors and places to ensure that they understand their obligations in this area, that there is an awareness and understanding of the risks of radicalisation and of how radicalisers work and that each sector is capable of developing an effective response. This objective complements and supports our previous objectives.
- 10.3** The nature of that response and the role of Government in and with it will clearly vary according to the sector. Measures that are suitable in a prison will not be suitable in a university. The role of Government in dialogue with faith institutions will be significantly different from its role in any other area and will raise particular challenges.

- 10.4 For all these reasons, flexibility is therefore required within one broad overall objective: that through preventative work we want to contain and challenge radicalisation and minimise the risks that it may present to our national security.
- 10.5 The first part of this document noted that sympathy for terrorism is highest among young people. Statistically, it is clear that in this country and overseas most terrorist offences are committed by people under the age of 30. We therefore regard it as vital that *Prevent* engages fully – though in differing ways – with schools, higher and further education.
- 10.6 We have also noted (see page 27) that some people engaged in terrorist-related activity in this country have previously been engaged in other forms of criminality. We believe that engagement in criminality can create a vulnerability to radicalisation. We need to minimise the risk of radicalisation of offenders while they are in prison or under supervision in the community – notably, but not only, radicalisation of offenders by people who have been convicted for terrorism-related offences.
- 10.7 This review and strategy are primarily concerned with what we regard as the key threat and risk to the security of the UK – terrorism associated with Al Qa’ida. We know that Al Qa’ida has sought to provide a theological justification for terrorism. We know also that over the past ten years, people sympathetic to Al Qa’ida have sought to use mosques in this country (and overseas) to disseminate Al Qa’ida-related ideology and to radicalise individuals. Mosques, and to some extent madrassahs, therefore play an important part in supporting the new strategy.
- 10.8 We have referred to the internet throughout this document but primarily in the context of how it can be used to facilitate *Prevent* delivery. Here we consider how we deal with the internet as a sector in its own right and the legal framework for doing so.
- 10.9 We also consider below two other sectors – health and charities – where, for different reasons, *Prevent* work is also important.
- 10.10 It is important to recognise that a *Prevent* strategy needs to engage with many of the sectors considered here because they have the capability of addressing and resolving challenges we face. Schools are important not because there is significant evidence to suggest children are being radicalised – there is not – but because they can play a vital role in preparing young people to challenge extremism and the ideology of terrorism and effectively rebut those who are apologists for it. The vast majority of people who attend mosques in this country will have no sympathy with terrorism. It is exactly for that reason that they can play a vital role in reaching out to young people who maybe vulnerable to radicalisation.
- 10.11 The strategy needs to be flexible, aware of risks but also of the proper constraints on Government in developing counter-terrorism work. This section considers *Prevent* in specific sectors, reviews what has been achieved to date and outlines what steps will be taken in future.

Education

Schools and children

Background

- 10.12 In England about 8 million children are educated in some 22,000 publicly-funded and around 2,400 independent schools. The publicly-funded English school system comprises maintained schools (schools maintained by local authorities), and academies (state-funded independent schools).⁵⁶ As part of the Government's changes to the schools system, teachers, parents, and other members of the public will also be able to set up Free Schools where there is demand.
- 10.13 About one-third of publicly funded schools are associated with a specific faith group. Many of these schools give priority in some or all of their admissions to pupils from that faith and many teach religious education and hold collective worship in accordance with its principles.
- 10.14 The privately funded, or independent, English school system also includes a significant proportion of faith schools, mainly funded by fees paid by parents. They set their own curriculum but must comply with the Independent Schools Standards, which include a requirement that schools promote tolerance and harmony between different cultural traditions.
- 10.15 All schools are required by law to teach a broad and balanced curriculum which promotes the spiritual, moral and cultural development of pupils and prepares them for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of life. Publicly funded schools are required to promote community cohesion, a duty first introduced through the Education and Inspections Act 2006.
- 10.16 There are also safeguards against biased or unbalanced teaching and the promotion of partisan political views in publicly funded schools. These require that all reasonably practicable steps are taken to ensure that, where political or controversial issues are brought to pupils' attention, they are offered a balanced presentation of opposing views.⁵⁷
- 10.17 The Education Act 2002 puts a duty on local education authorities, maintained schools and further education institutions, including sixth-form colleges, to exercise their functions with a view to safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children.⁵⁸ The Act puts the same duty on independent schools, including academies, through the Independent Schools Standards.
- 10.18 All publicly-funded schools – including academies and Free Schools – are inspected by the Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted) and are subject to intervention if they fail to provide a satisfactory education. Where failure is very severe schools can be closed.
- 10.19 Privately-funded independent schools are inspected by Ofsted or one of three independent inspectorates. If they fail to meet the Independent School Standards, they must remedy the problem or be subject to de-registration (which would make their continued operation illegal).

⁵⁶ The devolved administrations have different school systems. There are about 1,900 state schools offering free education to more than 470,000 pupils in Wales. Scotland has 2,722 state schools serving around 700,000 pupils.

⁵⁷ Education Act 1996 as regards to maintained schools. These safeguards are reflected in Free School Funding Agreements and will be in Academies' Funding Agreements.

⁵⁸ DCSF (2010) *Working together to Safeguard Children: A guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children*. London: DCSF.

- 10.20 Concerns have been raised about the robustness of the regulatory system for independent schools and in particular about the clarity of the Independent School Standards (the regulations against which independent schools are inspected). In 2009 Ofsted conducted a survey which concluded that, overall, the regulations are fit for purpose, but that there is a lack of clarity in the language of the regulations⁵⁹. If the regulations are not clear, or are not clearly understood, there are clear risks that schools might not fully understand their obligations and that extremist or intolerant messages may go undetected by inspectors. This is of particular concern, given that open-source reporting has suggested that extremism may be more of a problem within some of these institutions than in publicly-funded schools.
- 10.21 The Charity Commission has a regulatory role where schools are charities or are run by charities and are not under the jurisdiction of another regulatory body. The Charity Commission can investigate if charity law is not being observed. Charity law stipulates that education cannot be used to promote a political (including an extremist) point of view (see pages 127-130) for further background).
- 10.22 On 30 March 2011, the Government announced proposals for promoting the compliance of academies, sixth form colleges and foundation and voluntary schools as exempt educational charities. It is proposed that as Principal Regulator, the Department for Education (DfE) would have a role in raising awareness of the principles of charitable status (and the nature of charitable education), similar to the Charity Commission's. However, any misuse of a charity for non-charitable purposes would be for the Commission, in consultation with the Principal Regulator, to address.
- 10.23 Protecting children from harm and promoting their welfare depends on a shared responsibility and effective joint working between different agencies. Section 11 of the Children Act 2011 requires a range of organisations to make arrangements for ensuring that their functions, and services provided on their behalf, are discharged with regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.
- 10.24 Each local authority in England is responsible for establishing a Local Safeguarding Children Board (LSCB) in their area and ensuring it is run effectively. There are 148 LSCBs covering 152 top level Children Services Authorities. The LSCB is the key statutory mechanism for agreeing how the relevant organisations in each local area will cooperate to safeguard and promote the welfare of children, and for ensuring the effectiveness of what they do.
- 10.25 On 10 June 2010, the Secretary of State for Education and Children and the Families Minister asked Professor Eileen Munro to conduct an independent review to improve child protection. The Munro review has been looking at the obstacles preventing improvements to child protection and the steps required to improve child protection. Professor Munro submitted her report at the end of April 2011.
- 10.26 Children spend a substantial amount of time attending out of school clubs and classes, online and informal social activities. With the exception of activities organised by full-time schools, none of these activities are subject to the rules and regulations that apply to schools, although

⁵⁹ Ofsted (2009), *Independent Faith Schools: Is the standard relating to spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils, together with the five regulations underpinning it, fit for purpose?* Manchester: Ofsted. Inspectors visited 51 registered independent primary and secondary faith schools for children from Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist and Hindu religions.

some are bound by child protection and health and safety legislation. Research has shown that out-of-school-hours activities can play an important role in a child's development and academic attainment as well as in communities.⁶⁰

- 10.27 For a significant number of children, at least some out-of-school learning will be about faith. Many children in England (perhaps 100,000) attend Muslim supplementary schools, sometimes referred to as madrassahs.⁶¹ As with other extra-curricular activities like Scouts, sports clubs and Christian Sunday schools, there is no formal regulation or registration process and so the exact number of madrassahs in the UK is not known. Estimates put the number of madrassahs in the UK between 700 and 2,000.⁶²
- 10.28 Madrassahs teach Arabic and Qur'anic studies and some also offer a wider programme of religious instruction. Most mosques have a madrassah but more informal classes are also held in local schools, community centres or in people's homes.⁶³ Children, usually aged between four and fourteen, attend madrassahs after school or at the weekend.

Prevent, schools and children

- 10.29 The youngest person convicted of terrorism-related offences in this country in recent years was 16. He was 15 at the time when he was recruited by a terrorist group. At least 3 separate Al Qaeda-related operations in this country (in 2003, 2005 and 2006) have involved people who, to varying extents, became involved in extremism while they were at school.⁶⁴ Of the 127 convictions for terrorism-related offences associated with Al Qaeda, 11 have been committed by people in the age range of 15-19.⁶⁵
- 10.30 We have seen no systematic attempt to recruit or radicalise people in full time education in this country, either in the state or independent sector. But we do know that some people who are supportive of terrorist groups and ideologies have sought and sometimes gained positions in schools or in groups which work closely with young people. One of the 7/7 bombers, for example, worked as a learning mentor with children at a school in Leeds.
- 10.31 The majority of referrals to the Channel programme (described above, pages 74-81) have been under 25, with most aged between 15 and 19. Very few have been younger.

⁶⁰ Maylor, U., et al (2010), *Impact Of Supplementary Schools On Pupils' Attainment: An Investigation Into What Factors Contribute To Educational Improvements*. London: Department for Children, Schools and Families. Available from: www.education.gov.uk/publications/eOrderingDownload/DCSF-RR210.pdf

⁶¹ See Muslim Parliament of Great Britain (2006), *Child Protection in Faith-based Environments: A Guideline Report*. London: Muslim Parliament of Great Britain. Available from: www.muslimparliament.org.uk/documentation/childprotectionreport.pdf. There are an estimated 5,000 'supplementary schools' in Britain, providing out-of-hours education for children and young people. They offer a range of activities, including lessons on national curriculum subjects, religious studies, language classes and cultural studies as well as sport, music, dance and drama. Generally, they are run in the evenings and at weekends, are set up by local community groups and tend to operate in a variety of venues. Some supplementary education is faith-based.

⁶² Cherti, M., Glennie, A., Bradley, L. (2011), *'Madrassahs' in the British media*. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.

⁶³ Hart Dyke, A. (2009) *Mosques made in Britain*. London: Quilliam Foundation 487 mosques responded to the survey conducted in September 2008. 86% said that they held classes in the evening during the week, 23% at weekends and only 5% said that they had no classes at all.

⁶⁴ See Taylor, P (2010), *Talking to Terrorists: A Personal Journey from the IRA to Al Qaeda*. London. Harper Press.

⁶⁵ Simcox, R., Stuart H. and Ahmed, H. (2010), *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*. London: The Centre for Social Cohesion, p.229.

- 10.32 There have been allegations that a minority of independent faith schools have been actively promoting views that are contrary to British values, such as intolerance of other cultures and gender inequality.⁶⁶ There have also been reports that some independent faith schools have allowed extremist views to be expressed by staff, visitors or pupils.⁶⁷ In 2009, Ofsted found that 8 out of 51 independent faith schools surveyed were found to be displaying teaching materials that had a bias in favour of one particular group.⁶⁸ Some teaching materials were also seen to contain biased or incorrect information about other religions.
- 10.33 Recent media reports have suggested that some madrassahs are promoting a highly conservative version of Islam and promulgating extremist views, particularly against non-Muslims. A BBC Panorama investigation in November 2010 reported that some madrassahs were using textbooks with anti-Semitic and homophobic messages.⁶⁹ The Government is currently considering ways to stop children coming into contact with material of this kind in and out of school provision.

Activity to date

- 10.34 Over the last few years in England, DfE has engaged in a range of *Prevent*-related initiatives through a dedicated *Prevent* team.
- 10.35 Following an informal consultation process with headteachers and local authority children's services in early 2008, the Department published a toolkit to help schools prevent what was described as 'violent extremism'. The toolkit sought to raise awareness of the risks from violent extremism and provided guidance on developing a positive and inclusive ethos that championed democratic values and human rights.
- 10.36 To support the roll-out of the toolkit, and efforts to tailor it to local conditions, DfE and OSCT provided £4.7m to local authorities and the police. An additional £950,000 was made available regionally to support local authorities and schools in embedding the toolkit. Following requests for more practical advice, DfE developed a 'workbook', based on the Ofsted self-evaluation framework, which linked *Prevent* in to other school safety and improvement policies.
- 10.37 In 2009, ACPO produced guidance entitled '*Prevent, Police and Schools*' to help police officers work more effectively with teachers and school staff. ACPO have also developed an initiative called 'Act Now' which helps stimulate debate on violent extremism. The product is aimed at young people and explores political and historical terrorism as well as human rights.
- 10.38 In 2008-09, ACPO, DfE and OSCT provided funding for 'Watch Over Me', a DVD designed to help secondary school teachers discuss challenging topics such as terrorism. DVD box sets of this series have been given out to every secondary school in England and training events were held for police officers, teachers and community leaders.

⁶⁶ Bald, J. et al (2010), *Faith Schools we can believe in*. London: Policy Exchange and MacEoin, D. (2009), *Music, Chess and other Sins: Segregation, Integration and Muslim Schools in Britain*. London: Civitas.

⁶⁷ BBC Panorama (2010), *British Schools, Islamic Rules*. 22 November; and Channel 4 Dispatches (2011), *Lessons in Hate and Violence*. 14 February.

⁶⁸ Ofsted (2009), *Independent Faith Schools: Is the standard relating to spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils, together with the five regulations underpinning it, fit for purpose?* Manchester: Ofsted.

⁶⁹ BBC Panorama (2010), *British Schools, Islamic Rules*. 22 November.

- 10.39 DfE, DCLG and the Department for Children, Education, Lifelong Learning and Skills in Wales also funded the Religious Education Council of England and Wales to deliver the 'Resilience' project. The project provided training and materials to help teachers of religious education discuss contentious issues, including extremism.
- 10.40 To reach children and young people outside school, DfE has jointly funded two projects with DCLG: the Islam and Citizenship Education project (ICE) and the Young Muslims Advisory Group (YMAG). ICE sought to help young Muslims in 300 madrassahs and 100 independent Muslim faith schools explore their faith and understand its compatibility with broader citizenship values. YMAG was designed to help young Muslims find solutions to a range of challenges, including discrimination, extremism and civic participation.
- 10.41 Local authorities are increasingly recognising *Prevent* as an important issue in safeguarding young people. According to a DfE assessment in March 2010, 61% of local authorities' children's services were actively engaged in *Prevent* work and had a specific plan in place to engage schools (though this does not necessarily reflect on whether the quality and scope of that engagement is appropriate). This is an increase of 11% from 2009.
- 10.42 Awareness of *Prevent* in schools has increased. A survey conducted by Ipsos MORI in 2011 indicated that a majority of schools (84%) know at least *something* about their role in preventing violent extremism and most (75%) regard this role as important.⁷⁰ But a significant minority (20%) disagreed. A majority of schools (70%) felt they need more training and information to build resilience to radicalisation.⁷¹
- 10.43 The three information sources on *Prevent* most widely used by schools surveyed by Ipsos MORI were guidance issued by DfE, local authority guidance and the media. Only a small number (26%) of schools surveyed had used the police to provide information and support about *Prevent*.

Next steps

- 10.44 We regard *Prevent* work with children and with schools as an important part of the strategy. But this work needs to be proportionate. It must not start from a misplaced assumption that there is a significant problem that needs to be resolved. We have seen some evidence of very limited radicalisation of children by extremist or terrorist groups. There is further evidence that some schools – and some supplementary schools – have used teaching materials which may encourage intolerance. And we know that some extremist or terrorist organisations have held positions of influence in education or in other organisations working closely with children. But these issues must be kept in perspective. And they are not all within the remit of *Prevent*.
- 10.45 Schools can help to protect children from extremist and violent views in the same ways that they help to safeguard children from drugs, gang violence or alcohol. Schools' work on *Prevent* needs to be seen in this context. The purpose must be to protect children from harm and to ensure that they are taught in a way that is consistent with the law and our values. Awareness of *Prevent* and the risks it is intended to address are both vital. Staff can help to identify, and to refer to the relevant agencies, children whose behaviour suggests that they are being drawn into terrorism or extremism.

⁷⁰ Ipsos MORI (2011), *Community Cohesion and Prevent: How have schools responded?* London: Department for Education. Available from: www.education.gov.uk/publications/eOrderingDownload/DFE-RR085.pdf

⁷¹ *ibid*

- 10.46 We are particularly concerned not to encourage or create an environment where children are referred to the support programmes discussed in the previous chapter (for example, Channel) unless there is very clear evidence that they are being radicalised and there is clearly no alternative or more proportionate means of dealing with the issue. Referring very young people has rightly been a source of community concern and risks undermining the credibility of the Channel programme as a whole.
- 10.47 We believe that schools of all kinds can play a role in enabling young people to explore issues like terrorism and the wider use of violence in a considered and informed way. According to a survey by the UK Youth Parliament in August 2008, 94% of young people said they thought schools were the best environment in which to discuss terrorism.⁷² We agree. Schools can facilitate understanding of wider issues within the context of learning about the values on which our society is founded and our system of democratic government. These are important for reasons which go far beyond *Prevent* but they connect to the *Prevent* agenda.
- 10.48 The Government's vision for the English school system is set out in *The Importance of Teaching: Schools White Paper 2010*⁷³. The White Paper explains the importance of head teachers having the freedom to manage their own institutions and the need to keep top-down bureaucracy to a minimum. Teachers, parents and other members of the public will be able to apply to set up Free Schools where there is demand.
- 10.49 The Government is clear that there is no place for extremists in any school. That is why a Preventing Extremism Unit, which includes experts in counter-terrorism, has been established within DfE. The unit will work with partners across Government and beyond. The Preventing Extremism Unit will conduct effective financial and non-financial 'due diligence' to minimise the risk that unsuitable providers can set up Free Schools. The unit is expected to become a centre of excellence of its kind for due diligence on individuals and groups who may use education as their route into radicalisation.
- 10.50 Free Schools must be inclusive. A rigorous process will minimise the risk of unsuitable providers. Applicants will also need to demonstrate that they would support UK democratic values including support for individual liberties within the law, equality, mutual tolerance and respect.
- 10.51 The White Paper also proposes changes to the inspection of publicly funded schools so that it focuses on schools' core education purpose and exempts outstanding schools from routine inspection. The Chief Inspector will retain discretion to re-inspect any school about which Ofsted has concerns.
- 10.52 Working with DfE, Ofsted will ensure that inspectors have the necessary knowledge and expertise to determine whether extremist and intolerant beliefs are being promoted in a school and then to take appropriate action. Consideration is being given to strengthening Independent School Standards. DfE is working to establish a new set of standards for teachers and an independent review has been set up to look at how these can include standards of ethics and behaviour; In future, new standards should better enable schools to take action against staff who demonstrate unacceptable views.⁷⁴

⁷² www.ukyp.org.uk/debatable

⁷³ www.education.gov.uk/publications/standard/publicationdetail/page1/CM%207980

⁷⁴ www.education.gov.uk/schools/teachingandlearning/reviewofstandards

- 10.53 Publicly funded schools remain under a duty to promote community cohesion. The Education Bill which is currently before Parliament removes the current duty on Ofsted to report on schools' contribution to community cohesion. However, the stronger focus on teaching and learning and a continuing focus on provision for pupils' spiritual, moral, social and cultural development will enable inspectors to identify inappropriate practice, including the promotion of messages that undermine community cohesion.
- 10.54 The Government is considering ways to stop children coming into contact with extremist views in out-of-hours provision with partners such as Ofsted and the police.
- 10.55 Over the lifetime of this strategy, DfE will undertake the following *Prevent*-related work in England:
- ensure that teachers and other school staff know what to do when they see signs that a child is at risk of radicalisation;
 - continue to collaborate and encourage collaboration with policing and the development of products for teachers;
 - as part of the planned changes to the inspection arrangements for maintained schools, give due weight to schools' activities in support of our shared values, and for any concerns to be reflected in the report;
 - strengthen the Independent School Standards to ensure that schools understand their obligations;
 - establish a set of standards for teachers which clarifies obligations regarding extremism;
 - provide effective financial and non-financial 'due diligence' to minimise the risk that those with unacceptable views can set up Free Schools or gain control of academies or other publicly-funded schools;
 - work with the Charity Commission to ensure that schools that are charities and under their jurisdiction comply with charity law;
 - work to reduce the risk that children and young people are exposed to extremist views in out of school hours provision; and
 - help children's services work with schools and other agencies, including Channel, to identify children at risk of radicalisation and take necessary steps to protect them from harm.

Higher and further education

Background

- 10.56 Universities and colleges promote and facilitate the exchange of opinion and ideas, and enable debate as well as learning. The Government has no wish to limit or otherwise interfere with this free flow of ideas, and we must be careful to balance the need to preserve national security with protecting our civil liberties.

- 10.57 We are completely committed to protecting freedom of speech in this country. But universities and colleges also have a legal and moral obligation to staff and students to ensure that the place of work and study is a tolerant, welcoming and safe environment.⁷⁵ Although it is vital that universities and colleges must protect academic freedom, it is a long-established principle that universities also have a duty of care to their students. Universities and colleges – and, to some extent, university societies and student groups – have a clear and unambiguous role to play in helping to safeguard vulnerable young people from radicalisation and recruitment by terrorist organisations.
- 10.58 The sector is regulated by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE). Universities and other higher education institutions are charities and must comply with charity law, guidance on which is provided by the Charity Commission. The Charities Act 2006 requires all student unions to register with the Charity Commission by the end of June 2011 after which student unions in England and Wales are regulated by the Charity Commission and governed by charities legislation.⁷⁶
- 10.59 Legally, all charities must work for the public benefit and must act to avoid damage to the charity's reputation, assets and associated individuals. Higher education institutions and student unions can be challenged on whether they have given due consideration to the public benefit and associated risks notably when they, or one of their affiliated societies, invite controversial or extremist speakers to address students. Student unions and higher education institutions should also take an interest in the activities and views being expressed within affiliated societies to ensure compliance with charities legislation, which includes provisions relating to human rights, equalities and political neutrality.
- 10.60 Further information on charities legislation can be found in the section on the charitable sector below (pages 127-130). The Education (2) Act 1986 also requires higher and further education institutions to maintain and update a code of practice on the freedom of speech, setting out procedures and conduct for organising and attending meetings.

Higher and further education and Prevent

- 10.61 More than 30% of people convicted for Al Qa'ida-associated terrorist offences in the UK between 1999 and 2009 are known to have attended university or a higher education institution. Another 15% studied or achieved a vocational or further education qualification. About 10% of the sample were students at the time when they were charged or the incident for which they were convicted took place. These statistics roughly correspond to classified data about the educational backgrounds of those who have engaged recently in terrorist-related activity in this country: a significant proportion has attended further or higher education.⁷⁷
- 10.62 Some students were already committed to terrorism before they began their university courses: some of those convicted following Operation Overt are an example.⁷⁸ Other students were radicalised while they studied at university, but by people operating outside of the university itself: they include the terrorist who recently killed himself in an attempted terrorist attack in Sweden, and who had been educated in Luton.

⁷⁵ As regards staff, see Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and Equality Act 2010. They are available at www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1974/37/contents and www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/contents respectively.

⁷⁶ There are separate provisions and regulators for Scotland and Northern Ireland.

⁷⁷ Simcox, R., Stuart H. and Ahmed, H. (2010), *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*. London: The Centre for Social Cohesion. pp.227-232 and 237-245.

⁷⁸ www.bbc.co.uk/news/10455915

- 10.63 A third group of students appear to have been attracted to and influenced by extremist ideology while at university and engaged in terrorism-related activity after they had left. We believe that the person responsible for the attempted bombing of an aircraft over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009 was an example.
- 10.64 We believe that this data is important in highlighting ways in which universities can play a key role in *Prevent* while still upholding their commitment to academic freedom and learning.
- 10.65 We have considered throughout this report the way in which terrorist groups can make use of extremist ideas developed by extremist organisations. We have said that where this is the case we need to be able to challenge those ideas and the organisations that exploit freedoms in this country to promote them.
- 10.66 We believe there is unambiguous evidence to indicate that some extremist organisations, notably Hizb-ut-Tahrir, target specific universities and colleges (notably those with a large number of Muslim students) with the objective of radicalising and recruiting students. The Al-Muhajiroun organisation has done the same. Although that group has now been proscribed under counter-terrorism legislation, splinter groups from it continue to operate in the same way.
- 10.67 We also judge that some extremist preachers from this country and from overseas, not connected to specific extremist groups, have also sought to repeatedly reach out to selected universities and to Muslim students. There is evidence to suggest that some people associated with some Islamic student societies have facilitated this activity and that it has largely gone unchallenged. Five former senior members of university Islamic societies have also been convicted of terrorism-related offences.⁷⁹
- 10.68 Following the failed Detroit bombing, Universities UK (UUK) – the main higher education sector umbrella body – set up a working group to look at ways to prevent radicalisation on campuses while protecting freedom of speech. In its report published earlier this year, UUK concluded that the higher education sector does need to be vigilant and aware of the challenges posed by extremism.⁸⁰
- 10.69 The report focused largely on universities' legal responsibilities relating to freedom of speech and academic freedom. It made recommendations regarding universities' work with charity and higher education regulators and student unions as part of future efforts to tackle extremism, which we come back to later in this chapter.
- 10.70 The UUK report noted that managing potentially controversial speakers is a challenge for universities. Some universities were found to have well-developed protocols in place but the report recommended that universities should review their arrangements, and ensure they were aligned with their student union.

⁷⁹ Centre for Social Cohesion (2010), *Radical Islam on UK Campuses: A comprehensive list of extremist speakers at UK universities*. London: Centre for Social Cohesion. Available from: www.socialcohesion.co.uk/files/1292336866_1.pdf

⁸⁰ Universities UK (2011), *Freedom of Speech on Campus: Rights and Responsibilities in UK Universities*. London: Universities UK. Available from: www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/Publications/Documents/FreedomOfSpeechOnCampusRightsAndResponsibilitiesInUKuniversities.pdf

Activity to date

- 10.71 In England, BIS has led recent work to tackle extremism and radicalisation in the sector. We have touched on some of their work above (pages 99-100).
- 10.72 In 2009, BIS identified about 40 English universities where there may be particular risk of radicalisation or recruitment on campus. BIS invited these universities to assess their ability to manage this risk. Not all of the institutions responded to the request.
- 10.73 For those universities that did, the assessment looked at their working relationships with key *Prevent* partners including the police, their internal policies and procedures to identify and manage risk and the training and awareness-raising provision within each institution. This highlighted some good practice and the need for sharing of best practice, intelligence and training to help faculty and other staff identify the signs of radicalisation and understand how to offer support.
- 10.74 In 2009, these universities received intelligence briefings and were subsequently offered a small grant for further *Prevent* work and training. Some of these universities now have a dedicated police officer to advise on these issues.
- 10.75 The majority of work in this area has focused on providing advice, guidance and support to help institutions manage the risk of radicalisation on campus. Guidance for all higher education institutions was issued in 2008. In conjunction with the police, the Home Office and the National Union of Students (NUS), BIS have also supported a number of projects designed to help key members of staff to identify vulnerability when they see it and offer appropriate support.
- 10.76 Most of the 650 student unions in the UK are affiliated to the NUS and BIS have funded a full-time position there to build a better knowledge base and to develop training materials for staff working within student unions. The NUS also operates a 'No Platform' policy, which forbids any officer of the NUS sharing a platform with a 'racist' or 'fascist'. Organisations currently subject to the 'No Platform' policy are the British National Party, Combat 18, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, MPAC UK, and the National Front. This policy has been largely effective although some organisations seek to circumvent it by changing their name to avoid detection.
- 10.77 The NUS has recently produced a Good Governance Code of Practice for its member unions to help them adjust to their new status as registered charities.⁸¹ The new code aims to promote good practice in student union governance and provide a framework for a good working relationship between student unions and their university or college. The Charity Commission has also recently produced guidance aimed at trustees of charities on how to perform 'due diligence' of individuals and organisations associated with the charity.⁸²
- 10.78 The NUS has taken positive steps towards tackling extremism, including building their relationship with a number of their affiliated societies including the umbrella body for Islamic societies, the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS). We judge that FOSIS has not always fully challenged terrorist and extremist ideology within the higher and further education sectors. FOSIS needs to give clearer leadership to their affiliated societies in this area.

⁸¹ www.nusconnect.org.uk/goodgovernance/sections/

⁸² Charity Commission (2011), *Compliance Toolkit: protecting charities from harm (the 'compliance toolkit')*. London: Charity Commission. Available from: www.charitycommission.gov.uk/Our_regulatory_activity/Counter_terrorism_work/protecting_charities_landing.aspx

- 10.79 There are several examples of students engaging in terrorism or related activities while members of university societies affiliated to FOSIS. Such extremists must have no part in any organisation that wishes to be recognised as a representative body. It is critical that FOSIS continue to strengthen their engagement with the NUS and that (like any other student body), their members take a clear and unequivocal position against extremism and terrorism. Although FOSIS have received no direct funding from BIS, the Department does give FOSIS advice and guidance on how to improve their ability to communicate to their members.
- 10.80 Some local authorities have engaged with universities and colleges and included them on *Prevent* groups alongside representatives from the local police, the local authority and youth and probation services.
- 10.81 Research by the Institute of Community Cohesion in March 2010 showed that there remain concerns across both the higher and further education sectors about the skills and confidence of staff to deal with radicalisation.⁸³ This survey illustrates the demand for better information sharing. According to this research, only 45% of universities and 40% of colleges engaged with any frequency with the police on *Prevent* related work and 40% of universities and 30% of colleges with local authorities.
- 10.82 There has been much less activity in the further education sector than in universities: what activity there has been has tended to focus on guidance and training. *Prevent* guidance to local partners, published in 2008, made it clear that colleges need to be part of local *Prevent* partnerships. In 2009, two further documents set out the role that colleges can play in preventing violent extremism, including a toolkit with practical advice. ACPO has distributed guidance emphasising the importance of police entering into an ongoing dialogue with staff and students in colleges and are currently developing further guidance.
- 10.83 In 2008, the Champion Principals Group, made up of college principals, was established to provide leadership for the further education sector. The group has promoted available guidance and helped raise awareness and engagement levels in colleges across the country.

Next steps

- 10.84 Universities and colleges have an important role to play in *Prevent*, particularly in ensuring balanced debate as well as freedom of speech. They also have a clear responsibility to exercise their duty of care and to protect the welfare of their students. We firmly believe these objectives are consistent with a commitment to academic freedom and learning. We believe this is recognised in the UUK report.
- 10.85 We have seen that people may be radicalised at different points in their life. Whether radicalisation occurs on campus or elsewhere, staff in higher and further education institutions can identify and offer support to people who may be drawn into extremism and terrorism.
- 10.86 We accept that universities and colleges of further education will need guidance, information and best practice to address these issues, for example, no single group should be allowed to control prayer facilities on any campus. But we are concerned that some universities and colleges have failed to engage in *Prevent*.

⁸³ Beider, H. and Briggs, R. (2010), *Promoting Community Cohesion and Preventing Violent Extremism in Higher and Further Education*. London: Institute of Community Cohesion.

- 10.87 This lack of engagement must be addressed. We believe that staff in every university and college have a responsibility for the welfare of individual students as well as the wider student body. University and college staff should have access to support if they suspect one of their students may be becoming radicalised. We will support the sector to improve their capacity in this area, training staff to recognise the signs of radicalisation and helping them improve their awareness of the help that is available.
- 10.88 We note that much less has been done with further education colleges, although young people at college may be as vulnerable to radicalisation as those attending university and for the same reasons. This is a gap in activity which we will also address as a priority.
- 10.89 BIS will lead the delivery of *Prevent* in these sectors. Over the life-time of this strategy, BIS will, with the assistance of other Departments where appropriate, undertake the following work:
- help universities and colleges better understand the risk of radicalisation on and off campus and secure wider and more consistent support from institutions of most concern;
 - work to ensure that all institutions where there is risk of radicalisation recognise their duty of care to students to protect them from the consequences of their becoming involved in terrorism, and take reasonable steps to minimise this risk;
 - support local police forces in working with those institutions assessed to be at the greatest risk;
 - create better links between universities, colleges, local authorities and communities engaged in *Prevent* work;
 - establish links between universities and colleges and local programmes to support people vulnerable to radicalisation;
 - appoint regional champions in each of the nine regions in England and host a central point of information where practitioners can share information, advice and good practice;
 - fund the NUS to undertake a programme of work to ensure that their sabbatical officers and full time staff are fully trained and equipped to manage their responsibilities under charities legislation and are able to implement the NUS' guidance on external speakers.
 - work closely with UUK and the Association of Colleges to provide advice, guidance and support particularly to universities and colleges that are in *Prevent* priority areas;
 - ensure that HEFCE and the Charity Commission execute their regulatory duties consistently across the sector; and
 - work with the police and other partners to ensure that student societies and university and college staff have the right information and guidance to enable them to make decisions about external speakers.

The internet

Background

- 10.90 The internet has transformed the extent to which terrorist organisations and their sympathisers can radicalise people in this country and overseas. It enables a wider range of organisations and individuals to reach a much larger audience with a broader and more dynamic series of messages and narratives. It encourages interaction and facilitates recruitment. The way people use the internet also appears to be conducive to these processes. Despite the wealth of information available, people often talk to those whose views are similar to their own, encouraging group thinking and inhibiting external challenge.
- 10.91 For many years, the security and intelligence agencies and police have worked to disrupt the ability of terrorists to use the internet for operational purposes. But tackling terrorist use of the internet is as vital to *Prevent* as it is to *Pursue*.
- 10.92 Many of the programmes we have outlined in the sections above depend on the internet for successful delivery. RICU, for example (see pages 65-66) runs a range of projects designed to challenge terrorist ideology online through effective counter-narratives, positive messaging from credible sources and critical analysis of extremist propaganda.
- 10.93 But there are a number of internet-specific measures which we need to take to address the threat of radicalisation online. They include steps to:
- limit access to harmful content online in specific sectors or premises (notably schools, public libraries and other public buildings); and
 - ensure that action is taken to try to remove unlawful and harmful content from the internet.
- 10.94 This work will require effective dialogue with the private sector and in particular the internet industry. It will also require collaboration with international partners: the great majority of the websites and chat rooms which concern us in the context of radicalisation are hosted overseas.
- 10.95 The legal framework for this work is provided by Sections 1 and 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 (TACT), which create the offences of encouragement of terrorism (s.1) and the dissemination of terrorist publications (s.2). Section 3 of TACT provides that those served with notices who fail to remove, without reasonable excuse, the material that is unlawful and terrorism-related within a specified period are treated as endorsing it.
- 10.96 The serving of notices was intended to achieve the rapid and effective removal of material. Notices can be served on anyone involved in electronic publication or dissemination.

Activity to date

- 10.97 A cross-departmental approach to counter-terrorism on the internet, including programmes in the areas set out above, is coordinated by OSCT.

- 10.98 OSCT has engaged with DfE, Regional Broadband Consortia and the filtering software industry to explore effective filtering options across the public estate (for example, schools, libraries, etc).⁸⁴ DfE and OSCT have also secured the inclusion of language that promotes terrorism and extremism in the filtering technology 'kitemark'.⁸⁵ The kitemark covers commercial filtering software on sale to schools and families and the first accredited product is now on the market.
- 10.99 The police have made no use of formal Section 3 notices as had been intended by the legislation. In practice a close relationship with the industry in this country has meant that, once alerted to its existence, providers have removed material voluntarily. The powers have proved ineffective in dealing with content hosted overseas.
- 10.100 10.100. In early 2010 the police, in association with the Home Office, launched a Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU). The CTIRU is a dedicated police unit intended to assess and investigate internet-based content which may be illegal under UK law and to take appropriate action against it, either through the criminal justice system or by making representations to internet service providers or, where necessary, by both these means. The CTIRU has removed material from the internet on 156 occasions over the last 15 months. The CTIRU is beginning to liaise with law enforcement agencies overseas to obtain agreement to remove websites in their jurisdiction.
- 10.101 Online material can be referred to the CTIRU through the Directgov website, which also explains how material which is unlawful or offensive can be referred directly to the company which hosts the relevant site and whose contractual terms of use may be breached by it.⁸⁶
- 10.102 As well as police activity to enforce the law, there have been some projects intended to educate internet users so that they can protect themselves online. These projects have educated users in the techniques being used by online radicalisers and have reached schools, community groups, youth centres and mosques. Some are police-led; others have been taken forward by local authorities with *Prevent* funding.
- 10.103 OSCT has engaged with the internet industry to explain the Government position on acceptable material and explore ways to reflect that position in industry standards and best practice. Internet service providers set out their own terms of use and act when they find that these terms have been breached. To help their users, they provide mechanisms to highlight examples of unacceptable use: we note that YouTube has introduced a 'promoting terrorism' referral flag for videos of a terrorist nature, enabling YouTube users to report terrorist content which might be in breach of YouTube's Community Guidelines. If found to be in breach, YouTube will remove it.
- 10.104 Among other initiatives, OSCT has secured agreement from AOL to assist in raising the visibility of the Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorism Hotline by ensuring it is presented when certain specific search requests are entered.

⁸⁴ Regional Broadband Consortia (RBCs) are associations of local authorities established to provide cost-effective broadband connectivity to schools in England.

⁸⁵ Kitemark is a registered mark owned and awarded by BSI, the kitemark was originally developed by the British Standards Institution. This kitemark is in reference to the PAS 74 (Publicly Accessible Specification 74:2008. Access control systems for the protection of children online).

⁸⁶ www.direct.gov.uk/reportingonlineterrorism

10.105 There has been some multilateral collaboration on the issue of terrorist use of the internet. Europol's 'Check the Web' project aims to strengthen cooperation between member states while also sharing the task of monitoring and evaluating terrorist and extremist internet open sources on a voluntary basis. The European Commission's 'Public Private Dialogue to Fight Online Illegal Activities' seeks EU-wide voluntary self-regulatory measures to tackle crime, child exploitation and terrorism.

Next steps

10.106 We have reviewed the programme of activity to date and the steps that might be taken to strengthen it. We believe that the overall *range* of activities is appropriate: promoting the filtering out of harmful content; law enforcement action; educating users; working with industry and international engagement. These initiatives are in addition to those throughout this document which seek to deliver *Prevent* and *Prevent*-related projects through the internet.

10.107 But in each area much more is needed. We do not yet have a filtering product which has been rolled out comprehensively across Government Departments, agencies and statutory organisations and we are unable to determine the extent to which effective filtering is in place in schools and public libraries. Given the scale of the challenge, the inception of CTIRU was late (and we have no data at all on the number of interventions made before it was created) and the number of referrals to the CTIRU is still not yet sufficient: the numbers of websites which have been disrupted so far is a fraction of the problem. Many countries are not sufficiently seized of the threat posed by terrorist use of the internet.

10.108 Internet filtering across the public estate is essential. We want to ensure that users in schools, libraries, colleges and Immigration Removal Centres are unable to access unlawful material. We will continue to work closely with DfE, BIS, the CTIRU, Regional Broadband Consortia and the filtering industry. We want to explore the potential for violent and unlawful URL lists to be voluntarily incorporated into independent national blocking lists, including the list operated by the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF).

10.109 CTIRU needs to become a model of international best practice. We expect the CTIRU to develop further its technical, investigative and international capabilities. OSCT will work with the CTIRU, international law enforcement and industry to foster an environment of mutual assistance with respect to the further removal of terrorist material across the globe. We also believe the CTIRU can play a significant role in developing an unlawful URL blocking list for use across the public estate.

10.110 We should continue to educate internet users at risk. We will encourage programmes of this kind, led by local police forces, communities and local authorities, raising awareness of the CTIRU and Directgov websites. Local police forces will incorporate the CTIRU into talks, training sessions and other forms of support they give to libraries, internet cafés and schools. The objective is simply to better enable communities to alert the authorities and the industry to content which is harmful and possibly illegal.

10.111 We will want to engage effectively with the internet industry and encourage corporate social responsibility. We will continue to engage and draw on the experience of the international internet industry, encouraging and supporting further voluntary measures and cooperation with the CTIRU. We will encourage more user regulatory measures such as terrorist video referral mechanisms, clearer and more visible acceptable use policies and stronger enforcement of user referrals which highlight breaches.

- 10.112 We must also step up our international work, where our most important single relationship is with the United States. The US is by far the biggest provider of internet hosting services in the world, and therefore terrorists have hosted significant amounts of material on servers in the US, the content of which can breach UK legislation and be freely viewed by UK users. We are engaged with the US Government in this area on a basis of mutual understanding and valuing of each others' legislation. We are also in contact with the internet community in the US, with their strong sense of social responsibility, to help address this problem. The Government welcomes the developments in this area and will support and encourage further activity going forward.
- 10.113 We will also continue to work closely with the EU and EU Member States to explore self-regulatory measures to tackle terrorist use of the internet and seek to optimise existing projects and initiatives. Although there have been some bilateral exchanges with EU Member States to date, this has not proceeded systematically and we will take steps to improve those connections.

Faith institutions and organisations

Background

- 10.114 Historically, many terrorist groups have tried to legitimise their actions by reference to theology. Religion has provided both a motivation and an apparent justification for their actions. Contemporary terrorist groups therefore belong to a tradition: Al Qa'ida and like-minded organisations seek to radicalise and recruit people using what purports to be a theological argument. Members of Al Qa'ida often also seek specific religious sanction and approval for terrorist operations. That approval is sometimes provided by other members of Al Qa'ida who claim religious credibility, sometimes by members of other organisations and sometimes by people with no direct contact with any terrorist group but who broadly support their ideology, aims and objectives.
- 10.115 It follows that faith institutions and organisations can play a very important role in preventative activity. They can lead the challenge to an ideology that purports to provide theological justification for terrorism. They will often have authority and credibility not available to Government. They can provide more specific and direct support to those who are being groomed to terrorism by those who claim religious expertise and use what appear to be religious arguments. They can also play a wider and no less vital role in helping create a society which recognises the rights and the contributions of different faith groups, endorses tolerance and the rule of law and encourages participation and interaction. People who subscribe to these values and principles are unlikely to turn to terrorism.
- 10.116 For almost twenty years, organisations whose views we now associate with Al Qa'ida sought to infiltrate mosques in this country and sometimes even to set up mosques of their own. Where that has not been possible – very often because mosques have resisted their efforts – individual extremist preachers have sought to develop an autonomous role and identity and to develop what amounts to their own 'brand'. Some have created extremist organisations and institutions to better disseminate their views.
- 10.117 Community resistance has reduced the open operation of radical preachers in this country: this is encouraging. Some extremist preachers have been arrested and prosecuted; others are awaiting deportation or have been refused entry to this country. Few mosques now openly and

knowingly promote extremist or terrorist views. In some areas, groups and individuals continue their attempts to subvert mosques, to use them for extremist purposes or to encourage violence and to raise funds for groups in this country or overseas engaged in terrorist-related activity. Elsewhere, activity has been displaced to areas and venues which are less public and in particular to private study groups which operate in private premises or on the internet.

- 10.118 The Government will seek a dialogue with faith institutions which are under threat from extremist and terrorist organisations, irrespective of the faith concerned. The Government also needs to have a dialogue with faith institutions who can best address the ideological challenge of terrorism and support people who are lured into terrorist activity. But the dialogue, so vital to *Prevent* work, is clearly sensitive and needs to be handled with care. It cannot be separated from broader issues about the relationship between Government and faith communities.

Activity to date

- 10.119 At a time when Al Qa'ida and like-minded groups have posed the major threat to our national security, *Prevent* recognised the key importance of working with mosques. Since 2005, the police and local authorities have sought a much closer (albeit lower profile) dialogue with mosques and their governing bodies and in many cases also with the national or regional faith groups of which they are members. The police now talk regularly to mosques in a way that was very rare before 2005, advising about the terrorist threat and taking advice on the perspectives of the local community.
- 10.120 That dialogue has been complemented by official and Ministerial exchanges with national and local Muslim organisations. This has hitherto been coordinated and run from DCLG in England and by different Departments in Wales and Scotland.
- 10.121 In 2007, DCLG facilitated the creation of a Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), founded by four national Muslim organisations who continue to hold vice-chair positions on an executive board of over fifty people from a wide range of backgrounds. MINAB now has over 600 mosques as members. Its purpose is to improve mosque governance and management and to enable imams to work in this country and with young people in particular. This work was funded by *Prevent* on the basis that better-governed mosques and more capable imams would increase what was then described as 'community resilience' to terrorism (see above, pages 110-111).
- 10.122 For similar reasons, DCLG also supported the Charity Commission's Faith and Social Cohesion Unit which offered support to mosques in developing their finance and governance structures while enabling them to benefit from charitable status. The Charity Commission has also encouraged mosques to register as charities and has provided advice on how to do so.
- 10.123 DCLG and DfE have helped to develop lesson materials for madrassahs. The aim of this programme (Islam and Citizenship Education, or ICE) was to provide teachers with the tools to demonstrate to young Muslims that their faith is compatible with wider shared values and that being a Muslim is also compatible with being a good citizen. Using DCLG *Prevent* funding, some local authorities have also supported *Prevent*-related initiatives with mosques. The DCLG 'Community Leadership Fund' (under the auspices of *Prevent*) was intended to support Muslim organisations and communities.

Next steps

- 10.124 We believe it is essential to work with faith institutions and organisations to deal with the challenge of terrorism in general and *Prevent* in particular. But the work in this area to date has not always been successful and the Government has already made some changes to it.
- 10.125 As a general principle, responsibility for coordinating the dialogue at a national level on terrorism with faith institutions and groups has been moved from DCLG to the OSCT in the Home Office. The Government has already concluded that it is wrong for a Department whose responsibility is for a broad range of community issues to lead on matters of national security. This increases the risk that the security dialogue becomes dominant and marginalises dialogue on a wide range of other issues. We think this has happened in the last few years and has led to *Prevent* assuming a disproportionate role in exchanges between Government and some faith groups. It also disconnects the Department having the dialogue (in this case DCLG) from the Department with the policy responsibility for terrorism (the Home Office).
- 10.126 The Home Office will seek a broad dialogue with faith-based groups and institutions covering a range of counter-terrorism and security issues – not just those confined to *Prevent*. It is essential that faith groups – like other organisations – are able not only to identify concerns they may have about security issues but also to discuss how those concerns can be addressed and consider ways in which they can help deal with the security-related challenges which we have. But care is needed to ensure that that this dialogue does not lead the Home Office, holding responsibility for counter-terrorism, to be assuming responsibility for much wider community issues.
- 10.127 DCLG will continue to have the lead policy responsibility for faith communities in England. The Department will support inter-faith work which we judge can have benefits for *Prevent*. DCLG is also undertaking a series of Ministerial discussions with individual faith communities on developing the Big Society and promoting integration.
- 10.128 The dialogue on terrorism and security with faith groups and institutions must also continue to take place at a local level. This is vital. Although some national organisations can helpfully coordinate activity, they cannot and do not always reflect the views of their many affiliated members. Local dialogue can better and more quickly resolve local problems. We believe that the police and local authority dialogue with faith groups and organisations has progressed well. As so often with *Prevent*, evaluation has not been sufficiently thorough to give us clear evidence of this but polling on attitudes to policing tends to support the claim (see page 137, below).
- 10.129 We believe that it will also be vital that given the threats and risks we face, faith leaders (imams in particular, but also other role models) are able to engage with young people and talk to them about the issues they face and concerns they have. We know from our own research that an imam very often has more authority and influence than almost anyone else to stop people being recruited into groups like Al Qa'ida. We also recognise the important part that management committees play in mosques, especially in advising the imam on his priorities and his role.
- 10.130 We judge that significant progress has been made by communities to equip faith leaders with the skills and the qualifications to reach out to young people vulnerable to radicalisation and recruitment. We support that process and want to continue to assist with it where it is appropriate for Government to do so. We believe that MINAB can play a role here alongside many other groups and look to its participating groups to clearly support *Prevent*.

- 10.131 We are aware that a very small number of faith-based organisations and institutions are overtly – or, more commonly, covertly – supporting terrorism. We will continue to take action against these entities and prosecute them when they have broken the law. A wider number of organisations and groups continue to express views which, though not illegal, are extreme and (as we have argued in the introduction to this review) can provide the building blocks for a fully-fledged terrorist ideology.
- 10.132 As we have explained above (pages 58-61), we want to continue to take action against these groups consistent with our principles of free speech and expression. We want to ensure that such groups cannot manipulate, mislead and take advantage of young people and that their views are subject to civic challenge and debate.
- 10.133 During the life-time of the revised strategy we will therefore:
- Seek a dialogue on security issues at local and national level with more faith groups and organisations. That dialogue will be one part of a broader exchange on a range of issues: security is important but it must not dominate;
 - Where it is appropriate to do so, support capacity-building proposals that better enable faith organisations to reach people who are vulnerable to grooming by terrorists;
 - Encourage faith groups and organisations to play a full role in local *Prevent* coordination groups;
 - Continue to support the dialogue between local policing and faith groups that has already significantly improved the handling of counter-terrorism issues. This must continue to be a two-way dialogue and it must not be dominated by a narrow focus only on *Prevent*;
 - Take law enforcement action when faith groups or other organisations are supporting terrorism and ensure that when they are expressing views we regard as extremist those views are subject to challenge and debate.

Health

Background

- 10.134 Healthcare in England includes a range of complex services delivered through many organisations. The National Health Service (NHS) spans primary care, acute hospital care, community and mental health care, dentistry, pharmacy and delivery of services such as prison health. 1.3 million NHS workers have contact with over 315,000 patients daily and some 700,000 workers in private and voluntary healthcare organisations see many thousands more.
- 10.135 Healthcare professionals may meet and treat people who are vulnerable to radicalisation. People with mental health issues or learning disabilities (such as Nicky Reilly and Andrew Ibrahim, separately convicted in 2009 for terrorist-related offences) may be more easily drawn into terrorism. We also know that people connected to the healthcare sector have taken part in terrorist acts in the past.
- 10.136 The key challenge for the healthcare sector is to ensure that, where there are signs that someone has been or is being drawn into terrorism, the healthcare worker can interpret those signs correctly, is aware of the support which is available and is confident in referring the person for further support. Preventing someone from becoming a terrorist or from supporting

terrorism is substantially comparable to safeguarding in other areas, including child abuse or domestic violence.

Activity to date

- 10.137 Until recently, there was no *Prevent* programme in the health sector. Since January 2010, *Prevent* has been piloted in nine Strategic Health Authority regions in England, in areas such as mental health, primary care, drug and alcohol programmes, prison health and school nursing. In these pilot regions, the Department of Health has issued guidance and a toolkit for frontline workers and training for some 700 people.⁸⁷ A consultation by the Department in September 2010 showed that health practitioners had little or no prior knowledge of *Prevent*.
- 10.138 Across the sector, regional *Prevent* coordinators work closely with other local delivery partners to ensure the health contribution to the *Prevent* strategy is coordinated with wider activity. The roll-out of *Prevent* is improving channels of communication between the health sector and the police, as well as other cross-agency links.
- 10.139 There are some 12,000 students training for health qualifications within universities each year. Work has started to ensure that *Prevent* is included in the undergraduate curriculum. Current activity needs to be extended to cover the premises where university clinical training takes place within the healthcare estate.
- 10.140 The Department of Health has already made links with the Charity Commission and the National Council of Voluntary Organisations to enable further training. This is important given that the White Papers which outline the future provision of commissioning in the health sector open up opportunities for all private and voluntary health care organisations to deliver NHS care alongside NHS organisations. At the time of writing, these papers were out for consultation.⁸⁸
- 10.141 Since the launch of the Department of Health's guidance and toolkit in December 2009, there has been an increasing shift in the regional management of *Prevent* towards the safeguarding and nursing areas. This has facilitated take up and familiarisation. Situating *Prevent* within safeguarding will ensure it continues regardless of future changes to NHS organisational structures. It is also in line with wider attempts to mainstream *Prevent* in other sectors.
- 10.142 The Department of Health has also supported the review of the 'No Secrets' guidance on safeguarding adults.⁸⁹ This will embed the principles of *Prevent* within existing processes for safeguarding vulnerable adults and enable healthcare workers across the country to understand the parallels between *Prevent* and existing support and intervention processes.

⁸⁷ Department of Health (2009), *Building Partnerships, Staying Safe - Prevent Guidance and Toolkit for Healthcare Organisations and Prevent Guidance and Toolkit for Healthcare Workers*.

⁸⁸ Department of Health (2010), *Liberating the NHS: Legislative Framework and Next Steps*. London: Department of Health.

⁸⁹ Department of Health (2000), *No Secrets: Guidance on developing and implementing multi-agency policies and procedures to protect vulnerable adults from abuse*. London: Department of Health. See also Department of Health (2011), *Safeguarding Adults - The Role of NHS Commissioners*. London: Department of Health; Department of Health (2011), *Safeguarding Adults - The Role of Health Service Managers and their Boards*. London: Department of Health; Department of Health (2011), *Safeguarding Adults - The Role of Health Service Practitioners*. London: Department of Health.

Next steps

- 10.143 Given the very high numbers of people who come into contact with health professionals in this country, the sector is a critical partner in *Prevent*. There are clearly many opportunities for doctors, nurses and other staff to help protect people from radicalisation. The key challenge is to ensure that healthcare workers can identify the signs that someone is vulnerable to radicalisation, interpret those signs correctly and access the relevant support.
- 10.144 In common with other sectors, uptake of *Prevent* in the health sector has not always been consistent. This has been partly due to the unfamiliarity of the subject matter and partly because early training was not always appropriate. ACPO's internal 2010 review of *Prevent* policing has also identified issues regarding information sharing in the sector.
- 10.145 The Department of Health will need to ensure that the crucial relationship of trust and confidence between patient and clinician is balanced with the clinician's professional duty of care and their responsibility to protect wider public safety. Where a healthcare worker – be that a speech therapist, community psychiatric nurse or general practitioner – encounters someone who may be in the process of being radicalised towards terrorism, it is critical that the individual is offered the appropriate support. We believe that clear guidelines are needed for all healthcare managers and healthcare workers to ensure that cases of radicalisation whether among staff or patients are given the attention and care they deserve.
- 10.146 Evaluation of *Prevent* referrals in the health sector is improving but, as with other sectors, is incomplete. The Department of Health is addressing this issue.
- 10.147 Over the next year, the Department of Health will aim to deliver *Prevent* through those local organisations who manage mental health and offender health, prior to covering wider health communities such as primary care and hospitals. It is key that these organisations address *Prevent* through organisational governance and policies. Over the life-time of this strategy the Department will:
- develop knowledge and carry out awareness raising events for frontline workers in the public, private and voluntary health sectors;
 - strengthen work with partners such as BIS, to ensure that *Prevent* principles are properly embedded in university hospital trusts;
 - further develop awareness-raising and training products;
 - raise awareness of the parallels between *Prevent* and safeguarding guidance and procedures for adults and children to promote gradual mainstreaming of *Prevent*;
 - improve guidance of corporate governance policies and procedures to allow referrals and concerns to be raised with confidence; and
 - work with regional and local health organisations to expand support to Channel groups and other key partners to ensure that they have access to appropriate advice and support through healthcare interventions.

The criminal justice system

Prisons and probation

Background

- 10.148 There are 135 public-sector prisons in England and Wales, run through Her Majesty's Prison Service, and 11 prisons operated under contract by private sector organisations. About 85,000 people are held in these prisons at any one time, with 182,000 people received into prisons on remand or as sentenced prisoners each year.⁹⁰
- 10.149 35 Probation Trusts across England and Wales provide probation services, working with and for the communities in which they are based. The Trusts supervise approximately 240,000 offenders. Some are serving community or other non-custodial sentences; others are under pre-release or post-release supervision from prison.
- 10.150 Prisons and Probation Trusts are accountable to the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), an Executive Agency of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), for their performance and delivery. NOMS works to protect the public and reduce reoffending by delivering the punishment and orders of the courts and supporting rehabilitation by helping offenders to reform their lives.
- 10.151 As of 30 September 2010, there were 111 prisoners held in relation to terrorism or extremism. Of these 111, 74 are associated with offences linked to Al Qa'ida or groups influenced by Al Qa'ida. They include high profile and influential people, some with a track record of radicalisation and recruitment.⁹¹ It is important to note that there are a number of other people serving prison sentences for non-terrorism-related offences who, prior to their arrest, are also known to have been engaged in terrorist-related activity.
- 10.152 Terrorist offenders are located and managed in accordance with their security categorisation, which for many, but not all, is Category A.⁹² Given the risks that terrorism and terrorism-related offenders may pose to the public and potentially to national security they are closely managed and supervised. All Category A prisoners are held in one of the eight high security prisons.
- 10.153 The number of terrorist offenders managed in the community has grown over the past three years as offenders have progressed through the custody into the post-release phase of their sentence. As of February 2011, there were 36 terrorist offenders managed under Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA). This statutory system requires probation, prison, police and others to work together in managing the offender. The licence conditions imposed on terrorist offenders on release from prison reflect the particular risks that they may present.
- 10.154 Over the next four years, 34 terrorism-related prisoners may reach their release dates. It is therefore vital that the transition of these individuals into the community, and their supervision and management, ensures the risks they may post are effectively managed and minimised.

⁹⁰ NOMS Business Plan 2011-12.

⁹¹ Home Office (2011), *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stop and searches, Quarterly update to September 2010, Great Britain*. London: Home Office. Available from: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/hosb0411/

⁹² There are four prisoner security categories used to classify every adult prisoner (A-D). The categories are based upon the severity of the crime and the risk posed should the person escape. Category A prisoners are those whose escape would be highly dangerous to the public or national security.

Prisons, probation and Prevent

- 10.155 We know that some people who have been convicted and imprisoned for terrorist-related offences have sought to radicalise and recruit other prisoners. We also know that some people who have been convicted for non-terrorism-related offences but who have previously been associated with extremist or terrorist networks have engaged in radicalising and recruitment activity while in prison. The extent to which radicalisation which takes place in prison will endure beyond the confines of the prison environment is not yet clear.
- 10.156 There is a range of research on the issue of managing terrorist prisoners, including on radicalisation and recruitment in prisons, though less so in the probation system.⁹³ The literature reflects experiences around the world, indicating that this is not a challenge confined to this country or even to western Europe but is faced by all states who have detained or prosecuted people for terrorist offences, notably (but not only) offences relating to terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida.⁹⁴
- 10.157 Recent research has found that, while radicalisation is a live and important issue to both prisoners and staff, it is rarely witnessed.⁹⁵ Radicalisers use a variety of means to persuade and influence, including coercion and intimidation. This is true in prisons as in other environments. In prisons, it is not always clear where observable behaviours are indicative of radicalisation or other prisoner behaviours, such as the formation of alliances as coping mechanisms, bullying or criminal association.⁹⁶
- 10.158 Careful judgments are therefore required to accurately assess the extent of radicalisation in prisons and then to find ways to mitigate it. As the Chief Inspector of Prisons has commented, there are risks if we view Muslim prisoners principally through a 'security lens'.⁹⁷ We know that extremists can play on a sense of grievance to reinforce their messages.
- 10.159 The experience of a criminal conviction and spending time in prison can lead some people to take a closer interest in religion than they had before.⁹⁸ Religion can help them change their lives for the better.⁹⁹ However, as people who convert may initially be less well-informed about their faith, they may be vulnerable to overtures from radicalisers who seek to impress a distorted version of theology upon them.¹⁰⁰
- 10.160 Prisons also offer an opportunity for disengagement from terrorism and extremism through the severing of links with extremist peers and networks, the opportunity to re-evaluate identity

⁹³ Disley, E. et al (forthcoming), *Individual disengagement from violent extremist groups - A Rapid Evidence Assessment*. London: Home Office Publications.

⁹⁴ For an overview, see Neumann P. (2010), *Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and Deradicalisation in 15 Countries*. London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. pp. 26-31.

⁹⁵ Liebling, A. (forthcoming), *An Exploration of Staff-Prisoner Relationships at HMP Whitemoor: Twelve Years On*.

⁹⁶ Alison Liebling's report highlights the challenge for prison staff of differentiating between outward manifestations of faith on the one hand and indicators of radicalisation on the other.

⁹⁷ HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (2010), *Muslim prisoners' experiences: A thematic review*. London: HMCIP. Available from www.justice.gov.uk/inspectorates/hmi-prisons/docs/Muslim_prisoners_2010_rps.pdf

⁹⁸ Neumann P. (2010), *Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and Deradicalisation in 15 Countries*. London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. pp. 26-31.

⁹⁹ The positive effects of conversion are portrayed in Hamm, M. (2009), *Prison Islam in the age of Sacred Terror*. *The British Journal of Criminology*. 49 (5) Liebling, A. (forthcoming), *An Exploration of Staff-Prisoner Relationships at HMP Whitemoor: Twelve Years On*.

¹⁰⁰ The Liebling research found that prisoners (including recent converts) were ignorant and confused about the Islamic faith and those with extremist views could fill this gap with misinformation and misinterpretation.

and direction and engagement with others (staff and prisoners) which can challenge ideas previously held about terrorism and violence.

Activity to date

- 10.161 Since 2007, HM Prison Service and latterly NOMS have developed and implemented an extremism programme which contributes to *Prevent*, funded in part by OSCT.
- 10.162 Significant training has been provided to prison staff about *Prevent* and terrorism-related issues. In some areas (for example, permitted literature and the management of Friday prayers) policy has been amended to reflect *Prevent* risks. Information and intelligence gathering and sharing in prisons is now better able to address the challenges posed by terrorist prisoners, including radicalisation. A network has been established to coordinate, analyse and disseminate information and intelligence. Coordination (including information handling) with probation and policing has substantially improved.
- 10.163 NOMS have used existing offender management interventions to manage some *Prevent* issues. These interventions address faith, education, resettlement, location in the prison system and specific factors identified as relevant to an individual's behaviour and offending history. Interventions may be delivered by prison or probation staff or other organisations including those from the third sector.
- 10.164 NOMS has researched what additional provision is required to help staff intervene with radicalised offenders or those who may be susceptible to radicalisation. Some of these programmes involve what is best described as de-radicalisation and address challenges which are very often unique to the post-conviction prison environment. Other programmes more strictly deal with counter-radicalisation and bear some similarity to the programmes set out above.
- 10.165 Three new interventions developed by NOMS (drawing on their research and existing experience in offender management) target some of the likely drivers for terrorism and are currently running in four prisons and six Probation Trusts. Two are suitable for all types of extremist ideology and also for gang-related offenders. The other is specifically targeted at beliefs and ideology related to Al Qa'ida. Following assessment, national implementation is planned in 2012.
- 10.166 NOMS also works with OSCT-funded intervention providers (see above, pages 74-81) to whom offenders may be referred, either during the course of the prison phase of their sentence, or as part of their management in the community.
- 10.167 Chaplains provide important pastoral support in prisons: the number of Muslim chaplains has increased in recent years in response to the growth in the Muslim prisoner population. They are also well placed to play a key role in theological aspects of terrorist ideology. NOMS has piloted and is implementing an educational programme about Islam, which teaches spiritual values and contains modules on topics such as maintaining family ties, forgiveness, and interaction with people of other faiths. The programme is intended to help Muslim prisoners understand their faith and to better enable them to resist extremist arguments and ideology. In some areas, community chaplains also provide support to offenders on probation in the community.

Next steps

- 10.168 Over the last few years, the NOMS extremism programme has made some progress against key objectives. The *Prevent* strategy is more widely known and understood amongst key groups

of staff, reporting of suspected extremism and radicalisation in prisons is well established and significant work has been undertaken to improve the management of these risks within the offender management system.

- 10.169 In the key area of interventions – working through bespoke programmes to stop prisoners supporting terrorism – progress has been slower. This is partly because such interventions, in and out of prisons, are still being developed and there is no proven methodology which can be scaled up to manage the risks. Although there has been a great deal of work to understand lessons from other countries, it rarely offers a template for our work here (and in some cases their success may be overstated). But the effect in prisons has been that interventions have only reached a small proportion of the target prison population and have not kept pace with the number of Terrorism Act 2006 (TACT) offenders who have been released. We note that existing programmes and other tactical measures have also been used with those terrorist offenders who have already been released. But there remains a significant risk that prison fails to enable terrorist prisoners to re-evaluate the views which led to their offence and conviction.
- 10.170 There is also more to do to ensure that *Prevent* is embedded in the work of all prisons and Probation Trusts and *Prevent* concerns are managed seamlessly across prisons and probation.
- 10.171 Evaluation of impact has been an issue in other areas of *Prevent* and it partly reflects the difficulty of assessing behavioural and cognitive change. Building a knowledge base requires time to assess change and sufficient numbers of cases to draw conclusions. But this will also need to be addressed going forward. Wherever possible, the methods used for evaluation of NOMS interventions need to be coordinated with methods developed for use outside the offender management system (see above, pages 74-81).
- 10.172 Further research is required by the *Prevent* community to support NOMS' work, in particular on:
- the extent and endurance of radicalising influences experienced in prison after individuals are released; and
 - understanding of the impact of both offender management processes and the offender environment, on violent extremism, radicalisation and vulnerable individuals.
- 10.173 Over the lifetime of this strategy, and in cooperation with partner agencies NOMS will:
- implement screening tools, and the extremist assessment guidance, designed to assist staff to better assess and prevent extremist and terrorist offending and identify suitable interventions and management strategies;
 - significantly scale up targeted counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation interventions in prisons and in communities during the licence phase of a sentence;
 - establish closer connections between NOMS programmes and wider interventions to support vulnerable people;
 - develop research about measures which can mitigate radicalisation, and extremist and terrorist offending;

- update instructions to prisons on managing and reporting on extremist behaviours in custody;
- continue provision of training to prisons and probation staff; and
- replace local prison information and intelligence systems with a national system networked across the prison estate, which will significantly enhance prison information and intelligence management and build a better picture of the extent of radicalisation in prisons.

Young offenders and youth justice

Background

- 10.174** The Youth Justice Board (YJB) was established by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and has been responsible for oversight of the youth justice system in England and Wales. It has advised Ministers on the operation of, and standards for, the youth justice system; monitored performance, notably of Youth Offending Teams (YOTs); and purchased places for, and placed, children and young people remanded or sentenced to custody.
- 10.175** YOTs are multi-agency teams involving representatives from the education sector, police and probation, the health sector and Children's Services. YOTs deal with young people from the age of 10-17 both before and after they have offended. In October 2010, the Government announced its intention to abolish the YJB and transfer its key functions into MoJ. YOTs will continue to exist with the YJB's oversight function transferring to the MoJ.
- 10.176** Young people in the criminal justice system, or on the edge of it, are likely to be the most socially excluded and disadvantaged and can be vulnerable to a number of influences, including radicalisation.

Activity to date

- 10.177** In 2007, some youth offending practitioners in London, the Midlands and West Yorkshire, and in secure establishments, began to report that some young people were showing signs of extremist behaviour or were already in the process of being radicalised. Some areas requested assistance.
- 10.178** OSCT subsequently funded 53 projects in YOTs and the secure estate (the institutions where young offenders are housed). The projects aimed to protect vulnerable young people and provided interventions at all stages of the youth offending system from pre-offending through to young people who had been convicted and those that are in custody. Although funding was committed in 2007, most projects did not start until mid-2008 and some of them were not underway until 2009. A substantial amount of training was provided.
- 10.179** The YJB interventions fell into three categories: universal (those which included a whole community or group, for example, all pupils in a particular school year or all young people in a particular community), prevention (those interventions directed at young people who had not yet offended but were at risk of offending) and targeted (directed at young people already in the criminal justice system who were deemed vulnerable to radicalisation).
- 10.180** The more targeted work focused on issues of alienation, identity and belonging and provided education (including on faith matters). Projects ranged from targeted mentoring to debates,

large-scale community events and sessions in schools. There was some attempt to include support for parents. Ideology and grievances were covered across the majority of projects.

- 10.181 Since 2009, young people have accessed the different programmes nearly 17,000 times. Initially, projects were run in areas identified by OSCT, DCLG and the YJB as potential hot-spots. The majority of projects were run by staff in the YOT or the secure estate. Some were run by community organisations.
- 10.182 In 2008, the YJB, working with OSCT, commissioned the University of Huddersfield to evaluate this work. Early findings suggest the emphasis on Al Qa'ida and, by extension, Muslim communities made project managers and others uneasy and, ultimately, delayed the start of the work. There was also a perceived lack of clarity of what was needed and a strong emphasis on cohesion or integration-type work. However, the research also found that young people who had been through these projects judged them to be helpful against *Prevent* objectives.
- 10.183 The University of Huddersfield have noted that all of the projects found it difficult to measure impact. We have noted similar problems in other areas of *Prevent*. Practitioners reported that they had difficulty in 'measuring the distance travelled' by young people before and after an intervention had taken place. Many projects relied on participant feedback: this tends not to be a reliable measure. One project sought to develop a psychometric tool for measuring impact but this required considerable resource.
- 10.184 In October 2010, funding ceased for 33 projects assessed by OSCT and the YJB to be focusing on cohesion-type issues. The remaining 20 projects focused more on de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation. In the future, services of this kind will be made available through YOTs across the country, with a focus on priority areas. YOTs will utilise standardised risk assessment procedures and will have access to community-based support projects and other interventions providers through Channel.

Next steps

- 10.185 We believe that work to support young offenders and people vulnerable to offending is critical to the long-term success and credibility of *Prevent*. We judge that future work should be focused on ensuring that front-line members of staff are trained to recognise the signs of radicalisation and are aware of the support available to them. This should include a robust understanding of the referral process and the existence and nature of interventions that may be available through a range of providers, including Channel. The YJB and MoJ will work to ensure that any high risk young person that comes to the notice of the youth justice sector will be identified and offered appropriate support.
- 10.186 In common with many other areas of work, we consider that OSCT should have provided greater clarity on what was required from the outset from the YJB interventions and exercised greater and more consistent levels of oversight and monitoring. Many of the problems identified by the University of Huddersfield could have been overcome with greater clarity from the outset.
- 10.187 A greater emphasis on localism and a reduction in control from the centre has changed the nature of the youth justice landscape. Future work in this area will therefore need to be focused on supporting YOTs to develop their services locally according to local need. As current YJB

functions become incorporated into MoJ, consideration must be given as to how this strategy can best be implemented.

The charitable sector

Background

- 10.188 Over 180,000 charities are registered with the Charity Commission in England and Wales. They have an annual income of over £53 billion, assets of a further £52 billion, over 750,000 paid staff and almost 900,000 trustee positions. There are about 80,000 charities which do not have to register because they are very small or because they are 'exempt' or 'excepted'.¹⁰¹
- 10.189 The charitable sector is diverse and ranges from local village halls to national arts organisations to international disaster relief charities. Legitimate charities provide mechanisms for constructive debate and social action to build a strong civil society. Charities can be an important protection against extremism and terrorism.
- 10.190 The Charity Commission is a non-Ministerial Government Department and the independent regulator with responsibility for overseeing the charitable sector. It has both a compliance and enforcement function intended to protect charities from abuse.
- 10.191 Charity law (the Charities Act 2006) requires that charities are established and operate for charitable purposes and for the public benefit. Charities by definition are outward-facing and inclusive, not inward-looking or for private benefit. They should not be exclusive 'clubs' that only a few can join. If a charity – such as a student society – runs a debate or education forum that excludes people and is only open to members of a particularly exclusive group this could be judged to be in breach of charity law requirements. Speaker events must have the public benefit in mind.
- 10.192 Where charities place restrictions on the extent to which the public can benefit from their work, the Commission can take regulatory action to ensure compliance – and can ultimately take action against defaulting trustees.
- 10.193 Charity law contains provisions about how a charity should raise and use funds. These are important to countering terrorism, and *Prevent* more specifically, because they help ensure that funds are not misused.
- 10.194 Where a charity is suspected of criminal (including terrorist) activity, it will be referred by the Charity Commission to law enforcement agencies. Any allegations or concerns about abuse of a charity or of charitable funds are dealt with under the Charity Commission's compliance function. The Commission has its own asset freezing powers and regulatory action which can be used to inhibit the flow of funds. Use of these powers must be justified by the evidence to the standards set out in civil law.

¹⁰¹ Under the Charities Act 2006, only charities with an income of over £5,000 per year must register with the Charity Commission. Certain types of charities are 'excepted' if their income is below £100,000 per year (although this income threshold may be reduced over time). They do not have to register with the Commission but do have to comply with charity law and are regulated by the Commission. This means that the Charity Commission can require them to provide information about their activities and investigate them if they consider that there is cause for concern. 'Exempt' charities are not required to register with the Charity Commission, and the Charity Commission is not their regulator, because they are supervised by another regulator (such as the higher education sector for which the main regulator is HEFCE).

10.195 Trustees play a critical role in monitoring the activities of charities. Charity law places clear obligations on trustees to ensure that finances are used appropriately, prudently, lawfully and in accordance with their purposes. Where trustees are in breach of these obligations, civil and criminal sanctions can follow.

Activity to date

- 10.196 Charities can be formed to raise funds often under false pretences for terrorist groups, in this country or overseas. More specifically, charities can also raise and move funds for the wider purposes of enabling radicalisation and recruitment activity. Of the Charity Commission's total caseload of 180 investigations in 2009-10, 11 investigations followed allegations or suspicions of terrorist-related activities. Eight of these terrorism-related investigations were completed during the year.
- 10.197 The Charity Commission has provided support and regulatory guidance which sets out the implications for charities of the UK's counter-terrorism legislation and highlights the Commission's expectations of charity trustees in complying with their obligations under counter-terrorism and charity law.¹⁰²
- 10.198 But charities can also play a key part in *Prevent*. Some charities can address grievances – such as improving access to basic facilities in developing countries or providing English-language training to facilitate better employment opportunities – which can otherwise be manipulated to draw people towards extremist and terrorist organisations. Civil society, of which charities are a key part, is also a critical place for free exchange of views and the debate which can inhibit the activities of propagandists for extremism and terrorism.
- 10.199 Charitable status can also provide a basis for the good governance of faith institutions, schools, student unions and (indirectly through HEFCE) universities whose role in *Prevent* can be important.
- 10.200 In the context of work to build the capacity of mosques, the Charity Commission has worked closely with DCLG and MINAB to help ensure that the finances of UK mosques are transparent and less vulnerable to abuse by terrorists and to encourage mosques to adopt charitable status. In October 2007, 331 mosques were registered with the Charity Commission. In 2009, 650 mosques had registered or had submitted applications to register.
- 10.201 The Charity Commission has investigated extremist activities, literature and speakers at charity premises and events in both religious organisations and student unions. Its regulatory intervention has, for example, ensured that trustees take greater responsibility for a planned event and decided themselves not to allow a particular speaker to attend. Where necessary, the Commission can use its legal powers to prevent charity money being used to support inappropriate activities and take action against trustees who deliberately ignore their responsibilities under charity law. This action can include suspension.

¹⁰² Charity Commission (2011), *Compliance Toolkit: protecting charities from harm (the 'compliance toolkit')*. London: Charity Commission. See Chapter 1: Charities and Terrorism. Available from: www.charitycommission.gov.uk/Our_regulatory_activity/Counter_terrorism_work/protecting_charities_landing.aspx

Next steps

- 10.202 As part of the Charity Commission's regulatory work, they will continue to carry out investigations into individual charities including where allegations of terrorist activity or links arise. We believe it is critical that, where criminal behaviour, including terrorism, is suspected, the Charity Commission must refer these cases immediately to the police and, where appropriate, to the Serious Fraud Office.
- 10.203 It is vital to the Charity Commission's credibility that their relationship with wider law enforcement bodies is seen to be seamless and effective. The Charity Commission must be seen to be capable of taking robust and vigorous action against charities that are involved in terrorist activity or have links to terrorist organisations.
- 10.204 The wider role of the Charity Commission in *Prevent* is also important. But we do not think it has been fully explored and considered as an issue in its own right, separate from the Charity Commission's role in counter-terrorism more broadly. We need to take this forward as a priority.

Overseas

- 10.205 We noted above (pages 52-54) that *Prevent* work overseas should wherever possible have the same objectives as *Prevent* work in this country. But we also noted the need for rigorous prioritisation and that projects funded by the FCO should have demonstrable impact on the UK security wherever possible.
- 10.206 It is clear that some sectors overseas – notably education and faith – can have a significant impact on radicalisation (positive and negative) not only in third countries but also here: a university or a madrassah overseas attended by many UK students would be one example.
- 10.207 It also seems clear that many of the sectors in this country which we want to support and where radicalisation may be taking place will have their own links overseas.
- 10.208 But much more work is needed to understand these connections and their relevance to and impact on *Prevent* and then to intervene where it is possible to do so in conjunction with the Government concerned. This work has not been systematically done before. It will now be led by the FCO with input from DfID wherever possible.
- 10.209 Programmes run overseas by DfID can help to build accountable and legitimate Government institutions with the capacity to deliver the core functions of the state, including security and justice, economic opportunities, and basic services such as education. There is some evidence that institution building of this sort can help *Prevent*.¹⁰³ We acknowledge that this is somewhat different from the other work outlined in this objective but recognise the contribution it can make in this area.

¹⁰³ Centre for Universal Education (2010) *Beyond Madrassas: Assessing the Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan*. Working Paper No. 2, June 2010. Brookings Institution, Centre for Universal Education.

11. *Prevent delivery*

Summary

This section explains how Prevent will be implemented in the future.

It describes the structures that are in place to ensure effective coordination, oversight and accountability and outlines how we will strengthen them. Prevent will be coordinated from and by OSCT in the Home Office and the Home Secretary will be the lead Minister.

We explain here the new arrangements and structures that we will put in place for the local delivery of Prevent and the partnerships which will be the basis for success. In future, Prevent will be prioritised according to the risks we face and not (as has been the case in the past) on the basis of demographics. This is a significant development. The 25 priority areas are listed here. We expect these areas to change over time.

The role of policing has been important in the development of Prevent to date. Prevent is not, however, a police programme and it must not become one: it depends on a wide range of organisations in and out of Government. Some changes to the police role in Prevent are essential to enhance confidence in the programme. But we judge that one of the effects of Prevent to date has been the improvement in understanding and cooperation between police and communities in this country on a range of issues, including security.

We anticipate that there will continue to be three main areas of Prevent funding: local authority work in association with communities; policing; and work overseas. The funding for the first two areas will be provided by the Home Office. The funding for the third will come through the FCO. The balance between funding in these areas will be constantly reviewed.

It has been a theme in this review that evaluation and performance monitoring have been weak in Prevent and they must now be improved. Data collection has been inadequate. It has not always been possible to understand what funding has been used for, or what impact projects have had.

This section also explains how Prevent has been delivered by devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales.

Introduction

- 11.1 In section 6 of this review we considered issues regarding delivery of a new *Prevent* strategy. We said that, as part of our national counter-terrorism strategy, *Prevent* would need to be developed and coordinated by the Home Office in conjunction with other Government Departments but delivered through local authorities, statutory organisations, policing and a wide range of community organisations. We also indicated that *Prevent* funding for local authorities (both posts and projects) would have to be much more tightly defined and directed.
- 11.2 This section of the review considers delivery issues in more detail.

Governance

- 11.3 The Home Secretary is responsible for the UK's counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. OSCT works to the Home Secretary and is responsible for overall development and evaluation of the strategy. The National Security Council has a key role in assessing the progress and direction of counter-terrorist work in general, including *Prevent* and has approved this strategy.
- 11.4 OSCT in the Home Office is responsible in particular for developing and coordinating the delivery of *Prevent*. OSCT will: ensure that the objectives and programmes of the strategy are appropriate; coordinate with other central Government Departments engaged in *Prevent*; liaise with local authorities on *Prevent* delivery and funding issues; cooperate with community groups of all kinds with *Prevent* interests; commission *Prevent*-related research, responding to demand by other *Prevent* partners; provide information, training materials and best practice; liaise with international partners; and evaluate *Prevent* progress and performance.
- 11.5 Other Government Departments will continue to have their own *Prevent* teams responsible for delivery of their contribution to the strategy.

Accountability

- 11.6 In Parliament, the Home Affairs Committee, the Communities and Local Government Select Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee have all taken a close interest in aspects of *Prevent* in the past.
- 11.7 Locally, *Prevent* work is accountable to elected councillors and will need to be discussed and considered by the police with new Police and Crime Commissioners. The Government has encouraged Members of Parliament to engage closely with this agenda.
- 11.8 We believe that *Prevent* would benefit from greater scrutiny and increased levels of independent oversight. For that reason, we intend also to establish a non-executive *Prevent* board to oversee the *Prevent* strategy and its local implementation. There will also be scope to look at DCLG's ongoing work to promote integration and tackle extremism.
- 11.9 The board will be permanent, with strong, independent membership, but not statutory. Reflecting the importance of local partnerships – and recognising the important connections between *Prevent* and the wider work referred to above – it will be jointly chaired by the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. Membership of the board is still under consideration.

Local delivery

- 11.10 The Home Office will fund dedicated *Prevent* coordinators in local areas of particular importance to coordinate local delivery. Funding will be subject to a grant agreement setting out a clear set of focused activities which the post is designed to support. Local authorities will decide how the role should best be integrated into their own organisation structure.
- 11.11 Under the last strategy, most local authority areas in England developed a partnership structure to facilitate *Prevent* delivery.¹⁰⁴ Some areas created a group specifically focused on *Prevent*, while others used existing crime reduction partnerships or another local multi-agency strategic structure. We expect all local areas to have a partnership tasked to take forward work on *Prevent* using the most appropriate structure in their area and to a level which is proportionate to local risk.
- 11.12 Wherever possible, the partnership should comprise social services, policing, children's services, youth services, UKBA, representatives from further and higher education, probation services, schools, local prisons, health and others as required by local need. Partnership working should not be restricted by local authority area boundaries. In the past, local authorities have worked together effectively, sometimes sharing and pooling resources. We encourage greater levels of partnership working between local authorities and partners in future.
- 11.13 We expect partnerships to have in place:
- appropriate accountability, monitoring and evaluation, oversight and commissioning arrangements; and
 - an agreed delivery plan based on the three *Prevent* objectives, particularly ensuring that a process is in place to protect vulnerable individuals.
- 11.14 Local authorities need to be able to draw on information to ensure that they understand the local risks which *Prevent* is intended to address. We continue to believe that CTLPs (drafted by the police) are the right means for distributing information from policing to authorities. Recognising their classified nature, we encourage distribution of these documents to key *Prevent* partners.

Prioritisation

- 11.15 In future, simple demographics will not be used as the basis for prioritising *Prevent* work. A new prioritisation process will aggregate different information and policing indicators of terrorist activity to understand areas where *Prevent* work needs to be prioritised. We recognise that these indicators are developing and that they do not yet take account of all terrorist risks. Prioritisation will be the responsibility of OSCT and will be regularly reviewed.
- 11.16 For 2011/12, following an analysis of all local authority areas across the UK, the 25 priority areas are as follows (listed in alphabetical order):
- Barking and Dagenham
 - Birmingham
 - Blackburn with Darwen

¹⁰⁴ As of September 2010, local *Prevent* progress monitoring collated via the Government Offices indicated that 100% of the 94 local authority funded areas and 85% of the remaining areas had a *Prevent* partnership in place.

- Bradford
- Brent
- Camden
- Derby
- Ealing
- Hackney
- Hammersmith and Fulham
- Haringey
- Kensington and Chelsea
- Lambeth
- Leeds
- Leicester
- Lewisham
- Luton
- Manchester
- Newham
- Redbridge
- Stoke-on-Trent
- Tower Hamlets
- Waltham Forest
- Wandsworth
- Westminster

11.17 Funding will be made available by the Home Office to the 25 priority areas for project work on a grant basis and for activities which address specific local risks and are designed to establish specific Prevent benefits. OSCT will have oversight of funding for projects and will work with local authorities to agree associated evaluation and monitoring procedures. All organisations provided with Prevent money should be able to prove that they are acting in the public interest (see above, pages 49-50).

Policing

- 11.18 The police have played a central and a vital role in implementing the last *Prevent* strategy. That contribution is reflected throughout this document in work to disrupt people engaged in radicalisation; in support to vulnerable people and the innovative Channel programme; and in work alongside and within key sectors, including education, health, the internet, criminal justice and with faith groups. Policing has played a galvanising role in developing local *Prevent* partnerships and bringing together a wide range of other organisations to support the strategy.
- 11.19 Central to police work has been a network of *Prevent* coordinators developed in 2008 at both regional and force level. This network has been supported by new *Prevent* Engagement Officers (PEOs) who connect counter-terrorism policing, neighbourhood policing and communities. PEOs have developed community contacts and an understanding of community issues; identified *Prevent*-related risks; generated *Prevent* projects and shared information with *Prevent* partners to support strategic objectives.
- 11.20 Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) form part of Neighbourhood policing teams and work with local communities to provide a visible police presence and build relationships with the public. PCSOs contribute to *Prevent* objectives by helping PEOs to build trust and confidence in policing and create stronger and safer communities.
- 11.21 In common with other areas of *Prevent*, we have found it hard to assess the overall impact of *Prevent* policing, although for some projects (for example Channel) that is easier than others (for example, support to *Prevent* work in schools). We note polling that indicates that Muslim respondents were more likely than the general population to give a positive appraisal of the police (excellent or good) and least likely to rate the police as 'poor' or 'very poor'.¹⁰⁵ We have seen no evidence that *Prevent* work has damaged police and Muslim community relations. We believe the evidence points in the opposite direction. The police and local communities are now talking to each other about the threat of terrorism – and ways to reduce it – in ways that would have been hard to imagine a few years ago.
- 11.22 A contributing factor to the trust built in communities has been the extent to which *Prevent* policing officers and staff have represented the communities they have served. In 2010, a staff survey revealed that over 30% of posts were of black or minority ethnicity. This compares to a national average of 4.6% for police officers and 7.4% for police staff.
- 11.23 On occasions, the police role in *Prevent* has been seen as disproportionate for a programme intended to deal with people who have not yet engaged in illegal activity. There have been allegations – to which we have referred several times in this review – that *Prevent* has been a pretext and means for spying on communities. In the course of this review, some police officers have expressed concern to us that at times they have been left taking responsibility for *Prevent* delivery in some local areas to an extent that they also find unwelcome.
- 11.24 In the early days of the programme, *Prevent* funding was used by forces to recruit *Prevent* Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officers (CTIOs) as well as PEOs. Of the 321 new dedicated *Prevent* police officers in 2008, 80 were CTIOs (67 of whom were funded by OSCT), distributed across 42 forces.

¹⁰⁵ Innes, M., Roberts, C. and Innes, H. (2011). *Assessing the effects of Prevent Policing*. Cardiff: Universities' Police Science Institute, Cardiff University. Available from: www.acpo.police.uk/documents/TAM/2011/PREVENT%20Innes%200311%20Final%20send%202.pdf

- 11.25 The role of CTIOs was to work alongside PEOs and neighbourhood policing teams, to inform and guide their community engagement and to determine how local police and partner resources should be focused to deal with any threats.
- 11.26 Using information in this way is a central, routine element of effective policing. Communities expect local police to act on the information that becomes available to deal with any risks. But the language used to describe this activity encouraged the view that the police may be engaged in covert (rather than overt) activity around *Prevent* which in turn undermined trust. To address these concerns, ACPO and OSCT ceased all future *Prevent* funding of CTIOs from the beginning of the 2011/12 financial year.
- 11.27 We have noted that funding for *Prevent* policing has been greater than funding for local authorities and that the police have very often been able to recruit more people to deliver *Prevent* than their local authority counterparts. To some degree (but not entirely), that explains the mismatch in burden sharing. It is also true that very often police officers were more familiar with counter-terrorism than others and therefore adapted faster to *Prevent*. We also note that some local authorities have been reluctant to engage in *Prevent*, in some areas reflecting concerns from elected councillors. We believe that this is changing but we are conscious that it remains an issue.
- 11.28 We regard *Prevent* as a programme which is not owned by policing but in which policing has a central role to play. *Prevent* must be a cross-Government and cross-community programme to meet its objectives. The changes made to this new *Prevent* strategy are intended to address objections to the proportionality of the strategy and the role of the police in it. We have also indicated above that we must keep under close review the balance of investment in policing against local authorities and communities.
- 11.29 But we are clear that policing has a key role in the delivery of aspects of all three of the objectives set out in this new strategy. We place particular priority on projects to disrupt terrorist and radicalising material on the internet and radicalisers working in this country; the further development of Channel-type projects; and stronger relationships with key sectors, including education, and with faith groups and organisations.
- 11.30 It is clearly essential that *Prevent* policing develops community trust. We have made clear that the allegations that *Prevent* is a pretext and means of spying undermine that trust. *Prevent* must not be used for this purpose.
- 11.31 Policing is not devolved in Wales. However, the police operate in a delivery landscape where a number of key delivery organisations are devolved. The Welsh Counter-Terrorism Unit (WECTU) works closely with the Welsh Assembly Government to oversee the implementation of *Prevent*.

Funding

- 11.32 The bulk of *Prevent* funding hitherto has been spent or distributed by three Government Departments: the Home Office (OSCT), DCLG and the FCO.
- 11.33 Home Office funding has been broadly divided into three areas: grants to other Government Departments and other related delivery partners (including for training); grants to police forces nationwide to pay for *Prevent* policing; and grants to local organisations for the delivery of

specific interventions work (notably in connection with Channel). Home Office total funding (including funding to the police) was £47 million in 2009/10; and £37 million in 2010/11. In 2011/12, the Home Office has allocated approximately £36 million for *Prevent* activity (including funding to the police).

11.34 In the past, OSCT has funded other Government Departments to deliver a range of different *Prevent* programmes and projects. This will continue. However, OSCT will be looking carefully at where Departments can mainstream *Prevent* into their core business. In many sectors, we are pleased to note that *Prevent* activity is happening without funding from central Government.

The distribution of the £24 million funding for *Prevent* policing in 2010/11 is illustrated below:

Percentage	Activity type	Examples
70%	Police officers and staff in forces and CTUs	<i>Prevent</i> Engagement officers working to develop community connections, understand communities, identify risks and share information with partners to support <i>Prevent</i> objectives.
15%	National coordination of <i>Prevent</i> by ACPO (TAM)	ACPO (TAM)'s <i>Prevent</i> Delivery Unit supports police forces with their contribution to <i>Prevent</i> by overseeing their delivery of ACPO's <i>Prevent</i> strategy, working with OSCT to allocate resources according to risk, building capability in forces to deliver <i>Prevent</i> activities, developing guidance to instil best practice and rolling out programmes to engage communities in <i>Prevent</i> events..
9%	Channel Coordinators	Channel coordinators lead multi-agency partnerships that evaluate referrals of individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism, and work alongside safeguarding partnerships and crime reduction panels to provide tailored support.
3%	Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit	A dedicated police unit to assess and investigate terrorism-related illegal internet content and take remedial action.
1%	Development of CTLPs and information sharing	The development of comprehensive assessments of threat, risk and vulnerability in local areas for sharing with police partners.
1%	Training and awareness raising	Developing and delivering police <i>Prevent</i> awareness-raising exercises such as Operation Nicole.
1%	Other activities focusing on engagement with vulnerable individuals	Activity aimed at Muslim communities, enabling discussions with the police and local partners around issues such as radicalisation, supporting vulnerable individuals and terrorism legislation.

11.35 The majority of DCLG funding was provided through the Area Based Grant to local authorities. This comprised £16.55 million in 2009/10 and £17.08 million in 2010/11. In 2009/10, DCLG also established a £3.2 million *Challenge and Innovation Fund* for local authorities not receiving the Area Based Grant. An additional £5.1 million national grant – the *Community Leadership Fund* – was intended to complement work being taken forward by local authorities, supporting leadership capacity within Muslim communities.

- 11.36 FCO funding for *Prevent* activity overseas was approximately £19 million in 2009/10 and around £17 million in 2010/11. Funding commitments for 2011/12 are currently £10 million.
- 11.37 DfID does not fund *Prevent* activities directly but its poverty reduction work contributes by tackling the drivers of instability overseas. The recently-completed Strategic Defence and Security Review sets out the Government's commitment to use 30% of Official Development Assistance to support fragile and conflict-affected states and tackle the drivers of instability.
- 11.38 Changes to funding have been detailed through this paper. We will be looking further at the balance of investment between the three main funding areas (overseas, policing and local authorities). We are providing precisely targeted and dedicated local authority funding for posts and projects.

Performance monitoring, evaluation and value-for-money

- 11.39 Performance monitoring and evaluation have been a weakness of the *Prevent* strategy. We cannot afford for that to continue.
- 11.40 In future, before funding is granted, any proposed *Prevent* project will be more rigorously assessed against its ability and likelihood to deliver against *Prevent* objectives. That assessment must generally take into account the extent to which the project can reach the people who are vulnerable to radicalisation: they are a small minority. We will expect clear agreement on what is to be delivered. To better ensure value-for-money we will no longer be contributing to the operating costs of any organisation.
- 11.41 To justify funding on particular *Prevent* projects, it will be necessary not only to evaluate their likely impact but also to compare the cost and impact of different interventions achieving the same end. This will require additional research resources in support of the *Prevent* programme.
- 11.42 Progress and performance will be assessed according to the principles of the Government's Public Service Transparency Framework (PSTF). We are developing input and impact indicators across the whole of CONTEST that will help us assess the effect of what we do to reduce our vulnerability to terrorist attack. In line with the spirit of the PSTF to reduce reporting burdens, indicators will be based wherever possible on data which is already collected and used by contributing organisations. For security reasons, not all of these performance assessments will be published, but will be used to report to Ministers on progress and to ensure value for taxpayers' money.
- 11.43 For *Prevent*, we anticipate indicators around our efforts to challenge ideology and disrupt propagandists for terrorism; the effectiveness of interventions to support vulnerable individuals and work in and with sectors to deal with radicalisation. We will consider 'input' (such as number of individuals within interventions programmes or total expenditure on *Prevent* in a sector) and 'impact' (such as the number of individuals no longer assessed as being vulnerable or a reduction of risk within a particular geographical area or sector).
- 11.44 As in criminology, we will commission regular follow-up studies following preliminary evaluation of projects against specific indicators. We will commission research into issues arising from performance assessment.

- 11.45 Further work is required to quantify benefits from *Prevent*, both direct and indirect. Quantifying direct benefits will (for example) require estimates of the cost of terrorism and the estimated reduction in the probability of a terrorist event following *Prevent* interventions.
- 11.46 Overseas, the FCO will continue to review its framework for evaluating *Prevent* activity, which includes the capabilities of their DeTECT model, ensuring that it remains fit for purpose in the unpredictable and challenging environments in which the FCO operates.

Prevent delivery in the devolved administrations

Scotland

- 11.47 The approach to *Prevent* in Scotland has always made a distinction between preventing terrorism and community cohesion and integration. In Scotland, *Prevent* has been more closely aligned to those areas of policy that promote community safety, tackle crime and reduce violence. Agencies in Scotland have defined terrorism on the basis of the rule of Scottish law.
- 11.48 These first principles of *Prevent* have influenced delivery in Scotland and this has necessarily involved a different style and emphasis. The approach in Scotland could be summarised as follows:
- targeted and intelligence-led, informed by CTLPs with a focus on tackling the primary threats from violent extremists and terrorists;
 - deploying mainstreaming approaches to interventions with individuals identified assessed as most vulnerable to violent extremism or terrorism;
 - funding of activity rather than staff, by utilising existing organisations and partnership structures, and placing importance on a cost effective, shared services approach;
 - focussing on vulnerable institutions like prisons, universities and colleges and community groups in key areas;
 - delivering proportionate interventions in schools;
 - actively promoting links between *Prevent* and other elements of the CONTEST strategy; and,
 - establishing streamlined planning, delivery, monitoring and evaluation structures with a focus on impact and value-for-money.
- 11.49 The CONTEST Scotland Board, which oversees delivery of *Prevent* in Scotland, has played an active role with regard to the UK Government-led *Prevent* review and it has recently completed its own evaluation of *Prevent* delivery in Scotland. This review describes good progress made in key areas since 2008 with a number of national and local statutory and voluntary sector partners. It also confirms the need to progress with *Prevent* delivery in Scotland in future years.

Wales

- 11.50 In 1998, the Government of Wales Act 1998 was passed, allowing for the creation of the first National Assembly for Wales. Eight years later the Government of Wales Act 2006 was passed giving the Assembly the powers to pass Welsh Laws, known as Assembly Measures.
- 11.51 On 3 March 2011 a further referendum was held in which 63.7% voted for further law-making powers. In the future, the Welsh Assembly will be able to make laws in all the areas for which the Assembly Government has responsibility. The areas in which the Welsh Assembly will be able to pass its own legislation include several areas critical to *Prevent* delivery such as education, health, housing and local government.

Prevent in Wales

- 11.52 Historically, the Welsh Assembly Government's approach to *Prevent* has been firmly rooted in wider work to promote to community cohesion. Currently, *Prevent* is the responsibility of the Minister for Social Justice and Local Government. Work in this area is directed by the strategy 'Getting on Together: A Community Cohesion Strategy for Wales', which was launched in December 2009.

Governance

- 11.53 The Wales CONTEST Board was established in March 2008 to coordinate the implementation of all aspects of CONTEST in Wales, and is jointly chaired by ACPO Cymru and the Welsh Assembly Government.
- 11.54 All 22 Welsh Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) have set up *Prevent* sub-groups based on local authority boundaries. Their members are from a range of organisations – some of which are not devolved (the police, for example) and some which are (health, for example). Since 2009, the Home Office Crime Team Wales has worked closely with the CSPs to ensure that *Prevent* was delivered at a local level. In addition, the All Wales Community Safety Forum has undertaken the role of providing oversight of *Prevent* in Wales, helping to shape and take forward work discussed at the Wales CONTEST Board.

Activity in Wales

- 11.55 The Welsh Assembly Government has also directly funded in 2010 a number of *Prevent*-related initiatives such as Training and Awareness days, a Foundation course on Muslim thought and ethics for those in regular contact with significant numbers of Muslim young people, Muslim Chaplaincy training, support for the formation of the Council of Mosques and Muslim Organisations in Newport (COMMON) and workshops and conferences exploring extremist rhetoric with young people.
- 11.56 Wales has also run a Home Office-funded pilot scheme called Faith in the Future which supports Muslim prisoners in prison and on release. Faith in the Future has been established by a steering group consisting of NOMS Cymru, the Welsh Assembly Government and the Muslim Council of Wales.
- 11.57 In 2009, a grant was awarded to the Muslim Council of Wales to develop a three-year programme of work to build the capacity of mosques, as well as Muslim youth and women's organisations, with the overall aim of increasing the resilience of Muslim communities in Wales.

Funding

11.58 The Community Cohesion Fund (£5 million over three years) supports the implementation of the Community Cohesion Strategy for Wales. It has been allocated to all 22 local authorities in Wales and can be used to support activities that promote community cohesion or in tackling various forms of extremism. A Community Cohesion Grant has also been made available to the four most ethnically diverse local authorities in Wales (Cardiff, Swansea, Newport, and Wrexham) for three years from 2009-10. Each authority receives £150,000 over the three-year period. This money can be spent on cohesion or Prevent projects.

Northern Ireland

11.59 Under the Northern Ireland constitutional settlement, national security remains the sole responsibility of the UK Government. For the most part, UK-wide counter-terrorism legislation applies in Northern Ireland and remains the responsibility of the UK Government. However, following the devolution of policing and justice matters in April 2010, the Northern Ireland Minister of Justice is responsible for policing and criminal justice policy matters. In addition, most of the levers which are relevant to the work of *Prevent* are devolved and are the responsibility of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

11.60 In Northern Ireland, unlike the rest of the United Kingdom, the principal threat from terrorism comes from Northern Ireland-related terrorist groups. While the *Prevent* strategy does not directly apply to Northern Ireland-related terrorism, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland works closely with Ministers in the Northern Ireland Executive to counter the threat posed by these groups..

12. Annex A: Glossary of terms

Introduction

There are many terms and expressions used in discussion and debate about *Prevent*. This glossary sets out what we mean when we use a particular word or phrase. These definitions relate to *Prevent* and are not always authoritative in any wider context. Some of the more contentious, or most heavily-used, terms are listed below. We draw particular attention to the way in which this document uses the terms extremism, radicalisation and terrorism.

Glossary

Counter-radicalisation usually refers to activity aimed at a group of people intended to dissuade them from engaging in terrorism-related activity.

De-radicalisation usually refers to activity aimed at a person who supports terrorism and in some cases has engaged in terrorist related activity, which is intended to effect cognitive and/or behavioural change leading to a new outlook on terrorism and/or disengagement from it.

Disengagement in the context of this document is the process whereby an individual ceases to be involved terrorism.

Extremism is vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.

An **ideology** is a set of beliefs. An **ideologue** is a proponent as well as an adherent of an ideology.

An **insurgent** is an individual who fights against a government or an occupying force with the aim of overthrowing it.

Interventions are projects intended to divert people who are being drawn into terrorist activity. Interventions can include mentoring, counselling, theological support, encouraging civic engagement, developing support networks (family and peer structures) or providing mainstream services (education, employment, health, finance or housing).

Islamism is a philosophy which, in the broadest sense, promotes the application of Islamic values to modern government. There are no commonly agreed definitions of 'Islamism' and 'Islamist', and groups or individuals described as Islamist often have very different aims and views about how those aims might be realised.

Some militant Islamists would endorse violence or terrorism to achieve their aims. Many Islamists do not.

Prevention in the context of this document means reducing or eliminating the risk of individuals becoming involved in terrorism. *Prevent* involves the identification and referral of those susceptible to violent extremism into appropriate interventions. These interventions aim to divert the susceptible from embarking down the path to radicalisation.

Radicalisation refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism.

A **radicaliser** is an individual who encourages others to develop or adopt beliefs and views supportive of terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism.

Radicalising locations are venues, often unsupervised, where the process of radicalisation takes place. Locations include public spaces, for example university campuses and mosques, as well as private/more concealed locations such as homes, cafes, and bookstores.

Radicalising materials include literature or videos that are used by radicalisers to encourage or reinforce individuals to adopt a violent ideology. Some of this material may explicitly encourage violence. Other materials may take no avowed position on violence but make claims to which violence is subsequently presented as the only solution.

Resilience in the context of this document means the capability of people, groups and communities to rebut and reject proponents of terrorism and the ideology they promote.

Safeguarding is the process of protecting vulnerable people, whether from crime, other forms of abuse or (in the context of this document) from being drawn into terrorism-related.

The term **Single narrative** is sometimes used to refer to the particular interpretation of religion, history and politics that is associated with Al Qa'ida and like minded groups. The narrative connects 'grievances' at a local and/or global level, reinforces the portrayal of Muslims as victims of Western injustice and thereby purports to legitimise terrorism. It combines fact, fiction, emotion and religion and manipulates discontent about local and international issues. The single narrative is also sometimes known as the Al Qa'ida Narrative, the Grand Narrative or the Global Extremist Narrative.

The current UK definition of **terrorism** is given in the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT 2000). In summary this defines terrorism as an action that endangers or causes serious violence to a person/people; causes serious damage to property; or seriously interferes or disrupts an electronic system. The use or threat must be designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public and is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.

Vulnerability describes the condition of being capable of being injured; difficult to defend; open to moral or ideological attack. Within *Prevent*, the word describes factors and characteristics associated with being susceptible to radicalisation.

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